In Moscow's Shadows 233: News, from Abu Dhabi to Kamchatka; and Chechnya After Kadyrov

First, a look at some of the news as this year starts hard and bizarre: trilateral talks in Abu Dhabi (with military intelligence chiefs to the fore), the Greenland crisis and the perils of Trump's Board of Peace for a Russia that we might consider a 'middle power.' Then, once-in-a-generation blizzards in Kamchatka as a test of state capacity and Putin's engagement.

With Kadyrov reportedly seriously ill (really, this time, we think), what prospects for this satrapy? His sons are too young, too raw, and too notorious. The likely pathways run through the Benoi clan: a feared enforcer, a well-connected dealmaker, or a polished general viewed as Moscow’s man. Expect bargaining, intrigue and selective violence rather than open war, but even a managed transition could consume attention and security assets at a time when bandwidth is already stretched by the war. The nightmare—a wider North Caucasus flare-up that drags troops from Ukraine—remains unlikely, yet no longer unthinkable.

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Transcript

Opening And News Agenda

MG 0:00

There's lots of news to catch up on. I'm after looking at some of the latest from to come. What's gonna happen in catching them? Hello, I'm Mump Galeotti, and welcome to my view of Russia in Moscow Shadows. This podcast, of varying length, frequency, and format, yet always reassuringly low production values, is supported by generous and perspicacious patrons like you, and also by the Crisis Exercise Software Company Conductor. Hello and welcome back. Look, I'll be honest, I had had a faint and clearly deeply naive hope that this year could perhaps start quietly, gently, gradually to allow us to slowly get ourselves into the suitable mood and spirit for dealing with it. Well, it didn't quite turn out that way. So let's just quickly skim through some of the key stories in the news. And obviously we've just had the first two-day round of talks in Abu Dhabi, trilateral talks, United States, Ukraine and Russia at the table. And by all accounts, well it didn't really achieve anything in particular, were we expecting it to do otherwise, but nonetheless, apparently it moved sufficiently that they have agreed to resume next week. What was quite interesting, I thought, about this particular format is that the respective heads of the delegations we have for the Ukrainians, Kirilo Budanov, who is currently Presidential Chief of Staff, but also remember was until very recently head of Hur, Ukrainian military intelligence. And facing him was Igor Kastyukov, Admiral Kostyukov, who's the head of Hur's Russian counterpart, the GU, still most widely known and by its old acronym of the GRU. So we had two counterparts, and indeed that's not the only thing. Apparently, according to some reports, that Alexander Zorin, who's first deputy head of the GU's information directorate, was also part of the Russian team. Now, Zorin has been known to be sort of called Russia's best negotiator because he was involved in all sorts of different uh various engagements, uh Syrian ceasefire negotiations, careful mediation between factions there, and also in brokering the 2022 surrender of the defenders at Azovstal Steelworks in Mariupol. So this is both a military intelligence heavy, but also serious delegation. And in some ways I think it's actually a good sign. You know, some people say, oh well, sending spooks to be diplomats is a mistake, but I don't think that's the case. I think in fact I'm something of a fan of spook diplomacy for reasons I'll come to in a moment. But in particular, I was reminded by John Foreman, once defence attache in Moscow, that actually it was a sign that the Russians were more serious than we might have thought in their talks back in 2022, was when we saw in Istanbul Lieutenant General Vladimir Alexeyev, again, first deputy head of the GU, really sort of replacing figures like Medinsky, who are essentially kind of political proxies. And well, why why do I think spook diplomacy is a good thing? Well, firstly, let's remember that Budanov and Kostukov's agencies already have a track record of being involved in behind the scenes negotiations. They're really crucial in the swaps of prisoners of war and indeed of the bodies of former soldiers. It's quite often the case that actually intelligence agencies can carry out the kind of back channel negotiations that their states cannot, because of the risk of it being seen in public light, misconstrued, and the like. Secondly, look, neither of them are going to be described as doves, but that's not a bad thing. It also means that if they can actually reach any kind of agreement, then they are not subject to them being sort of accused of being some kind of lily-livered apologists for the other side. No one is going to accuse Budanov, who after all has was behind a whole series of sabotage and assassination missions behind Russian lines within the Russian state. No one's going to accuse him of being a weakling, and I think much the same is true of Kostukov. And finally, look, these are people who know what's going on. They're not going to be subject to naive assumptions about the state of the front line or indeed the state of the rear area. Again, it doesn't mean to say that, for example, Budanov is in any way going to fold, but it does mean that he knows what he's talking about, and the same with Kostyukov. So we'll just have to wait and see. Again, I really don't want to sound too optimistic. Ultimately, my