In Moscow's Shadows 245: Belousov And The War Machine

Putin didn’t pick a battlefield hero to run Russia’s Defence Ministry. He picked Andrei Belousov, an economist with a planner’s instincts and a technocrat’s patience. Thats what the Kremlin thinks it needs most right now: a 'Quartermaster-in-Chief,' who wouldn't tangle with Chief of the General Staff Gerasimov, but instead focus in procurement that works, production at scale, drones that reach units fast, and a defence industrial complex that can keep up with an ugly, grinding war economy. 

He is satisfying Putin, the generals and society -- for now. But his legitimacy depends on results, he is boxed in by a team of deputies representing other factions and interests, and in many ways the real tests begin when the war ends.

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Transcript

Why Belousov Matters Now

MG 0:07

Defense Minister Belows. Hello, I'm Galeotti, and welcome to my view of Russia in Moscow Shadows. This podcast of varying length, frequency, and format, yet always reassuringly low production values, is supported by generous and perspicacious patrons like you, and also by the crisis exercise software company Conductor. It says me right, you know. It serves me right for planning. I mean, often these podcasts are distinctly impromptu responses to news stories. And this time I had thought, well, actually I'll do something different. And to a degree it was triggered by my work on my forthcoming book, Russia in Hell, which is titled notwithstanding, an attempt to be potentially optimistic about Russia's future and at least give reasons not to say why Russia will work out okay, but why it may. And that got me thinking actually about past moments, the sort of what if moments. If things have gone differently, Russia may well have emerged as a distinct different country. And well, yes, I I got enthused by that. I started thinking of various ideas, various moments, and as I jotted my thoughts down, I realised this was way, way too big just to be a single podcast. So I probably will do a little series of extra shorter individual ones, perhaps specifically for my patrons, but obviously that's not going to be now. So meanwhile, I was thinking it was worth taking a look at Defence Minister Andrei Removich Balusov, who is currently in North Korea having just held talks with his Chinese counterpart. But the point is he's coming up for the end of his second year in term. And well, it's worth thinking, you know, why was it he who was appointed and where might he be going? Because after all, the appointment of this, I think it's fair to say, rather dry, uncharismatic economist as defence minister in May 2024 came as a widespread surprise, not least to himself. He did later, after all, say that he was stunned when Putin offered him the position. And really the choice of Belusov, I think, reflected to Putin and the people advising him the needs of the time. First of all, this was in the context of shuffling previous defense minister Choigu off to a position as Secretary of the Security Council. Choigu, who, let's be honest, was a PR master, I think, in many ways, unfortunately to the point of convincing himself and Putin about the current state of the Russian military. But beyond that, Choigu was also a political operator. He built a whole circoterie, a clan around him at the Defence Ministry over his rather lengthy tenure, which of course led to massive institutionalized embezzlement. And so the idea was they needed to have someone who definitely would mark, both visibly, presentationally, but also practically something of a difference, and also to reflect the the wartime needs of the moment. They needed someone who was going to be able to address the questions of defence production, of technological innovation, of logistics as well as corruption. In other words, the practical side of managing the let's say the civilian side of the war effort, but at the same time someone who wasn't going to be a challenge to the chief of the general staff. Because after all, technically speaking, the defence minister is generally regarded as superior to the chief of the general staff. However, that's essentially a peacetime formulation. In time of war, in some ways they de facto reverse. The chief of the general staff, who after all reports directly to the commander-in-chief, in other words, the president, Putin, essentially calls the shots, and the minister becomes, yes, exactly, the the administrator or quartermaster in chief, whose job is to ensure that the generals have what they need, the weapons, the personnel and so forth, in order to fight their war. So it was someone who was going to accept this, frankly, rather subordinate position. When Choigu had been appointed back in 2012, for example, again, it was a reflection to the perceived needs of the time. But at that point, what they needed was a personnel management and institution building specialist. Choigu is the guy who had basically formed the Ministry of Emergency Situations from scratch in the 1990s, given it an esprit de corps, given it actually a surprisingly good, solid public profile, considering it is the Ministry of Bad Things Happening. But