In Moscow's Shadows

In Moscow's Shadows 227: It's War! (within the emigre opposition, at least)

• Mark Galeotti • Episode 227

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A demilitarised zone that invites armoured cars. A referendum that can’t be fairly run. A €210 billion pot that solves today’s bills but complicates tomorrow’s peace. 

We start with shuttle diplomacy and the hard edges of a potential DMZ in Donetsk. On paper it pauses the fight; in practice Rosgvardiya blurs policing and militarisation, turning “demilitarised” into a loophole big enough for armour. We then map the constitutional and moral traps around wartime elections or referendums, where occupied voters, blocked monitors and legal grey zones collide with Kyiv’s need to navigate Washington without capitulating.

From there, we track Europe’s move to indefinitely freeze Russian sovereign assets and the push to spend them on Ukraine’s budget. It feels just and efficient, but invites Russian expropriations at home, lawfare against Euroclear, and counter‑seizures abroad. It also spends tomorrow’s reconstruction funds during the war, betting that weary voters will keep paying later. Meanwhile, Moscow counts manpower, energy pressure and US politics more than ledgers, so the deterrent effect may be modest.

The Ben Aris article I mention is at: https://www.intellinews.com/commnet-the-eu-s-reparation-loan-vote-needs-to-fail-416078/?source=russia 

Finally, to a Paris restaurant where a row between Garry Kasparov and Vladimir Kara‑Murza exposed a deeper rift inside the exile opposition. PACE’s platform and its Berlin Declaration have elevated some factions while sidelining Navalny’s network, creating gatekeepers and fresh grievances. The result is predictable: public spats, claims of capture by donors, and propaganda gifts to the Kremlin. The uncomfortable truth remains that Russia’s future will be authored inside Russia; exiles matter most when they support rather than splinter the constituencies that still exist at home.

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MG:

Are we any closer to peace on the Russia-Ukraine front? Maybe, maybe. But less on the Russian emigrant opposition front. Definitely not.

MG:

Hello, I'm Mark Galeotti, and welcome to my view of Russia 'In Moscow Shadows'. This podcast, of varying length, frequency, and format, yet always reassuringly low production values, is supported by generous and perspicacious patrons like you, and also by the Crisis Exercise software company Conducttr.

MG:

So we're back after a one-week hiatus, and before I start, let me just note that from this episode onwards, transcripts of the podcast ought to be available. They won't go up immediately because it takes time, because I'll have to go over them, as the speech recognition systems are by no means perfect, and well, a fair number of the words and names that will appear in this podcast will be opaque to it. But anyway, that obviously costs money, and thanks very much indeed to my patrons for their support. And if you find the transcripts useful, because I know some people, particularly for whom English is not their first language, may want to go back and sort of check something or whatever, well, if you find it useful, then obviously ideally join the cohort of patrons, as I said, because it does all cost me time and money. But if you don't, or just can't afford to, no problem, at least spare a kind thought for those who did.

MG:

Anyway, again, as usual, the first half will be bits and pieces responding to the last week or so of news. And then in the second half, I'm going to dive in to a rather otherwise unedifying conflict that's erupted within the anti-Putin emigre opposition movement and try and tease out some thoughts from that.

MG:

Anyway, let's talk about the peace process. And first of all, you know, your usual reminder that this is a process of shuttle diplomacy. So in other words, we can expect all kinds of back and forth meetings and constant redraftings and proposals of different plans and things. No one step is crucial until the last. So let's avoid, if we can, some of the hyperbole about the peace mission that failed and that Russia or Ukraine or Europe or whoever has refused the peace process. It's not. This is just about the fact that, as ever in Trump world, what would once have been ideally a behind the scenes process being handled behind closed doors by experts with all this back and forth revisions is now being played out very, very publicly. So that's just simply a reflection of the modern world rather than a reflection of the peace process.

MG:

One specific issue is to do with the current attempts to square the circle of that portion of Donetsk region that Putin keeps claiming and Zelensky, I'd be surprised if he could surrender: the idea that this could be turned into a demilitarized zone. And I just wanted to bring up one of the obvious pitfalls with that. I've just written a brief piece about this for the Spectator's Coffee House blog, which is Rosgvardiya, the National Guard. So let's say that indeed these territories, which include, after all, four so-called fortress cities, are handed over to the Russians with the clear understanding and presumably definite monitoring to ensure that Russia doesn't just simply send troops in so that it could use this as a springboard for further attacks deeper into the heartland of Ukraine. Well, Russian law enforcement is based around two institutions, certainly the execution of law enforcement, shall we say. That is the regular police under the Interior Ministry and also the National Guard. Because when the National Guard was created in 2016, essentially it took all the special, highly armed rapid response units, which usually support the police, and rolled them into Rosgvardiya. Now, if you allow Rosgvardiya into a DMZ, you're talking about a force that also includes armoured vehicles, tanks, and artillery. So either you're gonna have to start getting very granular saying, well, these bits of Rosgvardiya can go in, but these bits not, or else essentially you're letting Russia move an army in by another name. I mean, just one unit, the 1 st Operational Designation Division, the so- called Dzerzhinsky Division, I mean that's 15,000 troops. Or if you say no Rosgvardiya at all, then the Russians can quite legitimately say, look, we're facing the need to police cities which are going to be in a pretty considerable state of disruption. There's going to be included amongst them partisans who don't want to be under Russian rule, quite possibly also Ukrainian stay behind forces. Now, without the support of the sort of SWAT teams and the like, so called SOBR and the OMON [riot police], well, our police will really be at a serious disadvantage, and that's just not going to allow us to properly control this area. So, you know, again, demilitarizing might sound like a neat workaround, but there's all sorts of complexities in the detail. And that's the whole story of this peace process, is it's all very well to try and come up with broad principles, and in a way, that's what we're on at the moment. But remember, these broad principles are going to have to be operationalized, and that's going to take time.

