In Moscow's Shadows 262: Jaw-Jaw Not Ending The War-War

I start with a round-up of current news stories: the Witkoff-Kushner peace mission that is likely heading nowhere, Zelensky's apparent threat to civil aviation that was likely more psyop than serious, and the SCO summit in Bishkek that was likely more significant than either of the above. (And medieval counterfeiting, for good measure...)

In the second half, I look at Russia's drone strike on the SBU HQ in Kyiv and the signs of a SBU-GUR rivalry, driven by both politics and also the thriving criminal call centre fraud industry.

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Transcript

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Welcome And Upcoming Talks

MG 0:00

Well, it's a weekend jewel. Memory of the wall. Hello, I'm Mump Galeotti, and welcome to my view of Russia in Moscow Shadows. This podcast, of varying length, frequency and format, yet always reassuringly low production values, is supported by generous and perspicacious patrons like you, and also by the Crisis Exercise software company Conductor. So today's podcast, I'm going to look at some current events in the first half of the pod, and then in the second half, dive into the Russian drone strike on the headquarters of the Ukrainian Security Service, and then also talk about some internal wranglings within the Ukrainian intelligence community. First of all, though, a couple of announcements. There will be no In Moscow Shadows next Sunday, though as usual, patrons will get something in their inboxes as an alternative. And also just to flag up some future talks in case people are interested. On the 24th of September, I'll be in Copenhagen at the Royal Danish Defence College's Reading Russia Right Conference, which is, I think, free, but you do have to sign up for tickets in advance. And I'll be talking about Russia's war in Ukraine and the consequences for the Putin regime. Can you think of a more generic title than that? Then on the 20th of October, I shall be in Finland, in Tampere, where I'm giving a talk on whether Russia is a prisoner of history at a pre-conference event for the Aleksanteri Conference, which is being held about ideologies in Russia in conjunction with the publication of a new book. Not mine, I should add. And then after that, I'll also be on a panel at the Aleksanteri Conference in Helsinki. And then on the 9th of November 2026, I shall be in Durham speaking at Stevenson College or Durham University about whether Russia can ever change. Details and links where I have them are on my In Moscow Shadow blog, the Speaking Events page, which also has some videos from past events. Anyway, on to the substance.