also he was thought as the being the guy who could actually placate the Geniet, the generals and other senior commanders, who at that point were up in arms, near revolt revolt almost, and speak that metaphorically, over the reforms that were being carried out, which involved shrinking the military, shifting it to smaller, more professional forces and the like. So Shoigo had to be the guy who was going to manage the personnel and the image. Now something rather different. So a technocratic specialist, one who seemed not only competent, but essentially honest, and look, let's be clear, when we say honest, we mean honest in the context of Russian officialdom. No one is really going to suggest that Berusov lives on his salary alone, but the point is he is, by the standards of Russian officialdom, as clean as you're going to get. So let's start with just simply who who is Belusov. Well, he was born in 1959 to sorry, 65, 66, um, to a prominent economist in Gosplan, the State Planning Committee. So in some ways, economic management was the bread in his bones. So he went on to become a capable economist himself, very much focusing on management, but also on technologies and the use of that. Got his doctorate in economic sciences in 2006 while heading the Centre for Macroeconomic Analysis and Short-Term Forecasting, which is worth noting. It's still around today, and is often on the loyal critics side of economic debate. So, in other words, you know, it is basically a patriotic force, but nonetheless it's perfectly willing to criticise the current direction of economic travel. He rose through the Ministry of Economic Development, became the Minister in 2013, then he became Putin's chief economic aide until 2020, when he became first deputy prime minister in charge of the economy. And remember, in the in the Russian system, certainly the way it is at the moment, really the first deputy prime ministers are, I would say, the real drivers of policy. They all have these kind of well, with the exception of Patrushev Jr., who was given the title, but his portfolio remains what it was before, agriculture. But anyway, apart from him, on the whole, first deputy ministers actually have quite broad and important portfolios. And he is Belusov, that is, is something of a Keynesian. He supports government spending to stimulate the economy. But on the other hand, he's also very keen on more generally, not just the state spending money, but also the state spending money to shift the economy in the direction he wants. Former Prime Minister Mikhail Kasianov said he's generally a conservative and statist, but his economic views are left-leaning in the Soviet sense. He has a Soviet vision. That doesn't mean he's for a planned economy, but he's for state control and regulation. And this helps explain why he is actually much more in tune with the current sort of direction of economic debate. That statism, it did not exactly endear him to the previous generation of the fiscal liberals who were dominant, people like Alexei Kudrin. But that, on the other hand, has fallen by the wayside, especially since 2022, as the Russian economy shifts to a wartime one, but frankly, probably even before then, that sense that actually the state needs to be playing a stronger role. And in 2018, when he was appointed first deputy prime minister, he was precisely described as a statesman surrounded by enemies, for this very reason that he was articulating what at that point was a fairly unpopular perspective. Of course, there has been some controversy about his appointment, especially at first. I mean, some of the nationalist mill bloggers, the Voyen Kori, who increasingly sort of shaped the public debate, called this decision unprecedented, and they didn't mean it in a good way, precisely because he had never served in the military or in any other uniformed service. I mean, at least Shoigu, who was technically a civilian, an engineer, had actually headed the uniformed emergencies ministry. And Anatoly Serdyukov, who had been minister before Choigu, was a tax official, but nonetheless he had at least completed his military service. On the other hand, though, insiders were generally positive about the announcement, precisely because he was seen as a well, I mean, as one observer put it, he's a tough guy, a Bolshevik. It's fascinating, by the way, the way Bolshevik is in some ways becoming stripped of its genuine ideological element. They don't necessarily mean a leftist, but it just generally means precisely someone who's willing to, if need be, storm the barricades for a cause. So there you go. There's one of Lenin's uh legacies which he might be happy with. He's devoutly Russian Orthodox, and again we are definitely talking Belusov here, devoutly Russian Orthodox, albeit not necessarily always a perfect one. I mean leaked emails demonstrated that he has had several mistresses. Still, acquaintances have claimed that he believes the mother of God speaks through Putin, and apparently he actually has also been known to make personal vows to the Virgin Mary, often over really mundane tasks like calling his remembering to call his mum. But moving from the personal to the professional, look, he has