suspicion is that these talks will fail, but that they will at least have made enough progress for some kind of resumption, perhaps in late spring, which could be rather more successful. But nonetheless, we see what's going on. Secondly, look, we've had this bizarre, surreal back and forth about Greenland. Now, I think it's worth noting that I don't think the crisis is over. Not only is there going to be this sustained and understandable legacy of transatlantic mistrust, but Trump has been known to change his mind. Of course, this is something that has made the Russians terribly happy. And the fascinating thing, and again, it's an example of the degree to which Russian propaganda can spin 180 degrees whenever it needs to, without any blushes. Rosiska Gazeta, the government newspaper that only a week or so ago was essentially egging Trump on, suggesting that he would become this grand historic figure in America if he did indeed take Greenland, now is essentially using this as an opportunity to talk about American past track records of essentially imperialism. He said that Riskiska Gazeta ran just just now a piece saying, Let's not lose sight of the main point. Within seventy years of each other, the United States encroached on Greenland in the nineteenth century and again in the twentieth, immediately after the end of World War II, and very much frames this in the context of what we could think of as military expansionism. But the Pentagon Hawks felt cramped within their own borders, and time and again they tried to launch a military claw here and there. Okinawa right next to Japan, Guantanamo Bay in Cuba, the Inshilik Air Base in Turkey. Now Ramstein in Germany, Manas in Kyrgyzstan, a whole bouquet of military bases. I'm not convinced, incidentally, that bouquet is the appropriate collective noun for military bases, but anyway, a whole bouquet of military bases in Kuwait and South Korea. So, you know, again, I think that the Russians are hoping that this will be a gift that keeps on giving, and that rather than just simply being a momentary spat that has now been resolved, that there will continue to be problems, but we'll have to wait and see. Rather more complex is the whole business of Donald Trump's board of peace. Now, Putin has controversially been offered a place on this. He hasn't said yes, he said he's seriously considering it, though he has also added, in I think what was a rather neat little bit of um cynical positioning, that he was, as it was, willing to contribute one billion dollars, the the the requisite entry fee to be a permanent member of the board, from Russian sovereign assets frozen in the United States. Now I had rather sort of mischievously tweeted that if he really wanted to be cunning, he'd actually say he was perfectly happy to do it with a billion from the Euroclear in Belgium assets, because then Trump would have had to have lent on the Europeans to try and get them to soften their freezing order. But this is not bad, but you know, definitely the second best. So we'll we'll have to see if the Americans are willing to essentially allow that money to be at least partially unfrozen. I think ultimately Putin will regard this as an offer he can't refuse, because it's certainly, I mean, even just the offer dramatically undermines what's left of any claims that there's some kind of concerted Western effort to isolate Putin in terms of international diplomacy. It's going to be very hard to then go and try and lean on other countries not to engage with Putin when Trump is inviting him onto this board. Still, as I said in the Sunday Times today, and paying patrons should have received uh the text of that, it's not entirely something that the Russians are comfortable with. Indeed, quite a few commentators are calling this a trap. Why? Well, the goal seems to be that this could in fact become some kind of replacement for the United Nations. A very, very grandiose uh dream, absolutely, but Trump is indeed prone to such dreams. The thing about the United Nations is however much Russia may well ignore or flout its various rules and resolutions, nonetheless Russia likes the UN. Why? Well, because of its special status there. It is after all a P five member, a permanent member of the Security Council. As such, it has a veto on any Security Council matters. This is not just very useful politically for Moscow in terms of ensuring that resolutions it doesn't like don't get passed. It also enshrines this notion that Russia is one of a handful of truly special countries. That really matters to a country which is still trying to cling on to its great power status, even though in many ways I would suggest, again, something I talk about in the Sunday Times piece, actually Russia in some ways should think of itself more as one of these so-called middle powers. I'll come on to more of that more in a moment. So if he goes on to this Board of Peace, Russia will just be one more member. Remember, the executive committee of this board is almost entirely packed with Americans. Trump has installed himself as chairman for life. It would take a vote of the executive committee of people whom he has packed with his own cronies to actually replace him. This would very much be an American-centered organization, and Russia would just be one more paying member of the club. Equivalent to anyone else. Argentina has already said it's willing to stump up a billion to be a permanent member. You know, does Russia really see itself as being on a par with Argentina? So I think there is caution here, and