In Moscow's Shadows 247: Victory Day Without The Victory

No tanks, great camera work. Victory Day is supposed to be Russia’s most unshakeable story, the moment when the state proves its strength, its allies, and its confidence on Red Square. Yet watching this year’s parade, I can’t escape the sense that the symbolism is working harder than the reality: fewer troops, no heavy hardware in Moscow, and security concerns hanging over the whole performance. 

In the rest of the podcast, I look at a leaked report on spinning peace and wonder if it part of an attempt to lobby Putin indirectly, the appointment of a new commander of Aerospace Forces, Colonel General Chaiko, and that (to me, pretty dodgy) 'European intelligence report' that has caused such a storm.

The bigger point is simple and uncomfortable: disinformation and psychological warfare are part of how this conflict is fought, and they thrive on our appetite for certainty.

The Kyiv Independent report I mentioned is here.

The podcast's corporate partner and sponsor is Conducttr, which provides software for innovative and immersive crisis exercises in hybrid warfare, counter-terrorism, civil affairs and similar situations.

You can also follow my blog, In Moscow's Shadows, and become one of the podcast's supporting Patrons and gain question-asking rights and access to exclusive extra materials including the (almost-) weekly Govorit Moskva news briefing right here. 

Transcript

Why Victory Day Feels Different

MG 0:00

Today, Saturday the 9th of May is Victory Day in the Russian calendar. But I'm not so sure it really feels like it. Hello, I'm Mark Galliotti, and welcome to my view of Russia in Moscow Shadows. This podcast, of varying length, frequency, and format, yet always reassuringly low production values, is supported by generous and perspicacious patrons like you, and also by the Crisis Exercise software company Conductor. No, not a permanent change to the opening music. I just thought because I was recording this on Saturday the 9th of May, because I'm travelling tomorrow, well, I thought therefore it was worth swapping out the usual arise ye Russian people with the classic Dien Pabedi, Victory Day, in this wonderfully overblown style. Anyway, this podcast is going to be about, well, victory is celebrated and claimed, but also as a subtext about the difficulty in knowing the truths these days, unfortunately. But anyway, let's start, of course, with Victory Day. This morning there was the parade through Red Square. And I mean it's interesting because clearly the basic story about this is indeed that it's a rather humiliating, truncated Victory Day light that we have. No tanks, no rumbling missiles. Indeed, a much, much smaller complement of troops, very few foreign guests, as I'll come to, and definitely it had to be say, not really in the A-list. So that's the key story. But just before digging into that, I mean it's worth noting that if a similar parade had been launched by any other European country, it would have been quite impressive. And thinking also of the frankly not very convincing attempt to do a parade through Washington, DC, likewise, you know, on one level, this wasn't a bad parade. The point is it was in comparison to the way the bar had been placed by previous parades, and clearly in comparison with what Putin would have liked to have had. Well, in that context, clearly it is a rather shabby knockdown. And it's quite interesting that in fact what they ended up doing was having a big video package in the middle of it showing all the exciting shooty stuff, the rockets, the missiles, the submarines, the soldiers, and so forth, rather than having them anywhere near actual Red Square. The real stars in many ways of this, I would say, are whoever the uh wizards behind the cameras on Russian TV. As usual, some quite extraordinary camera shots, including, and look, if anyone knows how they did this, please by all means tell me. Because we had really close camera shots of the um acrobatic jet fighters doing a fly past over Red Square and a sort of tight diamond. You know, it looked like they had a camera really close to the lead plane. And I was thinking, look, they can't there can't be a a drone that can be that fast and that well controlled. Surely that it's safe. Is it just simply that they actually had a very, very long lens camera taking it, or what I have no idea. But as I say, I I I was impressed by the camera, which is a little bit um a little bit like damning with faint praise. What did you think of the grand military parade? Cracking camera shots. But anyway, yes, otherwise, it was as I say, it was a a rather shabby contrast to future ones, to previous ones. And this is not just a Moscow story. Thirty-eight million people watched the parade last year. I have no idea how many this year, but this is actually a national and indeed international event. So it matters when you have to change dramatically your format and your approach. And people will be picking up on that. So after all, what is the purpose of this grand, pompous, patriotic pageantry? Well, the first one obviously is to demonstrate military might, and there I mean I'm sure the the soldiers who paraded through, they marched jolly well indeed, but nonetheless this really didn't have the same effect. And particularly what's striking is some of people saying, oh well, it's because they don't have the tanks and so forth. They absolutely do. If the Russians had wanted to put it on, remember at the moment the war in Ukraine is primarily, not exclusively, but primarily, being fought by drones, by infantry, by guys in pickup trucks. And yet at the same time, the factories keep churning. They're rolling out, I think it's it it's averaging out, I think, more than one of the new T90M tanks every day. And these are not, as I say, all being driven straight into battle to be blown up by Ukrainian drones. So of course, if they'd wanted to have a phalanx of heavy metal, they could have done so. And indeed, many other parades being held