distinguished himself, not just in terms of economic management, but particularly, and again it's relevant in this context, working with the defence industrial complex. In particular, actually, he oversaw the unmanned aerial systems national project before the war, which certainly gave Russia something of a head start in the accelerated production of combat drones, once that became such a feature of the conflict. And all of this helps explain why, for example, Colonel General Andrei Kartopolov, who's head of the State Duma Defence Committee, welcomed his appointment as an absolutely well-considered, well thought out, and urgently needed decision. Now, Kartopolov is significant because he's an important bridge between the political leadership and the military leadership. So his endorsement went a long way to ensuring that Belusov was at least given the chance to prove his worth at the ministry. And in that context, I should just as a little sidebar note that there are these claims that there had been a close relationship between Belusov and Yevgeny Pigojin, he of the Wagner Mercenary Company and military mutiny fame. The claim that they would sometimes sit in meetings, giving each other a hug, and naturally using the informal D, or little sort of abbreviations like gen instead of Yevgeny or Genia, and so forth. So the claim had been, quote, their work meetings were reminiscent of family get-togethers over tea. I'm not entirely convinced by this, A, because that doesn't really sound like Belusov's natural style, first of all, or actually necessarily Prigozhin's. More to the point, there is no other evidence of a cosy relationship. Yes, Belusov actually was, of course, privy to the complex and covert financial arrangements that led to the formation of Wagner in 2014 or so. And then clearly with the various uh f let's just say murky flows of money that kept Wagner operating thereafter. But the idea that he actually played a crucial role rather than just simply initialing documents that crossed his desk, that doesn't convince me. So, anyway, how is he doing? Well, first of all, remember that I said he's a he's the quartermaster in chief, not the warlord. And for all the to talk of Bielosov's own probity, as I've mentioned, it's sort of relative, nonetheless, he certainly has, I think, approached the corruption issue for a start with a certain amount of caution. Yes, there's been sort of massive displacement of Shoigu's team, but that's only to be expected and quite normal. But a general comprehensive campaign to cleanse the Defence Ministry and indeed the wider military of institutionalised corruption, that we haven't really seen. And I'm not really surprised. I mean, particularly it would mean an open clash with the Generalit, who themselves have become accustomed to all their little perks and scams. And he doesn't have the authority or the mandate for this. It's worth noting, after all, that uh it's an interesting question about quite where authority over the main military procuracy lies. But more to the point, this would be a job for the FSB's military counterintelligence department. And it would be incredibly, I mean, apart from the fact that it would have to be Putin or the FSB leadership who actually mandate that, it would also be incredibly politically problematic to give the FSB yet more power over the military. It would definitely make the generals very unhappy. So, you know, I think what we're going to see, and I remember sort of talking to someone, an insider within the system, who basically drew a parallel with what happened in Moscow, with the transfer of power from the former mayor, Yuri Lushkov, who was famed for his greed, and the current one, Sergei Sobjanin, who, again, does not live on his salary by any means, but nonetheless he's rather more pragmatic. So the idea is what we saw is corruption become, you know, a bit less excessive, a bit less obvious, a bit less embarrassing, a bit less debilitating. Everyone still gets their cut, but nonetheless the projects still go ahead rather than just simply all the money being stolen and nothing happening. So that's what we're likely to see, and that's probably, I think, about the best to which Belusov could aspire in the circumstances. Where he has made his mark, though, is precisely in this connectivity between battlefield needs and the defence industrial complex. Now, in part that depends on his relationship with the managers of that complex, and particularly Sergei Chemizov, the head of the Rostek arms conglomerate. I said I'll come to that in a moment. But it's also just more generally appreciating the need for, and although they're never going to be able to rival the Ukrainians in this, but nonetheless, as rapid a feedback loop as possible between the observed needs of the battlefield and what is being produced. Because the Russians have the advantage of production at scale, but they're not the um corollary of that often is that they can't operate quite as quickly. The point is though, he, as I say, he was the driver behind early moves to build up drone production, and that helped when he very, very quickly, in August 2024, pushed forward the creation of the Rubicon Centre for Advanced