that speaks to a much wider issue about what I'm calling Trump's rough world order, one in which it is increasingly clear that might, whether it's military or political or economic, makes right. And in this context, not only is there a growing sense of the degree to which every country has to fight for its own place in the world, its own oxygen. Interestingly enough, Moscowsky Kamsomolets ran a piece in which it actually presented this whole rollout of the Board of Peace as an attempt to humiliate China, saying that there was this demonstrative delay in inviting China to join, a manifestation of America's genuine attitude towards China. Well, I mean in this context can Russia, as I said, seriously feel that it is indeed special? Yes, it has had all kinds of opportunities to, I think it's fair to say, punch above its weight, but to a considerable extent that was because it has always depended on Western restraint, on the fact that it knows pretty damn well where the West's red lines are, whether pragmatic ones or legal ones, which means that it knows just how far it can go without prompting the kind of response that it really wouldn't like to see. I mean, in some ways, if we even if we think of the invasion of Ukraine, remember this was expected to be a quick, neat political operation more than anything else. And by the time the West really had woken up to the situation, Russia would have installed a new puppet leader, talked, began to talk about withdrawing its forces. You know, the sense was that, well, given that it's a feta complis, that the West wouldn't really do all that much. So generally speaking, it likes a West that is predictable, that is legal, and that is willing to constrain, restrain itself. Now, obviously Trump is not really one for self-restraint. But more to the point, is he either heralding, I mean, in many ways, he's not really the creator, but simply the person who just recognises how things are going, or the midwife of this rough new world order, in which actually your real strength matters much more than you the degree to which you're you're willing to exert it. And in that context, yes, in some ways I do think Russia should be considered a middle power. Sure, it has a nuclear arsenal. Well, so to Britain, so does France. And I don't think anyone's thinking that that gives them particularly special sway in the world. You know, a nuclear arsenal is good really for one thing, and that's blowing up the world. Now you may have used to doing that if you face an existential military threat, which frankly for Russia will only come from the direction of China. But broadly speaking, well, I mean the Russian economy the usual comparisons with Italy and Spain don't really hold water. If we took about it in GDP by purchasing power parity, Russia is fourth after China, the United States, and India, which is no bad place. But it's not hugely above, say, Germany's. In terms of soft power, Russia isn't really anywhere. It's got a certain amount of kind of authoritarian chic with kind of wannabe Putin's, but more broadly, not many people are looking at Russia as an example of the kind of country they they want to be. And more broadly speaking, Russia is not, I would say, I think it's well, is Russia a declining power? I mean, one can argue the case. I don't think it really encapsulates Russia. But I mean broadly speaking, Russia is a strong second rank power. And that's not a very comfortable place to be in this new world. But anyway, let's move away from foreign policy to one other story I wanted to touch on, which hasn't really had much coverage in the West, perhaps for obvious reasons, because it relates to snowstorms in Kamchatka. Kamchatka, off on the far east of the Russian Federation, has suffered the heaviest snowstorms in 60 years, and they really have been massive. The capital, Petropavlovsk Kamchatsky, is reporting that it had snow drifts of over two and a half metres, that's what more than eight foot, blocking streets, preventing the emergency services from getting anywhere. There's been power and water outages, shortages of food in shops. No wonder that there has been a state of emergency since the middle of January. And if that were not enough, I mean two days ago there was a magnitude 6.2 earthquake just off the coast. There you go, little cherry on top. Now, the regional governor, Vladimir Saladov, has had to acknowledge the situation as critical, but on Wednesday there was a televised meeting with Putin and where he said, Oh, that the situation was returning to normal. Well, returning to normal, that's covering a lot of that's bearing a lot of a burden there. Yes, things are a bit better than they were a week ago, but still it's a bad situation. And although the Ministry of Emergency Situations, the Ministry of Defence, and a whole variety of other regions, particularly Moscow, have been rushing equipment and crews to try and help the situation. There is progress. I think tomorrow most school children, for example, are returning to school, but nonetheless, still a way to go. Now, the reason I'm dwelling on this is because one has to ask, well, where is Putin? This is exactly the kind of crisis situation where back in the day the good Tsar would be making a point of, if not necessarily travelling to the area. Remember, Putin hates being sort of seen in the context of anything that looks like a failure or a problem. But nonetheless, you know, he would be being much more active, particularly because Kamchatka is United Russia territory. The governor, Vladimir Salodov, he's