around the country, like I mean I saw pictures of Yekaterinburg's, for example, they did have tanks. So, no, this is a choice, and as such, it's it's a definite fail. The second key purpose of the parade is to demonstrate the international connections that the Kremlin retains in this age in which the West is trying diplomatically to isolate the country. Now, in the past, we have seen various high-profile figures, particularly last year because it was the 80th anniversary. This year, though, wow, it really was not impressive. I mean, they had Alexander Lukashenko of Belarus, of course, but otherwise no heads of state from either Commonwealth of Independent States or CSTO countries. In other words, precisely the countries who would have been regarded as the countries that still wanted to cultivate Russia. And that includes the presidents of Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan. Usually they turn up to these parades, not this time. Who did they have? The leaders from Laos, from Malaysia, and Slovakia. I mean, with all due respect to those countries, that is not probably what had been on Putin's wish list. Plus, there's the presidents of the Abkhazian and South Ossetian unrecognized pseudo-states, and the president of Republika Srbska, which is not even a state, it's the Serbian part, the Serbian substate, shall I say, of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Now, Russian presidential aide for foreign affairs Yuri Ushakov claimed in a briefing that, well, no official pres invitations had been sent out to foreign leaders. I can't help but feel that sounds like a rather shabby excuse for the low turnout. But then again, if you're clearly fearing that your parade is going to be buzzed or attacked by Ukrainian drones, perhaps it's not surprising, not only that you actually don't invite that many, but also that not that many people choose to turn up. Now the third key purpose is in some ways for Putin to give one of his big showcase speeches of the year. And frankly, this was pretty boilerplate stuff. I mean the first half was all about World War II, sorry, the Great Patriotic War, and the great triumphs and the great hardships and such like. The second half was clearly about the special military operation, the war in Ukraine. And I suppose it's striking that he did explicitly frame it as such, because at other times he's tried to scarcely mention it at all. But well what really could he talk about? He had no great victories after all to announce. What do we have? The great feat of the victorious generation, i.e. the great patriotic war generation, inspires the soldiers carrying out special military operations today. They are confronting an aggressive force, armed and supported by the entire NATO bloc. Must have been a little bit uncomfortable actually for Robert Fitzo, coming the Slovak leader, coming as he does from a NATO member country, to hear that, but never mind. I dare say he'll live. And yet our heroes continue to move forward. Then Late continued, the key to success is our moral strength, courage and valour, our unity and ability to endure anything. We will overcome any challenge. We have a common goal. Everyone makes a personal contribution to victory. It is forged both on the battlefield and in the rear, and that's really the point. I mean, essentially, Putin could have just simply said, keep calm and carry on, accept the sacrifices of the present in the name of your ancestors, and that's about it. It was a lot of yada yada around that. We've heard it all before, but I must say that the Russian people have also heard it all before, and I'm not convinced it has much traction left. But as I say, what else could he have really said? So this is one where there were certainly no surprises. And that's particularly problematic because a fourth purpose of Victory Day is to project confidence. And here is the issue. They've already they've slimmed it down for fear of a Ukrainian attack. Some people are suggesting that in fact this is all some kind of Machiavellian manoeuvre in order to make the Ukrainians look like the bad guys in the eyes of the Russian people because oh, they're so evil, they might even attack the Victory Day parade, parade commemorating triumph over fascism and so forth. I think that's perhaps a little bit too clever. So anyway, you you've cut down your parade. You have offered a ceasefire, and there's been a bit of back and forth with the Ukrainians, but ultimately the ceasefire that is announced just in time is announced by Donald Trump. So although, I mean, for example, Moskovsky Kamsomolet said earlier, had a headline, Trump pressured Kyiv. Zelensky called off strikes on the Victory Day parade, i.e., to try and make it as if the Ukrainians absolutely had planned it, I have absolutely no reason or evidence to believe that they had planned anything, because if nothing else, I think it's clear, even before the Russians started issuing some particularly horripulating threats about what would happen, you know, Putin would have had no option but to deliver some kind of extravagant pyrotechnic response to Kyiv had they attacked essentially the high holy day of his uh secular religion. And that would have probably seen Areshnik's uh these hypersonic missiles slamming into Bankova, the government building in Ukraine, things that actually hadn't been done before. So anyway, I don't think the Ukrainians were planning it. But nonetheless, as a way of trying to salvage a little bit of dignity from the situation, at least they're trying to say that, well, Zelensky had been doing so, but even then, it's because of Trump that he's not done so, not because of his fear of Russian retaliation. The point is, look, if you are an autocrat like Putin, you do depend very heavily not on fear, but on apathy. And apathy is best generated by that sense that you are unchallengeable, that there is this aura of imperturbable confidence around you, such that no one should even bother trying to think about the possibility of conspiring