Unmanned Technologies, that may sound like a research centre, and it is in part a research centre, it's also a training cater, and it's an operational unit. And certainly the Ukrainians themselves highlight Rubicon as a particular problem for them. These are the elite drone operators who also had worked out ways of using their drones precisely to hunt down Ukrainian drone operators. Then in December 2024, he began the process, and it takes time, of standing up a whole new arm of service, the unmanned system troops. Now, again, that's there's going to be there's still quite a lot of ground to be done on that, not least in terms of the relationship between Belusov and the aerospace forces, who are rather jealous of losing a whole area of drones. I mean, although the unmanned system troops are not meant to be just about aerial drones. Nonetheless, that's clearly the expectation of where the where the bulk will be. But still, you know, it looks like this is going to be a cross-domain force that will happen. So Belusov's mandate and focus is very much on the production and managerial side of the job. But as I say, that means he has to continue to produce results. In some ways, he is legitimating himself by the fact that he can provide the generals with what they're looking for. And that means obviously more production, the right kind of production, and also, and this is a crucial issue in the Russian context, proper quality control. I mean, this has been a recurring challenge that they get kit, but much of it is of dodgy quality, doesn't work in the first place, isn't quite what was was required, breaks down quickly, etc. etc. I I heard a retired general calling him Belusov the military's Domovoy, evoking the sort of household spirit of the Russian mythology. Whereby if you keep the Domovoy happy, putting out a little bowl of vodka for him and such like, then he will labour away at night doing what it can to keep the house in good repair and the household cared for. Though of course the corollary is if you don't, he can actually damage things a lot, but I don't think they mean that. So, in some ways, this is it. He is he is the the relatively inconspicuous figure at the back, making sure everything works smoothly. But he doesn't really have any choice about whether he's at the back, because he doesn't really have command authority. Um I mean when I was jotting down my notes for this section, I actually headed this section, perhaps slightly unfairly, emasculated. That is, I think, a little bit unfair, but you know, it's it's it's it's something that really applies from the beginning because when he was hired, he was warned right at the beginning that he was not going to have the chance to appoint his own chief of the general staff, which is usually part and parcel of getting a new defence minister. New defence minister, they want to have a chief of the general staff who, after all, is the absolutely crucial figure, who is both the um the shop steward articulating the views of the Generalität to the minister, but also the foreman imposing the views of the minister and the government as a whole onto the armed forces. So that really matters. However, it was made clear that Gerasimov, the current chief of the general staff, is still going to be staying. Despite his massive unpopularity in within many within the army and also the mill bloggers, nonetheless, it's clear that the Kremlin either approves of what he's doing or at the very least is worried about the consequences of any kind of new appointment right now. It doesn't. Putin clearly doesn't like churn within the security apparatus at the best of times, especially not currently in a time of conflict. One of the reasons why there's so little movement at the top end of the security services as well. Anyway, so Garasimov is clearly there staying. I mean he's reached the formal retirement age of 70, did so last year, but nonetheless, by special presidential decree, his service has been extended. So, well, does this mean that Belusov can at least shape the ministry in his own image? Well, not really. In part because one characteristic of higher, well, Soviet and now Russian officialdom is that, well, like Shoigu, you you build your own team. You have your own clan, and quite possibly as you move from one job to the other, you bring your clan with you. Well, Beluksov, whatever his his talents, he doesn't have the interest or the skill or whatever to actually build much of a team of his own. And so, although there has been a lot of new hiring within the top levels of the Defence Ministry, it doesn't seem to be that I mean, I dare say he might have had a veto power, shall I say, but I don't think that these are Belofsov's choices. Because let's quickly run through them. Because what quickly emerges is that they are all, or almost all of them, in some ways representative of some other interest group. So this is about building a kind of consensual team, which in one way is to help Belusov be able to reach out to different groups, but I think more importantly, is it meant to be a constraint on Belusov? Again, the sense that after Shoigu, you wanted to make sure that the minister was not going to be too