not actually a member of United Russia. He's technically, I mean, he because he is, I mean, he's a technocratic figure. He's a 43-year-old administrator and administrative sort of teacher. But nonetheless, he is, shall we say, United Russia deeply adjacent. He served as the governor since 2020. He won the vote there in 2020 with just over 80%. And then he was re-elected in 2025 with about 63%. And if you want to compare that, I mean that's 63% for him. The Liberal Democrats got just under 14%. The Communist Party just over 13%. And the Communists of Russia Party, that is frankly a spoiler party, got just over 5%. So in some ways, maybe the Communists could be said to have got more like 18%. But still, you know, so this is an area where United Russia is strong. Its State Duma representative, Irina Yarovaya, again, very prominent United Russia figure, infamous for being behind the so-called Yarovaya package of laws back in, I think it was 2016, very much in the name of fighting terrorism, dramatically expanded the powers of the intelligence community, particularly in terms of electronic surveillance. She was also a key figure behind the foreign agent laws, yet another infamous bit of repressive legal technology. But anyway, so she has been representing Kamchatka since 2021. So, you know, for all of these reasons, Kamchatka has been, shall we say, a good soldier in Putin's regional campaigns. And the usual payoff in the past has been that, you know, in that case, you can expect the federal centre to look after you too. This hasn't really been happening. I mean, indeed, Solodov also had to appeal to the Kremlin to unblock the mobile internet in the region. This was at an earlier meeting, a so-called operational meeting with regional officials, which is something that is being done essentially to prevent it being used for signals for Ukrainian drones. But this is Kamchatka. This is like I think it's 7,000. Kilometers away from the Ukrainian border. You know, I don't think it's a primary problem. And it certainly is interfering with efforts to coordinate relief and emergency efforts, and also just simply, you know, people wanting to check that their friends and relatives are still okay. So I think for a lot of reasons, frankly, Kamchatka can feel let down by the federal centre. I mean, it gets a lot more visible support, shall we say, from Sabianin's Moscow than Putin's Moscow. Probably quite glad that there's not going to be another gubernatorial election there for some years. But to me, this is the one thing that struck me. It is again, it's Putin opting out. Putin just not being interested in the things that look troublesome, things that would associate him with failure, and the things that don't really connect to the handful of issues that really interest him, which these days largely are around foreign and military policy. So I think, you know, again, is this a failure? Yes, it is, a kind of failure of the federal system, but it's also a failure, I think, of the social contract, not just with the people of Kamchatka, but the elite. There was this sense that you did what Moscow wanted, and that gave you brownie points in the future. Doesn't seem to happen anymore. But anyway, if I'm talking about regional politics and regional elites, it's time to have a break and then talk about Chechnya. Just the usual mid-episode reminder that you're listening to the In Moscow Shadows podcast. Its corporate partner and sponsor is Conducto, which provides software for crisis exercises in hybrid warfare, counterterrorism, civil affairs and the like. But you can also support the podcast yourself by going to patreon.com slash in Moscow Shadows. And remember that patrons get a variety of additional perks depending on their tier, as well as knowing that they're supporting this peerless source on all things Russian. And you can also follow me on Twitter at Mark Galliotti or on Facebook, MarkGaleotti on Russia. Now back to the episode. So, Chechnya. Look, I know we've heard it all before, but it does sound like Ramzan Kadirov is very seriously ill. Reportedly he was urgently hospitalized in Moscow at the end of December, suffering from probably kidney failure, and now is on death watch. We have seen some recent footage, which is what tends to get done, put out in order to try and reassure everyone that Kadyrov is fine, but this wasn't the opening of an Islamic school. Kadyrov doesn't speak and is seen using a walking stick. And look, this is a man who's just forty nine. And if so, if we really do have, and I must admit I can't find it in me to be too sad about the idea, the thought that Kadyrov will not be long with us, well this is a serious problem for the Kremlin. Chechnya, after all, is it's hardly really a constituent republic of the Russian Federation. It's a personalized satrapy, whose loyalty after a fashion has been bought through continued generous subsidies. It's the kind of relationship with which empires from the Roman onwards, all the way to the Raj would be pretty damn familiar. You pay off these troublesome border folk, knowing full well that you are just renting them rather than buying their loyalty. Anna Polikovskaya, who, after all, was almost certainly murdered by the Chechens, herself said The Kremlin has nurtured a dragon and now constantly needs to keep feeding it so that it does not spew fire. And that's perfectly true. And particularly I think the Kremlin was was getting anyway exasperated with Kadyrov. Firstly there is the fact of his regular threats. Whatever it looked as if the Kremlin