against you. And yet, we've had Putin scaling back his parade, and indeed I think in about a third of regional capitals parades were actually called off entirely or held prematurely on different days. Trump has had to get, or he's had to allow Trump the credit for the ceasefire, and he's not really got a great hall of foreign guests there. Put all that together, he is bleeding authority as a result of that. Now, again, I don't want to make too much of it, particularly at the moment when we'll we'll come to it, but there's all this overblown talk of coups and everything else, which I don't see for a moment. But nonetheless, there's no way of getting around the fact that this was not a net gain for Putin. What other uh particularly insights from watching the coverage? Um Putin, it has to be said, seemed to be in fairly good nick, fairly good health, spoke quite vigorously and so forth. His movements were pretty fluid, you know, and and no, I don't think it's because this was a double, as he went and sort of basically shook hands with remaining veterans of the war and such like. And well, who else do we see? Well, there was there was Shoigu, Sergei Shoigu, former defence minister, now according to this European intelligence report, and please note there are very, very strong air quotes around that description, as potentially involved in some kind of coup against Putin. Well, there he is, not in house arrest, not in manacles or electronic bracelets, but just sitting there chatting quite amicably with I think it was Genis Manturov, Deputy Prime Minister. So, anyway, more on Shoigu later. So overall, yes, this was not the classic and no doubt idealised notion of a Putin Victory Day parade. It was, though, a perfectly reasonable event. It was, in short, and here I'm going back to my point from last week, a perfectly decent parade for a middle power. But again, that's clearly not enough for Putin. In terms of talking about what's enough for Putin, one of the other big stories of the week has been about the potential for peace in Ukraine. Yeah, that that particular topic again. And there's a couple of interesting straws in the wind. But, but, but I mean on balance, I'm still not optimistic, but nonetheless, let me at least talk about it. Now, clearly in his speech, Putin didn't sound like a man who was contemplating peace. I firmly believe that our cause is just. We are together. Victory has always been and always will be ours. Nonetheless, we did have this interesting leak from which was reproduced in Dossier, which is a Khodokovsky-funded emigre media outlet that does a lot of this kind of leaks and investigative analysis, of essentially a plan that was drawn up for the presidential administration on contract, on essentially how something less than the full maximalist goals could be spun as victory. And this report, dated February 2026, includes points like we must know when to stop. Too much is a defeat. Continuing the special military operation would be a Pyrrhic victory. And also, a note that continuing the war in Ukraine might require a reconsideration of fundamental positions. In other words, we're talking about things like a general mobilization, complete transition of the entire economy onto a full-blown war footing, which it's nowhere near at at the moment. In other words, politically explosive moves would be needed. And this is something that, you know, I and others have been talking about. The fact that it is not that Russia cannot sustain a war longer term. It is that to do so, and I would say, again, I mean, who knows? It seems to be a little bit like the event horizon. It's always just a bit further away. Um, but nonetheless, I would say by the end of this year, it's going to be very hard not to be having to seriously consider ramping up measures in a way that Putin has resisted doing because then it absolutely changes the political calculus. But anyway, so that's that's what they're warning. And what they envisage as the kind of scenario, which will be there will be agreement signed between the United States and Russia, and then between the United States and Ukraine. So, in other words, this is not something that involves Putin and Zelensky sitting down and shaking hands, that we would see the entirety of Danetsk and Lukansk regions transferred to Russia, which implies, maybe even actually sort of formally acknowledged, but that's just me reading between the lines, that in Herson and Zaporizhia regions, essentially the front line gets fixed, which would leave Russia in control of about three-quarters of these regions. But on the other hand, the Russian troops would be withdrawn from the Sumi and Kharkiv regions where they don't have much it has to be said at all. The European sanctions can remain if the Europeans want, but the American sanctions would be lifted. And meanwhile, essentially there would be an acceptance of the sovereignty of Ukraine, and denazification would be entirely symbolic, and Zelensky could remain in power. So, this scenario would essentially envisage not just freezing the front line, but it's still expecting that remaining 20 or so percent of Donetsk region to be handed over. But apart from that, it's basically a freezing of the conflict and everyone going their separate ways. And yes, maybe the Europeans will keep their sanctions if they want. No real talk about limits to Ukraine's armed forces or anything like that. No real talk about limits to Ukraine's capacity to join other alliances. And the the basic uh selling point would be, as they put it, Putin has bent the West. We've thwarted the West's plans to expand and prolong the conflict. So, in other words, again, it goes back to, after all, the thing that Putin said in his Victory Day speech about actually this is not just a war with Ukraine. This is a war with Ukraine with the full backing of NATO, which is not entirely true, but not entirely false. Now, as I say, this does include the notion that the Ukrainians would abandon the remaining bit of Donbass or that Russian forces