MG:

Another of the sort of broad issues that have all kinds of devils in detail is the idea of either elections while it's still in a time of conflict in Ukraine, or indeed a referendum on territorial transfers. Now, as I say, I'm not convinced that a referendum is constitutionally necessary. Others, I'm sure, will know much more about the Ukrainian constitution than I. But if we're not talking about the legal transfer of territory to Russia, if we're just simply talking about recognition that at the moment these are occupied territories, even though they are still part of Ukraine as far as Kyiv is concerned, and that Kyiv commits to not using military means to try and take them back, I don't see how that breaches the constitution. But again, as I said, I may be missing something. But in any case, I think this is more than in more to be considered a gambit on the part of President Zelensky. Remember this sort of particular type of political jiu-jitsu he has to play. He can't just simply flat out and tell Donald Trump no to his face for the risk of, well, repeating the kind of bust-up we saw at the Oval Office, but also generally forcing Trump into withdrawing remaining support for Ukraine and in effect siding with Putin. So he has to basically say yes, but say yes in such a way that he throws up sufficient obstacles that it doesn't become an easy surrender to Trump's will, and hope that this buys him time to manage to get the peace process into a direction that he wants. So as I say, I don't think it's necessarily intended, but even if it is, what about all the various Ukrainian citizens who are still resident within the occupied territories? Now, Russia, for a start, will presumably consider these to be Russian citizens now, or temporary residents or some sort of similar formulation. In any case, Moscow is not likely to allow Ukraine to send as many election monitors as it likes to ensure that what happens on that side of the line of contract contact is a free and fair vote. So does this mean that either you write off those poor Ukrainians, which again I think will be contrary to the constitution, or does it mean that you accept that Moscow will be free to rig those parts of any vote and just ensure that a disproportion get cast in whatever direction it wants? This is, as I say, a complex and difficult issue.

MG:

And if we're speaking about complex and difficult issues, let's talk about the whole issue of seizing Russian sovereign assets. Now, the EU has just passed a resolution indefinitely freezing these assets held in Europe, using some emergency economic powers, so to ensure essentially that it's not still subject to a cycle whereby this freezing has to be reiterated every six months, which would allow potential awkward squad members such as Hungary and Slovakia from intervening and certainly blocking their use to support Ukraine. Now, I must admit I have problems about the use of these emergency measures, but I'll come on to that in a moment. But the point is, this way they they sidestep the requirement for unanimous approval. So this locks down the money that is held in Europe, which is about 210 billion euros, most of which, about 185 billion euros, is held in the Euroclear system in Belgium. Now the question is now, okay, so you've locked it, but that doesn't mean you can use it. So on, I think it's Thursday, there will be a vote on the Commission's plans to basically use these Russian assets directly in order to support Ukraine. I don't know what's going to happen. Now Italy has, which I think voted for the indefinite freezing, but anyway, it's joined Belgium and Malta and Bulgaria in at the moment opposing the idea that this money can should just be used to support Ukraine.

MG:

Now, look, I I get firstly on a moral basis the idea that this money ought to be used to support Ukraine, and also on a practical level, given that European economies are not doing that well, and come spring the current tranche of money allocated to Ukraine just to support the working of its state runs out: remember the degree to which Ukraine, the Ukrainian state and economy is on life support, and it's, if I can mix slightly mix my medical metaphors, blood transfusions are essentially all coming from Europe. But what would this actually mean?

MG:

First of all, I think it's important to stress that this measure does not, as I understand it, mean any new or extra money for Ukraine above that which has been promised. It is rather that instead of European countries having to find the money themselves, taking out loans, increasing taxes or whatever, they can actually use this money. So it's a really it's just a way of paying already the necessary costs of Ukraine beyond spring. So it's not new money for Ukraine, it's actually new money for the European Union.

MG:

Secondly, it actually might perversely mean new money for Russia. So far at least, a lot of these foreign assets in Russia have likewise been frozen. However, this would no doubt give an excuse for the Kremlin to expropriate billions of those foreign assets which are frozen there. Now again, actually then turning this into usable cash is a whole other issue. But the point is it actually gives the Russian economy a small, let's stress that, nothing like the in comparison to the monies in the EU, but nonetheless a small additional lifeline.