Putin Talks Peace And Holds Firm

MG 2:35

And obviously we have to start with the prospects, well, not really, of peace, because after all Jared Kushner and Steve Whitkoff are back on the peace train. They've been in Moscow for three-hour talk with Putin in the Kremlin's red drawing room that I must admit to me always looks distinctly overblown, a little bit too much like a nineteenth century Parisian Madame's boudoir. And then they're off to Kyiv today to meet Zelensky. Now, did the dynamic duo bring anything new to the table? It doesn't sound like it. Trump suggested so and then walked that back. Not exactly the first time we've had that kind of confusion. And frankly, they just simply said that they had discussed substantive plans for next steps. So it's not even about next steps, it's about planning, discussing how to plan for next steps. None of that exactly sounds especially optimistic. And particularly, look, Putin basically restated his usual talking points about recognising the realities on the ground, which is code for what we have taken, we will hold. He even sort of raised denazification in the context of the sort of recent ceremonial reburials of, it has to be said, people who were indeed in bed with the Nazis in World War II, which I think was a bit of an ideological own goal, but hey, you know, what do I know? Um so there's not much coming from there. It's not quite 2022 talking points, because clearly they're no longer talking about or anticipating control over all of Ukraine, but certainly no sense of any kind of give. And he sugarcoated that by praising his interlocutors. Though I have to say, were I, as Whitkoff was, ever told by Putin, you enjoy our full trust, it's been quite convenient working with you. I think I might be reassessing my life choices because being convenient for Putin is not something that a negotiator should be. Let me just briefly parse some a few aspects from the readout that we got from Yuri Ushakov, Putin's veteran foreign policy consigliere. Because after all, you know, at the moment we we really don't have much detail to go on as to what may have been discussed. Anyway, he called the talks constructive, extremely frank. Now, frank usually means blunt to the point of offensive in diplomatic speak, but I very much doubt it means that here. I think again this is boilerplate trying to suggest that there was real substance rather than just a kind of rather arid exchange of talking points and pleasantries. He said the talks were not limited to an exchange of views on resolving the Ukrainian crisis. Economic issues and potentially major mutually beneficial Russian American projects were discussed in considerable detail. So, in other words, the Russians are still on their attempt to woo Trump with various economic mirages, the sense that there's these huge deals for USA Inc. If only this trivial little detail of the Ukraine war were out of the way. Again, I'm not sure if it really has much scope to it, but the point is, again, what we're really seeing is no particular movement, it's all the old talking points, all the old tactics. And then he adds, note was made of the Russian army's tangible advances on in the combat zone. Well, obviously, so this means that Putin rambled on as usual about real and fake military successes and the imminence of victory in the Donbass. Again, we shouldn't be surprised about that, but again, I think what their Ushakov is signalling is again that they're really waiting for what they anticipate to be some kind of breakthrough in the Donbass. And again, it's all about where your troops happen to be. That's where the new line was going to get. How is the Russian press reporting this morning? Well, look, I had a quick skim through, and it's interesting because on the whole, this is just at the moment at the level of bear reporting rather than editorializing, which to me suggests that there isn't some kind of clear line coming yet from Peskov, press presidential press spokesman, and the presidential administration. And indeed, I mean Rasiska Gazetta, the government newspaper of record, hides behind its rather usual tactic of simply sampling Western media, which again is a sign that we don't really know what we're meant to be saying, so let's just pick some, generally speaking, convenient passages and quotes from a variety of foreign news sources. It saves us actually having to put ourselves on the line. Izvestia puts the whole Shambang in the context of the American midterms, noting that Trump has a desperation for foreign policy successes, given that he is mired in the Gulf, but at the same time introduces a note of caution that more or less suggests he's not going to get one here. And the rather more nationalistic tabloid Komsomolska Pravda asks, does the US want to make peace or buy time for Ukraine? And well it answers its own question. Putin outlined the essence of the meeting, not to find a final solution, that's a rather unfortunate translation there. No, to inform and discuss. The new round of negotiations is just beginning. Decisions are still a long way off. And very much it suggests that this is just preparing the ground for a trilateral Trump She Putin meeting at the Apex Summit, which I'll come on to in a moment. So, you know, again, everyone is basically involved in the game of expectation management, but I think accurately so, that they don't expect expect much to come out from this. Will

What Washington Tries And Europe Doesn’t

MG 8:34

it therefore make a difference? I mean probably not. The best that one can be said is at least Kyiv gets three days of grace from Russian bombardments as a result. And the negotiators, well, they got dinner with Kirill Dmitriev at the Avrora restaurant in Moscow. I looked it up just out of curiosity, since it's not one that I knew. And it's a very fancy, as you'd expect, restaurant, which is one of the reasons beyond the fact I think it might be a new one, but anyway, apart from that, it's not really my kind of place. But it was interesting looking at the trip advisor comments. A lot of them were very much complaining about slow and sullen service. Well, somehow I don't think that was going to be a problem for the Kushner-Witkoff delegation. Still, look, let's be honest, it's very easy to be cynical and critical of their apparent, and I'm being very polite when I say make it's only apparent cluelessness. But at least the United States is making some kind of an effort. Dialogue is useful. Even if it doesn't actually get anywhere, it helps eventually, little bit by little bit, identify the contours of the current sort of diplomatic possibilities. The Europeans, and I've got to be careful, I would say shameful failure to step up, just simply telling the Russians to end the war and withdraw does not represent a meaningful peace initiative. Well look, at the moment what's happening is the Europeans are maintaining the war, which has its absolute role, but just hoping that that somehow magically leads to peace. It will someday, perhaps, but at a terrible, terrible cost in the meantime, to everybody and to the international system. So, you know, it may be, as the convenient Stephen Jared Road show is demonstrating, be impossible at present to advance the cause of peace. But there's no harm in combining that, and I'll stress that, combining that with continued practical support for Ukraine. Speaking