might be trying to work out ways in which it could cut the massive subsidy that it sends, which covers the majority of all the expenditures of the Chechen government, and a lot of those expenditures are just buying off the elites and vanity projects for Kodyrov. Well no, any time they looked as if they might want to cut those, that's when Ramzan Kadyrov would throw his toys out of the pram. Maybe he would publicly speculate that it was time for him to retire, or in one particularly dramatic case, he launched a little mini invasion of neighbouring Ingushetia. But essentially each time what this was was a power play, was basically saying I am indispensable to you because I can keep Chechnya quiet. And don't push me. And each time, frankly, it was the Kremlin that backed down. More recently, though, well first of all, the performance of Chechen soldiers in Ukraine, despite the way that they have been praised by Kadyrov himself, has been lackluster to say the least. There's a widespread assumption that they are actually more than anything else TikTok soldiers who hang back, video themselves in heroic poses, and are more interested in looting rather than actually fighting. And I don't think that's an entirely unfair characterization, especially not because the Chechen forces essentially refuse to fully operate within the Russian chain of command. They are notionally part of either the National Guard or the Defence Ministry forces, but actually major orders, especially ones which will put them into harm's way, have to be countersigned by Grozny. No one within the High Command is happy about that. And then we had a very specific case in which actually Kadyrov publicly supported one of the two sides in a dispute over ownership of the online marketplace Wildberries against the side that Putin himself had already backed, and which obviously hardly surprisingly ended up winning the dispute. But the point was this was a case where Kadyrov was trying to throw his weight around in what was a commercial dispute that had nothing to do with Chechnya, nothing to do with Chechen assets. In these circumstances, if this had happened, if this illness of Kadyrov's had happened before February 2022, the Kremlin would have been torn between two pretty much contradictory goals. On the one hand, maintain stability to avoid any threat of having to have a third Chechen war. And on the other, reduce the subsidy being paid, because frankly that's money that could be better spent elsewhere. Now though, with the overwhelming bulk of Russian forces committed to Ukraine and the system overall looking a little bit brittle, the Kremlin is, I think, simply resigned to having to continue to pay the subsidy, even though the state budget is not really in a particularly healthy state. But the point is it is desperate for stability. But the question is who could replace Ramzan? It's worth noting, after all, that the Kadyrov clan as a whole, remember Ramzan inherited power from his father Akmat, come to that in a moment. In some particular contexts. First of all, it was in the reconstruction period after the catastrophic Second Chechen War. So in some ways all the political and clan and other structures had been to a degree upended. There was kind of creative destruction which does allow you to create something new. That wouldn't necessarily be the case if Kadyrov doesn't wake up tomorrow. Secondly, it was particularly thanks to the fact that Kadyrov's father, Ahmad Kadyrov, who'd been the Grand Mufti of Chechnya, had flipped sides. Originally he had been during the first Chechen War a rebel, and then he moved to the Russian sides in part because of concern about the increased influence of Wahhabist Islamic extremism within Chechnya, and in part just simply because of factional infighting. But the point is he had been a heavy-hitting defection, and therefore he had won for himself, his family, his clan, a lot of political credit with Moscow. Ramzan Kadyrov, for all his thuggish, ghastly ways, had played a serious and genuine role within the counterinsurgency campaign. So again, you know, he had the credentials. And perhaps most importantly, well no, not most importantly, but you know, equally importantly, the Kadyrovs had managed to eliminate a rival clan, the Yamadaevs. It is often forgotten. I mean, the Yamadaev brothers, Ruslan, Suleim and Zabrali, were, sorry, Jabrail, my mistake, were very prominent Chechen commanders in the Second War. They were serious rivals to, particularly Ramzan Kadyrov. They had their own private army, the Vostok Battalion, which would later emerge in a different incarnation in Ukraine, but essentially this was controlled by Suleim Yamadaev, and it was a unit that was really part of the extended forces of military intelligence, GU, GRU. So, you know, these are people who had contacts, they had firepower, they had political connectivities within Chechnya and to Moscow. Now, Jabrail Yamadaev had been killed in 2003 in a bombing. That was while Akhmat was still around, and the assumption, frankly, is that the Kharyovs were behind that. Ruslan Yamadaev, who had been State Duma deputy, was gunned down in Moscow in September 2008. And the next year, the last of the trilogy, Sulim Yamadaev was assassinated in Dubai. Frankly, we can't seem to get away from the United Arab Emirates at the moment. And the UAE authorities had actually accused one of Kadyrov's close associates, Adam Delim Khanov, of being behind the hit, more on him and none. By late 2008, the Vastok battalion had been disbanded, the Yamadaev's