MG:

The Central Bank of Russia has also already opened a case against Euroclear in, admittedly, a Moscow court. Now one could say, well, what's the big deal about that? Well, it's opening the way for, and this is what the Russians are clearly signalling will be one of their responses, a major lawfare campaign, trying to use courts all around the world in order to both punish Europe and Euroclear in particular, and by extension that means the Belgian government, because after all, it is on the hook at the moment for whatever losses come there, but just also wider European assets. So this particular court case might allow the Central Bank of Russia to attach or take Euroclear assets in Russia, and there are billions, but also opens the way not just to perhaps cases in Europe, and you might think, well, what European court is going to hear this? Well, the point is these are complex legal issues around finance. I think, for example, there is some kind of agreement between Belgium and Russia, you know, a historic one, which would allow a certain challenge. But also the Russians could start moving to third party jurisdictions. Is there the chance that, for example, they could open cases which allow them to counter-seize assets held by Europeans in other countries around the world, where the court system might well be more amenable to a Russian case? I mean, who knows? I'm sure this will enrich a lot of lawyers in the process, but nonetheless, don't assume that it's going to be an easy process.

MG:

It's also going to alienate Trump, who clearly has his own eye on this money. I mean, his view was that essentially half of it, at least half of it, was going to be used immediately for a fund to support reconstruction in Ukraine, some of the profits of which would go back to the States. Remember the degree to which Trump really does see the presidency as essentially being the CEO of USA Incorporated, and therefore is highly motivated by making profit for America. So, you know, he may well get annoyed, because after all, this is in some ways, for all that it's been couched simply as support for Ukraine, it is a bit of an unedifying tussle over who gets their hands on this lovely Russian money. And well, does it actually make the chances of peace harder? Ben Arris of BNE Business News Europe has produced a very sort of passionate and and closely argued piece called 'The EU's Reparation Loan Vote Needs to Fail' ( I'll provide a link in the programme notes) certainly arguing that that is the case.

MG:

For me, though, the the point I would make is this Russia had essentially signalled that it had, in truth, although it wasn't going to admit this openly, given up on these these funds. It didn't think it was going to get them back. And the understanding was that when there is some kind of a peace deal, Russia would accept the use of this money to support Ukrainian reconstruction in lieu of any kind of open reparations. Putin was not going to give reparations to Ukraine, because to do so would be to admit that he was in the wrong, and that's not going to happen. So instead the idea was that this money could be seized, the Russians would openly huff and puff, but not actually make any serious attempts to block it through the courts and the like. And therefore there'll be money for Ukrainian reconstruction, and the reparations issue could be squared off. Now, in theory this money gets seized subject to the Russians paying reparations, but it's not going to happen. More to the point, this money gets spent now, and is really going to be being spent on supporting the war effort. And the idea that is proposed by those who support this measure is look, once Russia realizes that Ukraine has now guaranteed two to three years more funding to be able to prosecute the war, that actually will mean that Putin realizes that things aren't going to get any better for him and he might as well make peace. Now, the thing is that I don't think the Russians are looking at the balance books. I think the Russians are looking at manpower tallies and their capacity to disrupt the Ukrainian energy supply and their capacity to also play the, if I can excuse that term, the Trump card. So I'm not convinced it necessarily will change their calculations. More to the point, it's a lot easier, quite frankly, to be able to justify spending money on Ukraine when you are seeing drones slamming into apartment blocks and the prospect of refugees coming across your borders and such like. When this is presented, and it is, I'll come on to this in a moment, as an existential part of, shall we say, a war for the security of Europe. It's going to be a lot harder to tell European populations who probably are already dealing with austerity by this point, that they need to stump up huge amounts of money to reconstruct a post-war Ukraine. This is what the elegance of using these funds for reconstruction was. The fact that it didn't require sustained political will on the part of potentially fractious electorates. Now what we're seeing is this money will be used to fund war, and that means that to fund reconstruction, European nations are going to have to dig into their pockets, or rather the pockets of their electors. And that I think is going to be really hard. And I know there's a lot of people in Kiev who are concerned exactly that Ukraine will be to a degree, not entirely, but to a degree forgotten once the guns stop firing. So I understand the impulse of this, but I'm really concerned about some of the long-term implications.

MG:

But of course, the long term implications are meaningless if you actually think that this is already an existential struggle for the security of Europe. And that of course brings me to one of my regular bugbears, and I wish it were not so (he seems like a perfectly decent human being), Mark Rutte, the Secretary General of NATO. Well, oh Mark, Mark, Mark. Why do you feel the need in order to support a very, very necessary rearmament program for Europe, but nonetheless feel that the only way to justify this is to re is to turn to the most extreme hyperbole? He gave a keynote speech on Thursday in Berlin, and let me just pick up on a few of his lines.

MG:

"Just imagine if Putin got his way. Ukraine under the boot of Russian occupation, his forces pressing against a longer border with NATO, and the significantly increased risk of an armed attack against us."