would take it. I'm not quite sure which of those is less plausible, but I think it is fair to say that this is one of those points where if the principle of this report were ever accepted, it would be easier to then extend it to then say, well, actually, why don't we just freeze the conflict now rather than sort of lasting another year just for the sake of what by that point would be entirely rubbled ruins and shells of cities. So it's a it's a it would be a step forward. Key point to make though, this was not commissioned directly by the Kremlin, but from within the presidential administration, and apparently by first deputy head of the presidential administration, Kiryanka. Sergei Kiryenka, who is both a survivor and a very savvy political operator, is not about to risk his position by going too out on a limb with something that Putin would find offensive. So, you know, it's quite interesting that he is associated with this. But we shouldn't assume that this is something that Putin himself is currently contemplating. It may just simply be contingency planning. After all, the job of the presidential administration is to be ready to give Putin whatever he needs whenever he decides to need it. So presumably they have, just like the generals, will have all kinds of contingency plans sitting in drawers just in case Putin decides that he wants to invade Greenland or whatever. Well, so too likewise the presidential administration has to have a whole variety of plans ready to roll if as and when things change. So it could just be that. However, and this is both speculative and probably unfeasibly optimistic, but bear with me, this may also be lobbying. We do know that, particularly these days, but generally speaking, Putin is not someone you go up against and disagree with openly. That's not the way to the man's heart, and indeed it may well be the way to the nearest window. Instead, often this is done indirectly. I mean, I still love the story that when there were attempts being made to persuade Putin to back the idea of Russia bidding for the Sochi Winter Olympics, one of the things that was done, and this was done by contacting Dmitry Peskov, his press spokesman, and basically asking his advice as to what would be a useful tactic, was on the radio channels that Putin listens to, and along the routes that his motorcade would take, they would place adverts, so billboards or you know radio adverts, essentially to try and give the impression. That there was some groundswell of opinion, that the Russian people were crying out for a Winter Olympics, and that was enough to help persuade Putin. So sometimes things are done indirectly, and as I said, I suspect anything as as delicate as persuading Putin perhaps to step down from his war effort, that may well be regarded as exceedingly delicate. So we've had this report drawn up, presumably briefed at least part of the way around the Kremlin. We've also had a series of opinion polls recently, which have shown Putin's approval and trust ratings still obviously high, but very definitely on the slide. Now remember that, okay, there are still independent polsters, but for these numbers to be released, and especially for them to be reported in the Russian press, it's because someone has given the green light to that to happen. This is not something that just simply would happen organically. So a warning that Putin's popularity is going down, a briefing of a suggestion about the fact that really the war would be even more problematic if it continued, and here is a way to make ending the war on really the current basis palatable. And also we had the United Russia bloc, Putin's own political party, in the lead-up to autumn's State Duma elections, actually releasing the guidance notes. And again, this is it. It's not just a leak, it was released. The guidance notes that they're giving candidates and organizers as to how to handle tricky questions. Now, the tricky questions are not so much about the war, they are about the secondary byproducts of the war, the inflation, the food prices, etc. etc. As well as the interruptions in access to online uh internet. So, in that context, they also are signalling that there are difficult questions being asked on the doorstep, that there is a problem in the country. Now, each of these may well be entirely unconnected, and there's, you know, we go back to the the usual Kremlinological danger that human beings being engines of pattern recognition, we're always looking for patterns, and sometimes we will create patterns where none exist. But still, it did seem a little bit uh indicative that at least within the political bloc, in other words, the political technocrats, the political managers, and indeed the technocrats generally, there are people who actually are trying to signal that this war is a problem and it's time to end it now. Now, that's also encouraging because I don't see an equally extreme counter-argument. I mean, the the counter-argument people are basically the ones who, again, to go back to Putin's speech in Victory Day, are more or less saying, look, steady as she goes. Yes, it's painful, but we will be able to win on the battlefield what we may not be able to win in the negotiating chamber, and essentially continue. I mean, outside the lunatic fringe, I'm not seeing any serious voices that are actually calling for escalation. So at the moment the debate seems to be from status quo to peace rather than the other way. We'll have to wait and see. And now I know there is the claim sometimes that when Putin has low numbers, then actually he will tend to escalate. I'm not convinced that that is true. What it does mean though, though it is possible, I mean you might decide, okay, what we need to do is actually, for example, take that bit of the Donbass quickly, and to do that we're gonna have to take some politically unpalatable steps like sending in conscripts or mobilising reservists or something else. So, yes, escalation is possible, but on the other hand, I think it's more that