overpowerful. So we have Anna Tsivilova, who's the wife of the energy minister Sergei Tsivilov. She was the founder of the Defenders of the Fatherland Foundation, and according to quite a few reports, actually a second cousin of Putin's. But certainly she seems to be there as Putin's, as a representative. Of Putin's own interests, a control mechanism, his eyes and ears, shall we say. Then we have Pavel Fratkov, son of former Prime Minister and Foreign Intelligence Service Director, and also the brother of the head of Promsyas Bank. Now, Fratkov himself served briefly within the FSB, and it's generally assumed that he's there as the representative of the security apparatus. What's more, this is a guy who worked in the Presidential Property Management Department between 2015 and 2024, which is, well, A, it's one of the most corrupt institutions within the presidential administration, which is after all saying something. But also, you know, it is about management of property and construction. And he is now especially involved in the Ministry's own construction problem projects, and including those within the occupied territories of Ukraine. Now these are real money spigots. And again, I think that the interest was to ensure that control over these highly lucrative opportunities was not purely within Belusov's gift, to avoid again that kind of cozy and corrupt deals that happened under Shoigu. Then we have Leonid Gorinin. Now he had been first deputy finance minister, and he's also comes from an sort of economic technocrat type background, so you'd assume that he's a Belusovite, but actually not so. Because he is on record as being quite a critic of a lot of the high spending projects, and actually supported a degree of austerity in opposition to Belusov. And frankly, he seems to be there to ensure fiscal control is maintained as a representative of finance minister Anton Stiluanov. So he's there just to make sure that the books get balanced and the spending doesn't run out of control. Then we have the former Deputy Minister for Trade and Industry, Vasily Osmokov. Now he's close to both the current trade industry minister, Anton Alichanov, and also the aforementioned Sergei Chemizov of Rostek. So in many ways he is precisely there to be the representative of Chemizov and the defence industrial complex in general. The only career soldier in the new cohort is Colonel General Alexander Sanchik. Now he actually is a proper soldier. He's led both the southern and eastern groups of forces in the special military operation. And he's in charge of logistics, and probably he's there to reassure the generals that their combat needs would indeed be met. And finally, Ayeg Savalyev, former auditor at the Accounts Chamber, former Minister for Crimean Affairs. He was Berusov's deputy at the Ministry of Economic Development. And probably is that the closest you're going to get to there being a Belusov man. Particularly, and that's why he's been made Chief of Staff, Minister's Chief of Staff, so that basically all the paperwork flows through him. So yes, that gives Berusov a certain degree of power and influence, but otherwise he is quite hemmed in by all these people. As the journalist Andrei Pertsev put it, Belusov became the coach of a national team, not a single team that he had handpicked. So let's let me talk after the break about actually who therefore Belusov needs to work with. Just the usual mid-episode reminder that you're listening to the In Moscow Shadows podcast. Its corporate partner and sponsor is Conductor, which provides software for crisis exercises in hybrid warfare, counterterrorism, civil affairs and the like. But you can also support the podcast yourself by going to patreon.com slash InMoscow Shadows. And remember that patrons get a variety of additional perks depending on their tier, as well as knowing that they're supporting this peerless source on all things Russian. And you can also follow me on Twitter at MarkGaleotti or on Facebook, MarkGaleotti on Russia. Now back to the episode. Oh before I start, just a little note for any of my listeners who may be in Spain, just to say that my book Homo Criminalis, How Crime Organizes the World, has just been released in translation by Capitan Swing. So do feel free to go and avail yourself of that. Anyway, after that particular commercial, let's go back to Belusov. And as I say, the key thing is that Belusov has to continually legitimate himself by his success. He is not a mate of Putin's. That's absolutely sort of crucial. He has the president's backing, but that's always something that you can't really rely on. I mean, his relationship with Putin is that of a loyal and capable underling. He was, it's worth noting, the only member of Putin's economics team, and I'd stress the economics team, who actually supported the 2014 annexation of Crimea. And that's the kind of thing that goes quite away with Putin. But nonetheless, we haven't seen any of the obvious markers of there being a strong personal relationship. For example, attendance at Putin's increasingly rare social gatherings, for example, or being visible at one of the night league ice hockey matches where Putin's team takes on a team of one of his