MG:

So many questionable assumptions wrapped up in there. First of all, Putin getting his way. There is no question, surely now, that the Russians are going to be able to push all the way across and essentially occupy and indeed pacify and control all of Ukraine. We are haggling over the front line. Do the Russians take that remaining or are given that remaining part of Donetsk region? If the war really rolls on for longer, will they extend their control in Zaporizhia and to the south of this region? But the idea that they're going to roll into central, let alone western Ukraine, I mean I think that that's for the birds. That's impossible to conceive. So this idea of occupation that means all of Ukraine is frankly inconceivable. So you're not going to have, quote, his forces pressing up against a longer border with NATO. And the more Ukraine he conquers, the bigger the pacification job, by the way. So you know, more resources and forces that are going to have to be deployed there long term, precisely because I'm sure a lot of Ukrainians are not happy under Ukrainian Russian control.

MG:

"In such a scenario, we would long for the days when 3.5% of GDP on core defence was enough. That number would grow massively, and with that imminent threat, we would have to actually. Fast. There will be emergency budgets, cuts to public spending, economic disruption, and further financial pressure."

MG:

Now, this is another sleight of hand which is used by those people who want to justify increased defence spending on the basis of, and again I'd stress I'm not against increased defence spending, but on the basis of an immediate and instant threat of all-out war with Russia. Sure, if you compare the cost of this 3.5 plus 1.5% of GDP defence spending commitment against the cost of an all-out war with Russia, of course, it's cheap at the price. But the point is that presupposes that this is an either-or choice. That if Europe doesn't spend 3.5 plus 1.5, then the Russian legions will come crashing through and presumably be more successful than they were crashing through into Ukraine. That is not the choice. The risks of an all-out war with Russia are limited and frankly can be moderated.

MG:

"Russia could be ready to use military force against NATO within five years."

MG:

Well again, mistrust all of these promises of specific time frames unless they are pegged to an end of the war in Ukraine. Now, if you mean five years after the end of the war in Ukraine, okay, that is a sustainable view. I think it's a little bit on the low side myself, but there are others who know much, much more about the military rearmament process and particularly the sort of technical details, who may say five years is fine. But the point is so much of this is pegged to the end of the war in Ukraine. Then, well, thank God, there's something with which I can actually agree. He says

MG:

"Russia is already escalating its covert campaign against our societies. Russia's list of targets for sabotage is not limited to critical infrastructure, the defence industry and military facilities."

MG:

Well that's perfectly true in my opinion. Yes, Russia is expanding its attacks on European NATO, it's worth stressing, not North America, for obvious political reasons, not alienating Trump. But the point is this campaign, hybrid war, grey zone, sub threshold, call it what you will, that is essentially a political campaign. It's not about destroying specific sites or breaking this railway because railways can quickly be reopened. No, it's actually about undermining the unity and the will of the West of Europe to continue to support Ukraine. And I'd argue that that is as much as anything else also directed towards amplifying and using those critical voices whose messages are convenient. So, in other words, the disruptive voices, the populist voices, the ones who say, sod Ukraine, it's not our problem, the ones who say no, we need to be spending more money on tax cuts/ net zero/ welfare/ whatever other hobby horse issues they have. You know, these are the people who actually are going to be useful to Moscow. And in that respect, we've got to be a bit aware that the more you spend on defence, the less money you'll have elsewhere, and actually the greater the risk that precisely you play into the hands of populists and dissatisfied communities. So, yes, I agree with Rutte about the nature of Russia's campaign, but we might need to think about the prescription to deal with it. And finally,

MG:

"Russia has brought war back to Europe. Well, Ukraine is Europe, but let's note that Russia is Europe too. And we must be prepared for the scale of war our grandparents or great grandparents endured. Imagine it. A conflict reaching every home, every workplace, destruction, mass mobilization, millions displaced, widespread suffering and extreme losses."

MG:

Well, honestly, Mark, you just seem to be getting a bit too excited by that particular scenario. But again, you know, this is the idea that Russia would, or indeed could, sustain and launch the kind of war that really we're talking about World War II, you know, millions of men under arms and such like. That's not what a future war would be, even if there was going to be a future war, which exactly I doubt. I get it. Rutte is a politician. He is banging the drum for his own policies, and he has chosen to use scaremongering as the main means of trying to build a political constituency for it. But I really worry about that because I support, as I say, I keep saying, I support the re-armament drive. But the point is if you base that on implausible scaremongering, you create a huge vulnerability for that then to be undermined in the future. My view is this ought to be on the basis of a mature discussion about what Europe, both as a European Union and as the European wider continent, needs to do for its own security, and part of that security is precisely to make sure that it can operate independently rather than being entirely dependent upon a United States who now and in the future will have interests which sometimes will converge but sometimes will diverge from Europe's. But there you go. Maybe that's too much nuance, but to be perfectly honest, the abandonment of nuance is one of, for me, the greatest problems with current political discourse. But anyway, now that I'm pontificating so broadly, time to stop this segment and then come back and talk about the emigre Russian opposition after the break.