when he sees his poll numbers down, especially in an election year, even if it is Doomer elections, but nonetheless, he will feel more of a need to do something. Remember, Putin is not a doer. Putin is a fence sitter as long as he feels he can, but that fence becomes a little bit more riddled with splinters, a little bit more uncomfortable a perch when political numbers are bad. So it is possible, no more than possible. And if it is true, if we are going to see some kind of shifting of position towards peace, if if if what could we expect? What are the indicators that we should be looking out for? Well, first of all, I think we'll begin to see articles in the heavyweight press, and particularly not things like Niesivissima Gazieta that are still slightly out on the fringe, but things like Resiska Gazeta or Ysvestia, uh putting forward the position that in fact actually we don't need to advance any further. And particularly if it means actually not taking that last bit of Danetsk or Blast. You know, maybe we'll see, I don't know, historians saying, well, historically that has never been part of the Don Vastos cities, or whatever else. But again, a little bit of preparing the ground that way, deniably. We will see the mill bloggers being reined in, because there is clearly a concern that these ultranationalist influencers could otherwise very much be the sort of kernel of a that's K-E-R-N, not C O L, the kernel of a stab in the back kind of mythology around a piece. We could have won it if only Putin had been willing to be more audacious. No, we'll see them being reined in. And that means anything from yanking their financial chains. I mean, a lot of them, frankly, they feed at the state's trough, or even more dramatic, people being arrested and the like. But also, most importantly, I think we will start to see appeals to Putin, particularly from, for example, people within the occupied Donbass and elsewhere, saying, look, you know, we don't care about this extraterritory, it's not important to us. We worry about our Russian brothers who are sacrificing their lives for our cause. We think that there's enough of their blood has been spilt or whatever. So, in other words, it makes it look as if, and this is after all a position in which Putin always loves to be politically, that they are requesting something from him, and he can be the magnanimous Tsar acceding to the wishes of his people, not a waverer cutting and running. Now, let me stress, this is entirely speculative. I don't actually expect it to happen, this is certainly not at the moment, and we're nowhere near there yet. But it's just a sense of the things that we should be looking out for, in the hope that it might signal a change in policy. Right, I think I have overdosed everyone with uh unnecessary and unfashionable optimism there. So time for a quick break while I regroup myself into a suitably pessimistic frame of mind. Just the usual mid-episode reminder that you're listening to the In Moscow Shadows podcast. Its corporate partner and sponsor is Conducto, which provides software for crisis exercises in hybrid warfare, counterterrorism, civil affairs and the like. But you can also support the podcast yourself by going to patreon.com slash inMoscow Shadows. And remember that patrons get a variety of additional perks depending on their tier, as well as knowing that they're supporting this peerless source on all things Russian. And you can also follow me on Twitter at Mark Galliotti or on Facebook, MarkGalliotti on Russia. Now back to the episode. While I think about it, in the past week uh two of my books have come out, certainly in in the UK, both of them from Osprey, not new books, well no correction, one is new, sort of. Forged in War, my military history of Russia from the Varangians up to today is now out in paperback. And The Siege of Kazan, Ivan the Terrible Breaks the Carnate, a very slender little book also from Osprey, that actually now has come out in the UK. There was a slight uh logistical hitch, which meant that uh supplies hadn't reached the UK when it was released elsewhere. Now I I would call them sort of good holiday reads except that I ought to note that my separate book, Homo Criminalis, How Crime Organizes the World, was after all described in the Financial Times as the readable, scary, fun beach read of the new crime literature. So maybe that's something that you ought to be sort of packing as you start to think think of your summer holidays. Anyway, enough about this. I mean this is all very well, but I know what you're saying. You're saying tell us about Alexander Tchaiko. And fair enough, just for you, because you asked, I will indeed. Yeah, okay, you probably don't know who Alexander Tchaiko is, there's no reason you should. Well, this week the news emerged that Colonel General Alexander Tchaiko is taking over from Colonel General Viktor Avsalov, who had been commander of the aerospace forces since 2023. Now, Afsalov was a professional Air Force guy. Chaiko, who's 54, is a career army soldier, not a fly boy. And this is why it's actually worth just very briefly dwelling on, just for a couple of reasons which I'll come to at the end. First of all, who is Chaiko? Uh as I say, he's 54, he career soldier, rose quickly through the ranks. 