power base in Gudermes had been destroyed, indeed, their actual homes had been bulldozed, and the family, what was left of the family, was forced out of power in Chechnya. So Akmat became president in the sort of post-war order, and when he was assassinated in 2004, Ramzan was a logical successor, but he was not yet 30, which is the minimum age to take power. But he was close enough. So there was a brief period of a kind of regency into regnum. Ramzan was made first deputy prime minister and then prime minister, while Alu Alchanov, again, another one of these sort of Chechen defectors to government sides, was the president. But in 2007, just after his 30th birthday, so no, this is only three years later, Alchanov duly stood down. He was rewarded with the role of Deputy Russian Justice Minister, and Ramzan was elevated to the presidency. Now, Kadyrov has ever since then really been looking to found a dynasty, but there are problems. He's just made his eldest son, Akhmat, acting deputy prime minister, and Akhmat is also Minister for Physical Culture and Sports, but he's only twenty. Now Ramzan's apparent favourite is his third son, Adam, who's notional head of his security service, chair of the Security Council, and so forth. Adam is only 18. Now, a three-year regency for a candidate who already has serious stature is one thing. A ten to twelve year one for a candidate who frankly has no real status beyond his father's surname. Well that's a lot trickier, and as we know, regents can often become actual or de facto monarchs in that time. So who are these various candidates? Well, I mean, who knows? But the names currently in the frame, as I said, we start with Akhmat Kadyrov, Kadyrov, Ramzan Kadyrov's first son, but he's still he's still 20. He's mainly known for having been involved in mixed martial arts. In 2024, he was ordered, he was issued the Order of Kadyrov, for God's sake. Personal services to the Chechen Republic, high achievements in the spiritual, moral, and patriotic education of the younger generation. Yeah, I mean, when you you're actually given the order of your own surname, it begins to give a sense of the degree to which this is clearly a kind of a vanity project. The thing is, Akhmati's reportedly the smartest of Kadyrov's sons, although, admittedly, that is not the highest praise one could have lavished on one. But he's not got great charisma, he's no particularly good public speaker. In fact, he doesn't really seem to be particularly happy in having a public persona. And all of this has helped ensure that he has no real constituency, plus the fact of, you know, his father clearly does favour the second, sorry, the third son, Adam Kadyrov. The second son, but just to mention, by the way, the second son is Zalimkan Kadyrov. We don't really hear a lot about him because he was he's 19 years old and was an uncontrollable chip off the old block. I mean, even by the standards of the Kadyrovs, he's pretty wild. And it says something that he has been in effect exiled to guess where? United Arab Emirates. No one wants him. Anyway, to return, Adam Kadyrov. He's a spoiled 18-year-old thug. I mean his main I was gonna say reason for fame, but it's really infamy, was back in November of 2023, there was a video of him assaulting a prisoner who had been accused of burning the Quran. Now, I mean this was a guy who was, say, a sort of bound prisoner in a cell, and he went Kadyrov and gave him a good kicking. I mean that even a lot of hardline pro-Kremlin figures thought this was actually pretty disgraceful and condemned. But nonetheless, of course, Ramzan publicly expressed pride in Adam, praising him for embracing adult ideals of honour, dignity, and the defence of his religion, and gave him not one but six medals in response. It's all getting a bit ridiculous here. However, apart from the fact that he's singularly ill-suited to actually running the country, it's also worth noting that on the 17th of January he was apparently involved in a major traffic accident in Grozny when his motorcade was, as is par for the course, zooming through red lights at high speed and hit another car. And the claim is we don't know for sure, but that Adam Kadyrov was in critical condition and was flown to Moscow for medical treatment. So we don't quite know his status. Now he married the daughter of the Chechen senator, Suleiman Gerim, who is a relatively powerful and significant figure, again, clearly part of an attempt to kind of build some kind of dynastic buttressing for Adam's case. But when it comes down to it, he's still a spoiled 18-year-old thug. So if we start moving out of Kadyrov's immediate family, well, there's the aforementioned Adam Delimukanov. Now, he is Chechnya's representative to the State Duma. And he's the guy, I think I've mentioned in the past about how the president hotel, presidential hotel in Moscow, is essentially now a bastion of this kind of group of Chechens who are in some ways the sort of Chechen foreign ministry, in effect, representative to Moscow. I mean, in many ways, Delimkanov is closer to being Chechnya's ambassador to Moscow than anything else. He comes from the Benoi tape or clan, which is Kadyrovs, and that's that really matters in Chechen politics. And as Chechnya's kind of representative outside Chechnya, he is a political figure, and he's also a business and quite frankly criminal figure. He's a key connector between Grozny and the Chechen diaspora, not just within Russia, but also in Turkey, Jordan, and uh guess where, the United Arab Emirates. So that means both