MG:

Just the usual mid-episode reminder that you're listening to the In Moscow Shadows podcast. Its corporate partner and sponsor is Conducttr, which provides software for crisis exercises in hybrid warfare, counter-terrorism, civil affairs and the like. But you can also support the podcast yourself by going to patreon.com/InMoscows Shadows. And remember that patrons get a variety of additional perks depending on their tier, as well as knowing that they're supporting this peerless source on all things Russian. And you can also follow me on Twitter at MarkGaleotti or on Facebook, Mark Galeotti on Russia. Now back to the episode.

MG:

Well, we're approaching Christmas, and what says Christmas more other than adverts for consumer goods that be persuaded to buy for yourself or for your friends? Let me just note that my 'We Need to Talk About Putin' is now out in its revised and updated form. If you know someone who might want a very handy, you more or less reading on a long plane journey or the like, very handy little primer for Putin. And if you want something that's slightly different, my 'Homo Criminalis, How Crime Organizes the World'. It's not just about Russia, in fact, it's largely not about Russia, but nonetheless it has been described as the sort of readable beach read of modern true crime literature. So that may be worth putting in someone's stocking, if not your own.

MG:

Anyway, on to rather less edifying matters. Beginning of October, PACE, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, decided to create something they called a platform for dialogue between the Assembly and Russian democratic forces in exile. And the idea was this would be made up of, quote, persons of the highest moral standing, unquote, who, amongst other conditions, all had to share Council of Europe values, unconditionally recognize Ukraine's sovereignty, its independence, and its territorial integrity, so in other words, also including Crimea, and who are working towards regime change in Russia.

MG:

Now, this may all sound uncontroversial enough, but it was based on a report by Eerik Niils Kross, the former Estonian intelligence chief, and its specific criteria included that any potential members must have signed the Berlin Declaration of Russian Democratic Forces. So what's that then? This was drawn up at a gathering of representatives of some, but by no means all, of the democratic pro-democracy emigre political groups back in 2023, and includes an unambiguous statement that the current regime must be, quote unquote, liquidated. I'm trying not to read too much into that specific framing, but that's a Russian term that has a very distinct and rather bloody implication. And delegates would even be banned from using the Russian state symbols like its flag, though very generously they would be allowed to display a white, blue, white flag without the bloody red, as a mark of resistance.

MG:

Now, in Kross's report, the key Russian Democratic forces were identified as Mikhail Khodorkovsky's Anti-War Committee, Gary Kasparov's Free Russia Forum, and the Free Russia Foundation of Natalia Arno and Vladimir Kara-Murza. Now at the time, Maria Pevchikh, head of investigations at the late Alexei Navalny's Anti-Corruption Foundation, the FBK, reviewed these PACE documents and drew attention to the mechanism for forming the delegation. And she noticed that while the FBK and indeed the wider sort of Navalny team are mentioned in Kross's report, they do not fall under his definition of Russian democratic forces, not least because it says that the FBK "drew attention with actions that provoke criticism and disputes within the Russian opposition." Which really means that there were other people who didn't like them.

MG:

The trouble is, in relying on a former Estonian spook, who, it's worth noting, publicly advocates the exclusion of all Russians from Europe on the grounds of collective responsibility, and who slammed Yulia Navalnaya, Navalny's widow, for daring to question whether all Russians ought to be punished for Putin's misdeeds. Also the man who back in 2024 criticized FBK for the temerity of launching its own investigation into a brutal hammer attack on Leonid Volkov, then Navalny's chief of staff in Europe, and Kross saying,

MG:

"In Council of Europe member states that respect the rule of law and individual liberties, criminal offences must be investigated by the police and tried by the courts. Replacing these processes with amateur investigations and attempts at public sentencing may be necessary in totalitarian conditions such as today's Russian Federation. However, in democratic societies this undermines the judicial system and can lead to a dangerous culture of accusations without due process."

MG:

So in other words, he's actually saying that the FBK should not launch its own parallel investigations. So investigations in Russia, that's good. Investigations in the West, oh that's bad. Now, maybe this was because the FBK report accused former partner in Yukos, Khodorkovsky's big oil company that was then seized and broken up, and Israeli businessman Leonid Nevzlin of ordering the attack on Volkov, and indirectly mentions his close close friend, I mean described as closer than brothers, Mikhail Khodorkovsky, founder of the Anti-War Committee. Incidentally, Maria Pevchikh called the Berlin Declaration Khodorkovsky's Declaration. He was a signatory, but also the idea is that he basically has been the force behind it.

MG:

Now look, I do get where Kross is coming from. I mean, he's Estonian, Estonia is in the front line with Russia, and he has a suitable pedigree. His grandfather was arrested by occupying Soviet forces as a Nazi collaborator and was killed in Podmar prison camp in 1946. His father was sent to a Gulag for eight years for anti-Soviet activities. He was an anti-Soviet nationalist agitator during the time of the Estonian independence movement. So, you know, I I get that, but but that's him.

MG:

Now, arguably there's no big deal in what PACE thinks. I mean actually out of curiosity I googled does PACE matter? And the AI answer that popped up:

MG:

"Yes, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe PACE matters because it serves as the democratic conscience of Europe, acting as a forum for debate, driving initiatives on human rights and democracy, and holding governments accountable through non-binding recommendations and resolutions."