Zelensky’s Airspace Threat As PSYOP

MG 10:39

of Ukraine, let's talk briefly about what seemed to be a threat from Zelensky to civil aviation, which I hadn't had a chance to talk about yet. He made this claim, and I think I ought to just read a passage from it, if you'll excuse me. Today we want to warn every airline that uses Russian airspace, every insurer, and everyone who still uses Russia's key airports. Russian airspace is becoming completely unsafe. Ukraine does not threaten civilian aviation as such, not a single civilian aircraft. There will simply be drones in Russia's skies on a scale that has to be taken into account. Although the Russian authorities are not properly informing people about this, Russian airspace will effectively be closing. The war started by Russia is closing its skies. We in Ukraine do not want innocent lives to be lost. That's why we're warning our partners the safe days in Russia's skies are over. Now, this was, I think, quite carefully judged. On the one hand, look, it did sound like the threat of a war crime, in other words, hitting a civilian plane, but couched in sort of gangsterish language, you know, lovely restaurant you've got here, it'd be shame if it burnt down. Likewise, in this case, we're not threatening Russian um civilian aircraft in Russian airspace. We're just saying there's going to be a lot of drones around, you know what I'm saying. Now, that said, I do not for a moment believe that actually Zelensky was indeed contemplating a war crime. Although we'll have to wait and see if, as some suggest, this might indeed be the beginning of launching Operation M's, which was this very ambitious but practically, politically, and morally, let's say, ambiguous or questionable or risky operation to essentially launch AI-controlled swarms of drones against Russian airports in order precisely to close them down, with the idea that the AI would be handling terminal target guidance, in other words, the final sort of attack. But of course, the problem is, can you absolutely trust that AI will always get it right and won't find itself actually hitting a crewed aircraft or a well-stocked civilian building on the ground or anything like that? And the answer is no, and by all accounts, when Zelensky dismissed his former defence minister Tekbro Fyodorov, at that point he also put MM's, Operation MM's kind of at the very least on hold. So some people are saying, oh, this is the start. I've seen no sign of that yet, and I still think it's unlikely he would do that precisely because of the risks. Instead, I think this should be better taken as a PSYOP, a psychological operation, against Russia, but also, as he explicitly said, against its foreign airlines that fly there and their insurers. It's something that I discuss in my book, The Weaponization of Everything, that in the modern world, bizarre and rather anticlimactic as it may sound, actually insurance companies have become, I wouldn't say a weapon of war, but let's say a venue of war. If you can stop things from being insured, whether we're talking about oil tankers going into the Black Sea or aircraft flying into Nukovar airport, well then you actually are going a hell of a long way to actually stopping them from operating altogether. So this was actually, I thought I thought quite cunning and carefully judged. It doesn't seem to have been especially successful. I mean Air Tanzania stopped its services to Russia, which I'm sure was a terrible blow, but then restarted them after a week. Turkey's Pegasus Airlines, I think very briefly stopped flights. But I took a look just to see yesterday at the Sherometcheva Airport arrivals and departures boards. And at least to my quick glance, it looked pretty much unchanged. Obviously, we had loads of flights coming in and going out to various Asian destinations, but also various Turkish destinations and the like. So, as I say, it didn't necessarily work. But I think this is the key thing. We have to realise that there is one crucial dichotomy here. The Russians on the whole have been committing war crimes without admitting it, whereas the Ukrainians are threatening war crimes without carrying them out. It's all part of this rather strange balance of this war. Anyway, let's move away from the west of Russia and Ukraine, and let's go east.