rivals and such like. So Putin supports him, and so long as he does, Belusov has a considerable degree of authority, but it only depends so long as Putin supports him. And Putin has demonstrated that although he is quite loyal and sentimental about making sure that sort of good soldiers who do their bidding get looked after, he has no problem with discarding them and sending them off and just giving them some kind of comfortable sinecure instead. So Belousov's authority depends on reassuring Putin that he's doing a good job. It depends on not getting on Gerasimov's bad side, at least for the moment, and it depends on continuing to convince the generals that he is the guy who can provide them what they need. He's not going to rock the boat, and he's going to deliver concrete improvements to the supply of men and materiel for the war in Ukraine. But of course, he can't actually guarantee all these things himself. To a considerable extent, he has to depend on other people and his relationship with other people and to get them to do what he needs. And in particular, we're talking about First Deputy Prime Minister Denis Manturov. Admittedly, Belusov seems to work well with him. And when Belusov was appointed, you know, he was Manturov said nice things about him, Belusov said nice things about Manturo and so forth, all very lovey-dovey. More to the point, they do have a track record of working smoothly together. And this is important now because Manturov is responsible for a swath of government projects that had been, many of which had been in within Belusov's portfolio originally, with direct military relevance, including the National Technological Initiative, and also promoting innovation in the aviation sector, rocketry, radio electronics, and the like. And crucially, state defense procurement. Because the capacity to actually make the defence industrial complex do what the military needs is central to pretty much everything that Belusov is promising the generals. And this also requires the defence industrial complex to cooperate. And this is where Chimizov's role comes in. Now again, Chimizov openly welcomed Belusov's appointment. He called it unexpected on the one hand, but on the other, I think it's the right thing to do because we need someone who views the defense industry not simply as a source of weapons, but also as a significant sector of the economy. Now that actually was, shall we say, a donut with a razor blade inside it. Because on the one hand it looked all very sweet and positive, but the problem was this issue about a significant sector of the economy. Now that, in my opinion, is code. It is code for saying that it's not just about what you can get from us, it's that you need to support us as well. Remember, there are issues with the payment of funds to the defense sector. There are issues with some defense sector industries actually having trouble because they can't get raw materials or spare parts, or just simply what they produce is no longer needed. There are those within the military, for example, who are saying we need to stop producing tanks and instead pivot our resources to other things. Well, that would be bad news for companies like Ural Vagon Zavod, who produce tanks. So this is Chemizov saying that you have to think of the bigger picture, and the bigger picture means keeping us all up and running and employing, and basically, if need be, subsidised. The potential Sovietization of the Russian economy continues. Now, it's this is again this is a relationship that actually has some kind of pedigree. The anti-corruption campaigner Ilya Shomanov noted that Bielosov's son Pavel, who's in business, has benefited from quite a few contracts from Rostek. And remember what Rostek gives, Rostek can take away. But more generally, look, they they seem to have a decent personal relationship, and they certainly seem to be able to cooperate politically. And given that we are seeing some signs of the current running anti-corruption campaign that I said is located outside of Berussov's empire. But anyway, is it being expanded from the military into the defence industrial complex? It may well be that Chemizov, who is absolutely a friend of Putin's, but nonetheless, you know, he may well feel greater pressure to demonstrate his capacity to reform in line with Berussov's ambitions. But nonetheless, you know, it does mean that there are a lot of moving parts, a lot of variables. Belusov is having to sort of tread quite carefully between a whole variety of different interests to get what he wants. Now, so far, he appears to be getting considerable credit from Putin, the generals and society alike. Seems to be doing the job he's been tasked, he's not generating all sorts of tension with the Generalität, tensions which Putin would then have to settle, which frankly he seems increasingly unwilling to have to do. And obviously, for the general's point of view, their immediate concerns have been defensive. He's not trying to throw his weight around, he's not trying to bring in his own some other team wholesale. He's on the whole willing to accept Gerasimov's operational role, but also Gerasimov's choices about who gets to point it to what positions. The