MG:

Now, to me, cynic that I am, all this stuff about non-binding recommendations, democratic conscience of Europe, that means no, it doesn't really matter. But it is, it does have a symbolic and moral force as this democratic conscience of Europe. And if so, well then I'd note that while I don't think it's necessarily at all futile or wrong for it to engage in dialogue with emigre forces, and certainly if this creates a body that is able to advocate for Russian emigres who find themselves trapped between a vicious authoritarianism at home and an increasingly intolerant environment in Europe, that could be a good thing. And not just for them, but for the West's credibility inside Russia. But nonetheless, even at the time I did express some serious concerns.

MG:

Because this is not like in Belarus we have Svetlana Tikhonovskaya and her Coordinating Council. Now one can make a very good case that really she won the last elections had it not been for Lukashenko's rigging of the process. You know, these are people in within terms of the Russian emigre opposition, who in many cases have massive moral integrity. But they don't have any mandate other than that PACE has decided that they are quote unquote good Russians. This is PACE picking its favourites, including some truly marginal elements, like the so-called representatives of small nations, groups who claim to speak for the non-Russian regions and peoples of the Russian Federation, and are implicitly or explicitly committed to some kind of breakup of the Federation. Now, these are people who have no or minimal support and credibility inside the country. On the other hand, this also excludes FBK, Navalny's movement, and the closest thing I would say that there is to a dissident group with some real credibility and constituency inside Russia.

MG:

More to the point, publicly committing support, not just for the liquidation of the Putin regime, but implicitly the fragmentation of the Russian Federation, through undue attention these representatives of small nations, is precisely what Putin tends to claim the West is after. The rationale he gives for his wars, his crackdowns, his militarization of Russia. PACE may not really matter much in the grand scheme of things, but in this way it certainly doesn't advance the cause of freedom in Russia. It gives Putin and his propagandists ammunition. And lo and behold, the FSB then accused the emigre groups in this anti-war committee of creating a quote unquote terrorist organization and plotting to violently seize power. Now, I think this is wrong, though it's worth noting that back at the point of Prigozhin's mutiny, Khodorkovsky more or less said, look, anyone, by whatever means that brings down the Putin regime ought to be supported. But anyway, let's assume that that was just a momentary little thing. When you find yourself apparently committed to breaking the Russian Federation up, it's not so odd that the FSB is going to call you and can get away with calling you terrorists. Imagine if the Russians supported a group committed directly and explicitly to breaking up the European Union and then encouraging separatism within countries. I'm not sure we'd be particularly relaxed about that.

MG:

So that was the situation. But then, oh well this week, this week the capacity of Russian dissidents to fall out with each other and endlessly fragment was once again in evidence. What happened? Well, of all things, this came out of a dinner. A collection of potential PACE delegate members, you know, the good Russians, were at a Paris restaurant together, and apparently Gary Kasparov, who had left Russia in 2013, began publicly berating Vladimir Kara-Murza for not being a team player, in particular for having had the temerity to bring Yulia Navalnya and fellow Navalny ally Ilya Yashin to go and meet Theodoros Russopoulos, the president of PACE. And apparently he shouldn't have done that, Kasparov claimed, because neither of them had signed the Berlin Declaration.

MG:

Now, once again playing the oh so unfamiliar role to me of cynic, I might wonder if Kasparov's nose hadn't been put out of joint, because there'd just been something of a kerfuffle around f status. Now Kara-Murza, who is, I mean I'll mention in a moment the indignities heaped upon him, but really I think is one of the giants of the emigre dissident movement. Anyway, he'd recently been named dissident in residence at Georgetown's Centre for Eurasian, Russian and East European Studies. And he had also been hailed at this Spring's World Forum in Berlin as "potential president of Russia in exile and human rights activist," which is maybe slightly over egging the pudding, but is kind of fair enough. However, in the gallery of speakers under his photo, it just simply said "Russian president in exile," which did sound like a rather more ambitious claim. And this news had really only just suddenly become a public thing. Anyway, for whatever reason, Kasparov berates Kara-Murza in what one other attendee called a thuggish tone, about why he'd not signed the Berlin Declaration, and Kara-Murza replied, obviously trying to lower the heat of the discussion, that look, he'd been in prison when work on the Berlin Declaration had been underway. The truth is though that, well, he he certainly has not been in any rush to sign it. And to be honest, he had raised what to me seemed perfectly sound moral and political grounds, essentially saying that, you've got this declaration, which is really supported by what he called one specific political group, which is clearly the sort of Kasparov and Khodorkovsky bloc, and that really it's strange to limit the participation to people who have affiliated themselves with that. And in fact, he called this "a completely clear element of political manipulation," and strange to say the least. So what we're actually getting already is the emergence of a dispute with a bloc of organizations and individuals associated with -- and unkind souls would say bought and paid for by -- Mikhail Khodorkovsky, the former richest man in Russia, long time we have to say, prisoner in Putin's gulag, and now clearly still a very, very, very rich bankroller of many such anti-Putin initiatives.