business and crime. He has maybe lost a bit of traction inside the country simply because of the amount of time he spends in Moscow, but he absolutely is not someone to be ignored. I mean he probably has the greatest amount of economic and political muscle of any figures short of Ramzan Kadyrov. Known sometimes as the man with the golden gun, because he was indeed presented with a golden gun by Kadyrov, which once fell out of his pocket during a scuffle in the State Duma. And he was also, as I mentioned, the guy who was named by the police in Dubai as a subsuspect behind the murder of Sulim Yamadaev. However, the charges were then dismissed in 2012 after Kadyrov visited Dubai. So you know, draw from that conclusion as you will. So Adam Delimkanov, you know, a serious figure, but perhaps a little bit less well connected inside Chechnya. He has the muscle, but not necessarily the connections. In some ways, a similar thing could be said about the speaker of the Chechen parliament, Magomed Daoudov, who's known as Lord, because apparently the first time Kadyrov saw him, he was all very nicely dressed in a suit, and Kadirov thought he looked like an English lord. Well, Daoudov is, for all his fine tailoring, also definitely, shall we say, a man of his hands. I mean, he particularly curried favour successfully with Ramzan by bringing him the head of another rebel field commander, Suleiman El Murzaev, who was a sworn blood enemy of Ramzan's and who had claimed responsibility for the murder of Ramzan's father, Akhmat. So, yes, I think bringing literally your enemy's head to Ramzan is definitely going to win you points. And he's essentially become Ramzan Kadyrov's strong right hand inside Chechnya. He's absolutely feared, he's been behind a lot of disappearances and repressions and the like. So he has muscle. Doesn't quite have the political and economic assets of Delimkanov, and he's not quite so well connected to the Kadyrov family, but again, a serious player. Now the other name that is most often mentioned is actually one of a Chechen, but in some ways he's because he's Moscow's favoured candidate, which is Major General Abti Alaudinov, who rose within the Chechen Interior Ministry. He's now the head of the so-called Akhmat Special Forces, which is a kind of, in some ways it's more of a private military company than anything else, because most of its members are actually not ethnic Chechens. But anyway, it's one of the forces I was going to say fighting in Ukraine, but let's just say assigned to the special military operation in Ukraine. And Aludinov is also deputy head of the Ministry of Defense's Military Political Directorate. He's much more urbane than any of the other candidates. I mean, obviously, especially by the standard of Chechen warlords, but not just that. Very noteworthy, back in 2023, he spoke at United Russia's 21st Party. Congress and gave a very polished, very confident speech, with no particular accent, which is very rare for Chechens. It's funny how some nations, some ethnicities, lose accents more easily than others. Anyway, Aloddinov can can can talk the talk, and indeed he delivered his speech without notes, which is also worthy. And he also actually demonstrates occasionally a slightly sly sense of humour. I was particularly impressed when he responded to the suggestion which had been made by Vladimir Zelensky that if American special forces were also going to be in the business of kidnapping any more dictators, they they could do worse than go after Kadyrov. Well Alodinov actually said that he was very strongly supportive of this notion, because Ramzan Kadyrov has been sort of chafing at not being allowed to go and fight in the special military operation, so he'd love the opportunity to teach the Americans a lesson for their audacity. Yeah, very much tongue-in-cheek. The problem is though, these days he is precisely seen as Moscow's man rather than Grozny's man. So imposing him, frankly, he would be considered to be what in the Russian term they call Varyagi, Varangians, which is the term for when you've essentially parachuted an outsider into control of a region or a business or whatever else. So that's got a lot of risks carried with it. Now there obviously are other candidates that are sometimes mentioned, including, for example, uh Ruslan Edelgariev, former Prime Minister of Chechnya, who has since became Putin's special presidential representative on climate issues. I remember hearing actually him speak at a British embassy event, and it was interesting. I mean, he, well, again, worth saying, very strong Chechen accent at times. I definitely had to try and work out what he was saying rather than know. But anyway, he came across as serious, sensible, and actually obviously committed to the climate agenda issue, which is not something you tend to find in Russia. Now, a cynic would think, well that automatically excludes him. But nonetheless, he might be an interesting candidate if Moscow is looking for some kind of compromise candidate who has credibility inside Chechnya, but also they know they can work with. You know, not a heavyweight these days, but nonetheless who might fill that gap. In some ways you don't sometimes you don't want a heavyweight, particularly if it's gonna if you're presenting this as a potential regency. Another person who is a rather different character, but nonetheless could also fulfil the same role, would be Abu Zaid Vismuradov, former commander of the Akhmat Special Forces, and he's currently Deputy Prime Minister. Some ties to both the