2007 to 2009, he commanded the here I need to take a deep breath. Second Guards, Motor Rifle, Taman, Order of the October Revolution, Red Banner, Order of Suvrov Division, named after M. I. Kalinin. Got through that. Which is one of the relatively elite units that is actually based around Moscow. So it's also there as a sort of palace guard and parade unit, but also as a kind of Praetorian Guard force there to check the other security agencies. Believe it or not, Russia is actually quite well set up for coup proofing. But the point is to actually have led that division, that's a sign of a high flyer generally, certainly someone who's got good political connections. In 2015, he was the first chief of staff of the Russian Armed Forces Group in Syria. He came back, he was 2018-19, he was deputy head of the General Staff Academy, which is quite an interesting position because usually that goes to someone who's a little bit more of a military intellectual, which I don't really get the sense that Tchaiko is. So again, it's an indication of political favour, as much as anything else. 2019 to 2021, he was Deputy Chief of the General Staff, in other words, he was Gerasimov, one of Gerasimov's deputies, and in that time he actually received the Hero of the Russian Federation Medal, which is the highest military award. So he spent two tours commanding forces in Syria, and then at the start of the invasion of Ukraine, well, he was in command of the Eastern Military District, and it was Eastern Military District forces who were meant to be key in the seizure of Kyiv. So in other words, it was largely his tanks that ended up burning and battered on the road to Kyiv. So this is a guy who has been involved in all the various major military engagements of the recent years. He's got a reasonable record in the special military operation, speaking as a commander rather than as a human being, but not necessarily a particularly distinguished military record. Now, it's no great surprise that Afzalov is gone. There's been so many failures of air defence, and he was primarily an air defence guy. And it was really quite interesting the degree to which the new defence minister, Belousov, actually kept his distance from him. I mean, in the context of a different project, I was trying to find evidence of connections between Belusov and other senior military figures. And, you know, it's clear that Belusov did the rounds and he met people and he goes and stands on a podium next to them as a new submarine is being launched or a plane is being shown or whatever else. But actually there was very, very little evidence of any connectivity with Avsalov. So I think even at the beginning, either Belusov didn't like him or essentially had realized that this was a dead man walking career-wise. But it is interesting that it's a ground pounder who's actually been put in charge of the air forces. Now it's not the very first time. Previously we had Sergei Sorovikin, who was head of the Air Forces 2017 to 2023, even though again he was a ground forces soldier. And, well, to be perfectly honest, you know, he he might well have held that position had it not been that his closeness to Prigojin and Wagner pretty much guaranteed his rustication after the Wagner mutiny. He's now, poor bugger, head of the Coordinating Committee for Air Defence under the Council of Defence Ministers of the Commonwealth of Independent States, which is a title that is far longer than the real significance of the position. It's a little bit akin to, I don't know, being made director of paperclip accounting or something like that. But nonetheless, there was a certain amount of logic then, as there is now, that you actually don't necessarily need an Air Force officer to command the Air Forces. I say Air Forces because they actually have divided them into several, well actually it's aerospace forces, technically, rather. The whole point is to actually be able to convert air power into effects, and given that this is basically a war that is being fought in ground terms, that that seems to be the logic. Now, Surovikin was, and I don't intend to pun here, a real high flyer. He was seen as a natural next choice as chief of the general staff before the Wagner mutiny. Is is Chaiko the same? Well, as I say, I mean his military record is decent, but not outstanding. There is a claim having been made that he's in fact a political client of Gerasimov's. And this is what was being said by one figure, Alexei Alshansky, who claimed to have actually served under him. He was born into the family of a general who once served with Valery Gerasimov in the German Democratic Republic. Gerasimov was literally Tchaiko's senior's subordinate. So the idea is essentially that this is a patronage relationship and that Chaiko is a mediocrity who nonetheless has risen up through the system precisely because of Gerasimov. Now that's entirely possible. I have to confess that I haven't yet been able to find anything corroborating that. Again, it's very difficult always to prove a negative. Is that because it's not true or just simply because I haven't found it yet? Who knows? It's also worth noting that Alshansky, he works for Prashaya Rouge, a farewell to arms, which is a French-based group that helps Russian deserters. And I have heard some people on, shall I say, the other side of the ideological divide sort of categorize it as a Western government-backed subversion outfit. So, you know, make of that what you will. But look, I promise to give you reasons why this actually might be important and why you have to put up with my military nerdery there. Well, I'll give you two reasons. First of all, if this is indeed the case of Gerasimov trying to elevate his own clients to the highest positions, and up to this point, we haven't really seen that. I mean, yes, of course, he looks after his mates, but not the same as actually sort of greasing the route up someone so quite so clearly, it makes one wonder if he's actually looking about identifying a potential heir. And why that matters, well, obviously, if he thinks that Putin is eventually going to disp sooner rather than later, dispense with his services, and remember he's over 70, so he now serves at the pleasure of the president even more so than usual, because the president has to be the one to actually waive the obligatory retirement age of 70. Well, he may well want a successor who will also be his protector. The point is Gerasimov is no more honest, in my opinion, than all the rest of the senior Russian officials. And you don't want your your new chief of the general staff deciding that he's going to make a point of looking at all the skeletons in his predecessor's closet. So it may well be that actually we might see some kind of change, which could