MG:

But then, oh God, I mean it almost gets embarrassing simply recounting the story. Anyway, then Kasparov went further, saying that Kara- Murza's imprisonment in Russia had been a PR stunt, and that he hadn't served enough time. Apparently, and again, you know, cautions about whether the sort of verbatim accounts are entirely accurate, but there does seem to be a certain convergence, at least about the message. He said, "Aren't you ashamed to say that you were imprisoned, by the way, for a mere two years when there's a person here who served ten years?" referring to Khodorkovsky. To which Kara-Murza replied, "And are you speaking of someone who fled Russia in 2013? As far as is known, you've only served five days in your entire life." At which point Kasparov apparently lost it, and started yelling that all the true fighters against the Putin regime had left and were fighting for Ukraine rather than sitting in prisons. And he also even attacked Kara-Murza for having a British passport and thus swearing allegiance to the crown. He proudly said that he hadn't sworn allegiance to anyone, though he did have a Croatian passport "just for travel." Yeah, whatever.

MG:

Now let's be clear. Kara-Murza, outspoken critic of the regime, outspoken supporter of democracy in Russia, has almost certainly been poisoned by the Russian state not once but twice. Then in 2023, when he still insisted on going back to Russia to carry on his political activities, he was arrested. He was sentenced to twenty five years in a strict regime prison colony for treason and quote, unquote, spreading disinformation about the Russian military, in other words, telling the truth about what's going on in Ukraine. And he was sent to the notorious IK-6 Omsk prison colony, which is where Navalny also was first sent. And then Kara-Murza was put in solitary in IK-7 for the terrible sin of not standing up when a guard told him to, which apparently the authorities had deemed a malicious violation. Fortunately for him, yes, he did only serve two years of that twenty five years sentence, because a big prisoner swap was in the works, and in August 2024 he, and indeed Yashin, were amongst those released. But apparently he was released too soon for Kasparov.

MG:

And likewise let us remind ourselves of Kasparov's prison record. As Kara-Murza said, he served five days in a special detention centre for administrative detainees, so in other words a relatively relatively gentle one, in 2007 for biting a police officer.

MG:

Now Kara-Murza had been a member of the Anti-War Committee since its foundation in February 2022, but he's now announced that he's leaving it, saying he no longer considers it possible to remain in the same organisation as Kasparov, who, according to him, allows rudeness and vile personal insults as a method of political struggle, and particularly because he says that a special clause in the Berlin Declaration is that the signatories refrain from public conflicts within the democratic and anti-war movements.

MG:

So is this just about a spat in a restaurant and a failure on the part of other members of the committee to back Karamurza up? Well, those who follow the intricacies of the emigre soap opera most closely very much see this as a struggle for leadership between Khodorkovsky, MBK, as he's often called, on the one hand, and Kara-Murza and Natalia Arno, who's the founder and president of the Free Russia Foundation, of which Kara-Murza is vice president, on the other. And it's certainly true that Kasparov had nominated Khodorkovsky to be the head of the delegation to PACE, whereas others thought that Kara-Murza definitely had the strongest claim.

MG:

Now look, I've got no insider connections with any of these emigre organizations and can't claim to any sort of secret knowledge. Sometimes, to be perfectly honest, it's very hard to credit the claims that are being made. Arno, for example, has just said on the emigre Dozhd TV channel Khodorkovsky also said at one point "Alexei Navalny didn't make a deal with us, and where is he now?" Which frankly would have been an extraordinary thing to say. Sounds like more of a line out of a mafia movie than anything else, and obviously I can't vouch for the truth of this particular allegation.

MG:

But certainly it is clear that there is a power struggle going on. And I've heard from other quarters that they feel that Khodorkovsky does tend to assume that those he bankrolls he, well, maybe own would be too strong, but certainly that they owe him. And so the battle lines thus get drawn. Why do I think it's worth dwelling on what otherwise seems a very much kind of an insider spat?

MG:

Well, first of all, I think it really is a strong highlighting of the dangers in trying to pick favourites. How much of this was precipitated precisely by the decision by PACE to pick a delegation that would therefore have some kind of possibly spurious but nonetheless apparent authority. And in the process, lay down terms which inevitably favour some political factions and perspectives. Now not only does this from the very first taint the whole process, it makes it look as if these are the tame Russians. It also creates incentives for more, not less, factionalism, because people want to become the gatekeepers. When there is a resource, even if the resource just simply means that you get invited to posh events and get fated as being more important, well, you know, you want to be able to control access to that resource. So in some ways one could actually say that, quite possibly for the best possible reasons, but PACE really were the ones who pulled the trigger on this increasingly open conflict within the emigre community.

MG:

Secondly, it's a useful reminder that my enemy's enemy is not always necessarily my friend. That in fact, even though all of the members of these sort of emigre democratic communities are broadly in support of the end of the Putin regime and proper democratic Russia, that doesn't mean to say that they're all going to play nice with each other.