economist Andrei Yakoviev phrased this as he doesn't interfere in the military's direct affairs, that's their responsibility. Under his leadership, a cleanup took place, and the military is grateful to him for that. I'm not sure if it's grateful, by the way, or rather they were just very happy to see Shoygo's people go. Supplies and manpower are flowing uninterrupted. He could be quite useful to the generals as a political representative. So again, legitimation by results. Now, meanwhile, Belusov is clearly trying very keen on ensuring that people believe that he gets those results. It's quite striking, for example, that even this rather uncharismatic minister seems to get a very good press, and in part that's precisely because he had a very successful campaign, I mean showed his political savviness there, to woo the mill bloggers, these Voyenkori, who are, you know, in the main a rather unruly and significant nationalist contingent of social media commentators and influencers that even the Kremlin is quite careful not to alienate. One of the first things he did was to start meeting regularly with them, to listen sagely to what they say, to make them feel that he was actually paying attention and doing something about it. I think in part that's true, but also he knows perfectly well how to flatter a bunch of self-important Voyankori. And this very much has, I think, is driven the national narrative, not least because let's be clear, a lot of newspapers rely on the Voyenkori as either their war correspondents or just simply people who provide them with copy and good click-bait click-baity interviews. So their support has a wider impact. It's worth noting, after all, that the latest Apex survey of Russia's hundred leading politicians that gets uh summarized each year in Yezovisma Gazeta saw Belusov rise to number 10, up from number 15 the year before and 20 the year before that. Now, to a degree that's inevitable in a time of war, the defence minister gets more coverage and people think they're more important. But I think it reflects something more than that. And it's quite indicative, actually, also that last year a deep fake image of Belusov surfaced online, in which he seemed to be saying that the country's economy was heading towards collapse in part because of the central bank's policies, and that everyone in the peripheries was dying defending the people in the homeland and such like. Some of that is true, some of that is not, but the main thing is that they actually use Belousov as the individual, and that gave it a certain amount of traction before it was very, very quickly and hurriedly debunked and pulled down. But the thing is, that's all very well now. He seems to be able to do his job, and in a way, no one wants to too obviously oppose him because clearly Putin wants him to do that job. But when we think about it, I mean, if you look beyond the initial needs, or the immediate needs, rather, of the special military operation, you know, Putin is still expecting Velovsov to do something that's pretty much impossible, which is after all, not just to win a war, but also to modernize and reform the Russian military. And to do so in a time of, I think it's fair to say, at best, stagnant economic progress. So he's fine for now, so long as he's producing so long as the war is going on. And you know, no one's gonna mess with the current status quo, it seems. That can't last forever, though, for a number of reasons. First of all, time. You know, it's worth noting after all that even when Choigu, who is the consummical operator, even when he became defence minister, you know, he didn't have a team ready to slot in instantly. He had to build it up. In fact, just like Belugsov, he hadn't actually expected the appointment, and we don't know if this is unlike or like Belusov, was actually quite reluctant to take it on. He was basically just like Beluxov, he was pushed into this when Putin decided he had to get rid of a politically problematic previous defence minister. But of course, over time things will change. Over time, let's say if Belusov remains in position for years, he will gain clients. He will get to know more of the generals and start to have an opinion as to who he thinks is good, who he thinks is bad, who he thinks is friendly, who he thinks is an enemy, and want to and probably will manage to exert some degree of influence over that. Particularly if after the war ends, whenever that may be, Gerasimov is then jettisoned, as is almost in, I think, impossible to avoid. Then, well, that will mean that Berussov becomes a political actor. And a political actor within the context of the military, he will gain allies, he will also generate resentment. And more broadly, as I say, about peace, it's not just about whether or not Gerasimov goes. When the war ends, then in theory at least, their respective roles once again return. And although the chief of the general staff will be expected to sort of lead the process of the reconstitution of the armed forces, the idea is that he would do so under the tutelage of the defence minister. We will see. As I say, if even if if Gerasimov goes, then there's gonna be the whole tussle over who's gonna be