Kadira family, the Benoi as a whole, and various other power brokers, but again, not a heavyweight, just a potential compromise figure. And very occasionally you have Kadira's daughter Aishat mentioned. Frankly, he seems to have been a lot luckier with his daughters than his sons, so I don't know if that really is something that he's happy about. But anyway, to be honest, she may well be I'm no, I let me rephrase that. She's certainly rather smarter and more politically sophisticated than Akmat or Adam, but I do think that the patriarchal to the point of downright chauvinist political culture of Chechnya, indeed the North Caucasus as a whole, precludes her playing any such role. So what do I think might happen if Kadyrov imminently dies? Well, I mean, yes, there is the possibility of the Varyag option. The Russians bringing someone in. I mean, for example, back in 2021, they appointed uh former intelligence officer or security officer Sergei Melikov as head of Dagestan, but I think it's very unlikely here. That was a different kind of context. Chechnya is too volatile, too dangerous, and there's too much money involved. Again, I think because of the federal subsidies, whoever becomes boss of Chechnya is going to have a massive amount of patronage involved, and they're not going to let, frankly, an outsider have that. So it's possible, but I would regard it as an outside opportun outside chance. Much more likely is, shall we say, a Benoi clanocracy. So it might not be someone from the Kadyrov family. In fact, it won't be someone from the Kadyrov family. But the idea will be to maintain the current system. Kadyrovism without Kadyrov. Yeah, I mean, it's not an ism, of course. But the point is, remember, Kadyrov has appointed at least ninety-five of relatives, members of his extended family, to government or government-linked posts in the country. And generally speaking, the Benoi are now very much a dominant force within Chechen politics. So essentially it will be relying on Klan rather than individual to simply keep a comfortable status quo flowing. And yes, that would involve continued amounts of money to buy everyone off. If Moscow was going to be more daring, which again I think is unlikely so long as the war in Ukraine is raging, one could see them instead think, well, we'll rely on clan politics, but we'll turn to a different clan. Shall I say a wannabe clan, precisely to try and sideline the Benoit because they're too powerful, which will give us more traction. Yes, more traction, but also more risk of strife. Because I do think it's not impossible that we may well see any kind of transition, even one that essentially seeks to maintain the status quo, with the Benoi in charge, with someone appointed who may or may not be being talked of as a regent. Of course, you can be talked of as a regent now, but uh renegotiate the position in a few years' time. But anyway, even in that case, I think it's not impossible that we would see feuds, personal rivalries being played out. Remember, there are about 20,000 Kadyrovsi, as the various security forces of Chechnya are known, if we include the Akmat forces. And yes, they are all broadly speaking under Kadyrov loyalists, but there are different shades, flavours, and degrees of that being the case. And even amongst these loyalists, we see all kinds of rivalries that could play out. So, you know, we we could see overt struggles between private armies. I think it's much more likely, though, that it'll be a little bit less dramatic. That it'll be, frankly, the Yamadaevs all over again. It'll be plots, conspiracies, character assassinations, and maybe actual assassinations. Because after all, these are figures who, on the whole, will want to preserve the system, they just want to be running that system, or at least be extracting a larger share of potential rents and benefits from it. So, do what do I think is going to happen? I think the Benoit clan is going to stay in power, but overall, the fact of the stability of Chechnya, that is something that I think will have to be considered uncertain. And if we see instability within Chechnya, will that spread to other parts of the North Caucasus? Will that, I mean again, this would be the absolute nightmare scenario, will that reach the stage where the the Roskvardia and other security, domestic security forces, really can't deal with the crisis, as they could not in the past, after all. The first and second Chechen Wars saw massive infusions of Russian army and air force assets into pacifying the country. Will Putin be faced with the prospect of, in some ways, having to either accept losing Chechnya or scale down operations in Ukraine and even potentially lose some of the territory that has been won? Now that is a very extreme scenario. I don't imagine it happening.

unknown 48:23

But it could happen.

MG 48:24

And as a result, Chechnya and indeed Kadyrov's future is one more thing to keep Putin awake at nights. Well, that's the end of another episode of the In Moscow Shadow Podcast. Just as a reminder, beyond this, you can follow my blog, also called In Moscow Shadows. Follow me on Twitter at MarkGaleotti or Facebook, MarkGaleotti on Russia. This podcast is made possible by generous and enlightened patrons, and you too can be one. Just go along to my Patreon page, that's patreon.com slash in Moscow Shadows, and decide which tier you want to join, getting access to exclusive materials and other perks. However, whether or not you contribute, thank you very much indeed for listening. Until next time, keep well.