MG:

It I think highlights the lunacy of trying to lock out those groups of individuals which have the greatest traction inside Russia. What is the point of this if it's not to have some kind of bearing on the discussions, the debates, and the eventual political evolution of Russia? Yulia Navalnaya, her role is controversial, but the point is she has the Navalny name and the Navalny imprimatur. Vladimir Kara-Murza and his allies, people like Ilya Yashin, people like Vladimir Milov, they do still have some recognition and some respect within Russia, especially within the kind of liberal, what we can think of as almost proto-opposition, that is still there. It can't organise, it can't publicly demonstrate its affiliations, but it's still there. Kasparov, though, sure, he used to be a chess grandmaster. I don't think he's really got any other particular standing beyond that in Russia today. And as for Khodorkovsky, look, I do wonder if he fully appreciates the degree to which he is still despised, rightly or wrongly associated, not with speaking out against corruption in Putin's court, as he did and triggered his own downfall in that respect, but his role in the oligarchic kleptocracy of the 1990s. Something that makes today's embezzlement look positively mannered. So in other words, this is a bet that otherwise seems to be being placed on those people who have no or negative traction within Russia, rather than the people who still can, just about, manage to reach out and have a constituency there.

MG:

Why does all this happen? Well, impotence creates disputes. I mean, why did Navalny go back to Russia? The fatal decision that some say was a sort of terrible mistake, and obviously it was a mistake for him, but it was precisely because he realized that you had to be in Russia to really maintain, again, I keep using the word traction today, but yes, some kind of influence on the political process and some kind of credibility with Russians, that you don't just look like just some fat cat or sort of coward who fled to the West and enjoins Russians from a safe distance to take terrible risks and challenge the regime. Well, others they're here. Some of them are doing their absolute best, some of them maybe not so much so. But nonetheless, I think this is a reminder of Kissinger's assertion that university politics are so vicious precisely because the stakes are so small. You know, in some ways it's precisely because these people are not in a position to shape Russia, and unlikely that they will be anytime soon, that they can afford these kind of disputes, and these kind of disputes, in a vicious circle, ensures their continued marginality.

MG:

This is all very painfully reminiscent of exile politics both before 1917 and after the Russian Civil War, whether we're talking Marxists or anti-Bolshevik groups. I mean, remember, indeed, Lenin's Bolsheviks, I mean, Bolshevik, majoritarian, they were not a majority. They were actually the product of the vicious infighting that was going on within the Marxist opposition. And then after the Russian Civil War, you have organizations like the Russian All Military Union, the Brotherhood of Russian Truth, the NTS, which is the uh what was it, National Alliance of Russian Solidarists or something like that. Um, and and even sort of groups that were actually almost vaguely collaborationists, who thought they could work with the Bolsheviks to create something that was better than the Bolshevik regime, like the Smenovekhovtsy. Now, these were all groups that were constantly feuding and rowing and shouting at each other in restaurants and coffee shops. These were also groups that were very heavily penetrated by the Okhrana, secret police, and then the Bolshevik Cheka and its successors, who didn't just want to track them, but also wanted to create provocations to discredit them and turn them against each other. The irony is, and I'm sure that the FSB would would love to do that to the emigre opposition movement, but there's very real little real evidence actually of any significant penetration. And more to the point, there's very little real evidence that at the moment the FSB really needs to be bothered to do anything. It is rather sad.

MG:

But ultimately, it is a useful reminder that Russia's future will be made in Russia. That it is not impossible for there to emerge new democratic political movements when the circumstances permit within Russia. In fact, I think it's almost inevitable that they will bubble forth, or no, to use perhaps a more Russian metaphor, they will emerge like mushrooms after the rain all over the country. And look, some of these may well look to the emigres for inspiration, for political advocacy, maybe even for practical support. And that's the point when the emigre movement, frankly, will have a real impact. And it is for that day that I can certainly hope that these squabbles, these rivalries, which sometimes look as if they make medieval theology look positively broad-minded, I mean if only they were just simply squabbling over how many angels could dance on the head of a pin. I can only hope that these various rivalries do get worked out. Because, regardless of the personalities involved, it is necessary that there are people there who themselves won't be frankly in a position to influence Russia, but who can then provide the kind of support that other dissident movements often did receive from forces outside, whether we're talking about the Roman Catholic Church being able to support Solidarity or whatever. They need to be there, and frankly they could do with getting their house in order before, not when that moment comes.

MG:

But anyway, now I'm doing exactly what I'm berating others for doing, which is in other words being an outsider, pontificating about what people in admittedly often quite tough positions should do. So really that suggests this is a moment when I should just shut up and end this podcast. Thanks very much for listening.

MG:

Well, that's the end of another episode of the In Moscow Shadow Podcast. Just as a reminder, beyond this, you can follow my blog, also called In Moscow Shadows. Follow me on Twitter at MarkGaleotti or Facebook, Mark Galeotti on Russia. This podcast is made possible by generous and enlightened patrons, and you too can be one. Just go along to my Patreon page, that's patreon.com/In Moscow Shadows, and decide which tier you want to join, getting access to exclusive materials and other perks. However, whether or not you contribute, thank you very much indeed for listening. Until next time, keep well.