the new chief of the general staff. If Gerasimov stays, is he going to be willing and able to accept this new realignment? Also, look, peace is gonna mean massive debates over the pace and the scale of demobilization, the reframing of doctrine to reflect the lessons of the war, and also the shape, size, and nature of the forced reconstitution. And all of that means resource allocation. It means money. And when you have money, well, you're gonna have winners and losers. So again, this is not something that can be easily managed without necessarily creating tensions. And tensions mean the third broad point, resistance. You know, for the moment Belusov is doing what the generals want him to do. The more he tries to assert his own role and his own vision, then inevitably the more likely there'll be the resistance from an officer corps, which is conservative. And also, while broadly accepting, shall we say, conceptually of political control over the military, often actually resentful when it happens. I mean I heard from a retired general who said, Give him another year, and Belusov will have grown into a job that was totally new to him when he arrived. That's when we'll really start to see what he's made of. In other words, that's when the Bolshevik will start to face his own white generals, and we'll see. Belusov, after all, started his tenure with a very bold statement. He said, I've always been guided by the principle, the reinforced concrete principle. You can make mistakes, you can't lie. I mean, it was a great soundbite. Um it's not quite sure how far it's really being applied now. But will he actually apply that? Especially when he has greater freedom of manoeuvre, especially with peace? Will he, for example, crack down on issues like the degree to which Russian military officers, including the chief of the general staff, massively inflate many of their claims of victories on the battlefield, to the point where it's beginning to almost become a meme and a laughing point. So again, Belusov, he's gonna actually have to make a choice between sticking to his avowed principles or breaking them and then really suffering the reputational loss as a result. And a final point is really about what the state of the country. As I've mentioned, there will be austerity. Russia after the war is unlikely, at least for a while, but quite possibly a long while, to be able to afford or want to maintain the current levels of defense expenditure, especially if it involves pivoting away from some current production and developing new forms of production. Now, it's easy to be a well-regarded minister when the money is flowing, and it is flowing in wartime. But maintaining that status quo when the money may be being cut, when the job is to drive economies forward in the face of opposition from within the Generalit, and perhaps even also to impose doctrinal changes, you know, what's going to happen to all these died-in-the-world tank officers, including incidentally Gerasimov, if the tank is, as maybe, I mean, it's too soon to say the tank is dead, but the tank may well be deprioritized, as shall I say, one of the sort of iconic forms of Russian military power. Well, that's when you get a much more serious test of Belusov's firmness. And even before that point, even while the war is still raging, there is the mobilization question. Again, to a large degree, outside of Belusov's actual control. He cannot decide how much money is being spent by the federal and local governments to attract people to the ranks. He can't change mobilization policy, he can't decide to send in conscripts, he can't decide to mobilize reservists. But in some ways, the fact that it's not under his control does not matter because this is part of the responsibility of the Defence Ministry to ensure that the soldiers are still there. And as a result, this will require him to be an advocate. An advocate with his peers within the government, but also with Putin. Is he going to be willing to do that? And if so, is he going to be successful? There's austerities of very different kinds. So look, for now, for for Belusov at least, it's all good. The technocratic challenges are, at least to a degree, you know, let's let's not overplay it, there's still all kinds of problems, but nonetheless, things are moving much more smoothly than they were before. Those challenges are to a degree being met. But those are the technocratic challenges and a time of war. The political ones, especially the ones which will be freed up by a time of peace, well, those are still to come. And then we'll see how the Bolshevik fares. Well, that's the end of another episode of the In Moscow Shadow Podcast. Just as a reminder, beyond this, you can follow my blog, also called In Moscow Shadows. Follow me on Twitter at MarkGaleotti or Facebook, MarkGaleotti on Russia. This podcast is made possible by generous and enlightened patrons, and you too can be one. Just go along to my Patreon page, that's patreon.com slash in Moscow Shadows, and decide which tier you want to join, getting access to exclusive materials and other perks. However, whether or not you contribute, thank you very much indeed for listening. Until next time, keep well.