indeed, again, if I was being ridiculously optimistic, be because there's some kind of end to the war. I'm not going to go that far though. And the second reason is again it says something about the nature, even now, of the Russian military system. Chaiko's not terrible, but he's by no means the star of his cohort. I could rattle off the names of half a dozen other Russian generals, don't worry, I won't, who would seem to be much, much better fits to this for this position. Indeed, some of them actually have had much more kind of collaborative work with aerospace officers. Sure, Chaiko, in his role as commanding forces in Syria, remember the Syrian operation was primarily an air war. So, you know, he's not totally without. He's not a terrible choice. He's just not necessarily one of the obvious choices. And it reminds us of the degree to which still, even now, even given all the challenges facing the Russian military in Ukraine, it still seems to be that politics and patronage and simple jealousy still gets in the way of appointing the really able soldiers. But anyway, for my last point that I want to cover in this particular podcast, you know, going back to this business, I said I have no idea whether or not it's true that farewell to arms is in any way connected with sort of Western backers who use it or whatever. This is exactly the kind of derogatory and undermining rumour that is used against any anti-Kremlin body, just as pro-Kremlin bodies are so often presented just simply as dupes and fronts for the Russians. I mean, that's unfortunately the present day. But if we are talking about biased information or possible disinformation, I do need to talk about that report. There was this so-called European intelligence report, which emerged having been leaked to, well, at least three media outlets. You know, it ran in CNN, the Financial Times, and the Russian emigre anti-Kremlin outfit Important Stories, Vajny Story. And I'd be really interested actually to know if any other media outlets were offered it but turned it down. Anyway, it purported to be this genuine, secret, spooky briefing on what was going on inside Russia, and it presented this very dramatic picture that, of course, generated equally excitable coverage because it's, you know, absolutely what people want to write about. Paranoid Putin trembling in his bunkers, afraid that the elite are going to use drones to kill him. I mean, the Russian elite, not even the Ukrainian elite, and indeed also fearing coups from his own soldiers. I found this a very, very problematic document. First of all, a lot of what it presented as new material was stuff that we knew about. I mean, look, obviously the FSO, the Federal Protection Service that's responsible, essentially it's quinted like the American Secret Service in a way, if the Secret Service also had a regiment of troops, it's responsible for the security of Putin, certain other senior government figures and the like. Of course, in a time of war, it's going to be getting much more antsy. Dmitry Peskov said, against the backdrop of this terrorist threat, of course, all measures are being taken to minimize the danger. Well, it's it's it's rare that Peskov just simply tells an unvarnished truth, but that is indeed what it is. Of course, they're going to be stepping up their searches and their background checks and so forth, but much of what was presented, the use of anti-drone weapons, the use of dog teams and such like, we've seen it, we've seen it for years now. And it also reflects the fact that it doesn't necessarily mean that Putin's paranoid so much as that actually the Putinist state is paranoid. Go back, for example, to remember in December the Russians were claiming that the Ukrainians launched a drone attack on Putin's residence in Valdai in Novgorod region, which has generally been poo-pooed, and I must admit, I don't think it was a deliberate Ukrainian drone attack. I think what we're talking about is a drone that was maybe, you know, it's its guidance systems were scrambled by jamming and it went off course. That happens. It's not just that there was no evidence that the Ukrainians were after Putin, there's no evidence that Putin was at that particular residence. But that said, just from speaking to people, in Moscow, I do feel that within the government or within the Kremlin, however you want to frame it, there is a pretty strong body of opinion that precisely believes that this was a deliberate attack. They're wrong, but nonetheless, if you think that the Ukrainians are actually willing to contemplate that, of course you're going to step up your security. There's also stuff within the report that is frankly impossible to verify. There's a very entertaining account of squabbles within the senior Security elite after the assassination of uh General Um was it, Fanny Ol Sarovarov, that was it. Again, end of last year, and Gerasimov was saying that basically it's the FSB's fault, the FSB saying that we we can't provide protection to everybody. You know, generally a a fair amount of of grumbling and eventually some kind of compromise was reached. Well, I mean that may well be entirely true. Though frankly, if that is true, given that this is not the kind of meeting I suspect that there will be a huge number of people at, um if if this was a genuine meeting, then I can't help thinking that that intelligence service is burning a source by making it public. But it might not be. It's entirely plausible. I had no idea. And then finally, there is stuff in the report which I in some ways I think was the real payload, is distinctly questionable, and particularly this stuff about a coup and the degree to which Putin is hiding in bunkers. Oh, and by the way, yes, in terms of things that we know are wrong, Putin is not currently hiding in bunkers all the time, especially not a bunker in Krasnodar. The suggestion is he's abandoned many of his residences and just stays largely in Krasnodar. Krasnodar is closer to Ukraine and thus easier to hit than many of the others. But in any case, we've seen Putin out and about doing all kinds of things. But also the idea that not only is he concerned about a coup, but that Shoygu, former Defense Minister Choi Gu, might be in some way involved. Now, this is why I have a feeling that this is actually a psychological warfare operation. That if it would be possible to A, get the Russians to start a mole hunt for a mole who doesn't exist, there is nothing more disruptive. But particularly if Putin could be induced to go after Shoigu, that actually would be highly disruptive. Why? Because Shoigu is not just an insider, he's a mate. He's someone who's actually personally close to Putin. And if nonetheless Putin started to mistrust him and indeed turned against him and he was arrested or whatever, one could imagine a whole bunch of other people who up to that point felt that they had the impunity of being one of Putin's circle of friends, they might be thinking, hmm, actually, this guy is getting dangerous for us all. So I suspect that that's the real I mean, do I know? Of course not. It's just that the nature of the document, the fact that it was leaked to three separate media outlets, this is not just one kind of random thing, it's clearly a strategic leak. It's timing, again, just before Victory Day. Well, again, that's quite indicative. I mean, look, if this is genuinely the quality of some European intelligence agencies' briefings, then someone's taxpayers are deserving of a refund. On the other hand, if this is actually just a piece of subversion, well then, well, frankly, I can totally understand where it's coming from. And it reflects the fact that there is a covert information war going on in parallel, in tandem with the war that's actually taking place in physical terms inside Ukraine. I mean, yes, of course, we know that there's Russian disinformation and subversion, especially within Europe. If they can persuade Europeans that the Ukrainians are all ungrateful sort of spongers and scroungers, and get people turning against the idea of continuing to support Ukraine economically, that is a massive, potentially war-winning move. Likewise, if one thinks of the Ukrainian sabotage and assassination operations taking place inside Russia, they are best considered to be political war. They're an attempt to basically get the officer corps scared, turn it against the war because they don't want to have to keep checking under their car to make sure there's not a bomb that's going to blow them and their family up, and likewise to make society as a whole feel that this war is somehow coming home to them. We even had recently a report, a well-researched report within the Kiev Independent newspaper about the degree to which a first Canadian and then British supported project by the group called Yellow Ribbon and its sister initiative, Zlamovka, to encourage non-violent protest and resistance amongst Ukrainians within the occupied territory. Now, that's controversial because it seems to be that at least 30 of those people who are encouraged to protest have been arrested and some of them have been killed or tortured. Now, there's a lot of debate over this. I'll leave a link in the programme notes to this the story so if people want to dig into it. But again, that's the whole point. It's that actually everyone is trying to carry out operations intended to undermine the unity, the morale, the discipline of the other side, and in the process undermine their war effort. I mean, in that respect, we can actually go back to Putin's words. I mean, actually, when he said that thing about victory, it is forged both on the battlefield and in the rear. Well, this is war being fought in the rear. And look, there's no question but that there is more happening. I mean, but I don't know about it because the whole point is this is covert. But nonetheless, amidst the welter of claims, Russian claims about Western governments spreading propaganda and funding anti-Kremlin emigré outfits, Western claims about Russians buying influence and penetrating political movements and the like. However paranoid and ridiculous so much of these allegations may be, I would be surprised if they were not some truths. And finally, so who was behind this report? Which is the European Intelligence Service that is responsible? I have no idea. But what I do find it interesting I had from two different sources, different countries, both within the security establishments, suggesting it was the Estonians. And the interesting thing is that there was no actual basis for that, just simply that, well, this is the kind of thing we'd imagine the Estonians would be doing. I have no idea if that makes my Estonian listeners proud or not. I suspect it does, but I just thought I would pass that on. The point is, this is warfare. Warfare is fought in the cognitive and political realms as much as the physical battlefield. But, and let me throw in yet another plug, as I say in my book, The Weaponization of Everything, if we're honest, it's always been so. It's just that now, living as we do in a common economic, information, cultural, and communication space, is just so much easier to mess with each other. And that can include psyching Putin out so that he mutilates his own Victory Day parade, or indeed spreading fear and disunity within the Russian elite. And the moral of the story? Well, sadly, I suppose it's trust nothing. Except me, of course. Well, that's the end of another episode of the In Moscow Shadow Podcast. Just as a reminder, beyond this, you can follow my blog, also called In Moscow Shadows. Follow me on Twitter at MarkGaleotti or Facebook, MarkGaleotti on Russia. This podcast is made possible by generous and enlightened patrons, and you too can be one. Just go along to my Patreon page, that's patreon.com slash inMoscow Shadows, and decide which tier you want to join, getting access to exclusive materials and other perks. However, whether or not you contribute, thank you very much indeed for listening. Until next time, keep well.