Bishkek Summits And Great Power Signals

MG 15:18

This past week there's been exciting things happening in Bishkek, the capital of Kyrgyzstan in Central Asia. Yeah, okay, there is the Shanghai Cooperation Organization Summit, but the really exciting thing is the World Nomad Games, which is this international sports competition that's held has been held regularly since 2014, dedicated to ethnic sports practised in Central Asia. I treated patrons in the last Gavarit Moscovar press roundup to some highlights, but we've got sports like Altish, which is belt wrestling. So the contesters are wrestling as you'd expect, trying to throw the other, but they have to hold on to their opponent's belt at all times. There's Er Enish, we're talking about wrestling, which is a traditional Kyrgyz horseback wrestling, the riders wrestle rather than the horses, one should stress. Another one, which sounds particularly interesting, is Salburun. Now this is a kind of hunting triathlon in which the contestants carry out falconry, mounted archery, and then a hunt assisted by a taigan, which is a Central Asian dog, a sight hound. I don't know, to me it looks like if you crossed an Afghan hound with a border collie and didn't let it go to a day spa every week, that's what you get. They look like good dogs. So yes, there was the World Nomad Games, but yeah, fine. I suppose I should talk more about the Shanghai Corporation Organization Summit. Not least because it's worth noting, although the SEO isn't a really tight bloc, nonetheless its member countries, together they comprise almost half the world's population and more than a third of global GDP, whereas, for example, the European Union accounts for about an eighth of global GDP. So this is absolutely not inconsiderable. And it's not just because of the presence of China, but also Russia and India, as well as a variety of other countries. So this was a chance for Putin to meet with Xi, China and India's Prime Minister Narendra Modi, but also Belarusian strongman Lukashenko, and indeed Turkey's Erdogan, yes, the gang's all here. For that matter there was actually also an American delegation in town, technically not there to attend the summit, but rather the nomad opening of the Nomad Games and the celebration of Kyrgyzstan's Independence Day. But still, you know, again, it it did mean that the actually Americans were present there. It's funny, uh there was a quite a funny photomontage, AI done photomontage in Tsagrad, of Putin and she shaking hands while a rather disgruntled Trump peers at them from behind some curtains, which gives some sense of A, the pleasure that the Russians have at being at a summit which is not for once dominated by the American presence, but also by the Americans' clear suspicion of this event. Now, in the this was this summit was in the news to a large extent because Modi apparently chastised Putin for not ending the war in Ukraine. I don't think it's quite as straightforward as that. Again, just it's worth actually always going to the original texts. And he said every day that the war continues, humanity is in effect set back a step, whilst every step towards peace gives all of humanity real hope for peace. Okay, quite a clumsy sp uh formulation there. We need to move from endless war to an end to the war, to a cessation of hostilities. And we will need to move precisely in this direction. I mean, okay, but what is that really saying other than peace is good? Which I think pretty much everyone accepts. I mean actually, interestingly, the Russians themselves say that peace is a good thing and we're moving towards it. Yes, of course, their notion of peace is you know peace through not just strength, but peace through obliteration. At the same time, though, anyway, Modi called Putin my friend, and Putin replied very courteously, Thank you very much, Prime Minister. We are moving forward along this path. So really I interpret this less as a rebuke to Putin, because I'm sure if nothing else, it didn't come as a surprise to Putin. I'm sure this would have been carefully sort of sounded out behind the scenes by their respective diplomats and Sherpers. But rather carefully calibrated equipoise. Modi wanted to say something that sounds critical enough to be hailed in the West, but not so critical as to anger Russia, and in particular by not saying who is at fault. It's not like Modi was pointing at Putin and saying, You, you, you've got to do this. He's just more as saying, well, peace should be made, should be pushed forward, which again is a kind of bland generic statement in many ways. So, you know, again, I don't think we should expect China or India to get involved, and certainly when they're not at the point where they're actually putting pressure to bear on Russia to pull in its horns and end the war. Indeed, I'm she himself said, on international and regional hotspots such as Ukraine, the Middle East, and Afghanistan, China is ready to strengthen communication and coordination with all parties, taking an approach aimed at addressing both the symptoms and causes of the problem and promoting a political settlement. Well, what does that actually mean? Again, it means peace is good, and if we have the opportunity to gain some kind of political capital, we will get involved. Both India and China would on balance want the war to end, but not enough to pressurize Moscow. And certainly in the case of China, they don't actually they they may not really care if Putin wins, but they certainly don't want him to lose, because that would be more problematic. So actually what I would say came out of the Shanghai Corporation Organization Summit is really a sense, once again, that we need to appreciate that Russia has I wouldn't say allies, but let's say Russia has partners who may not be especially keen on the war or indeed on Putin and much of what he does, but certainly for the present moment see pragmatic advantage in maintaining a relationship with Russia. But what was interesting, and this loops back to the point I was making earlier, was that Yuriushakov, in his readout, he said that there were discussions about a possible trilateral meeting between, as I said, Putin, she, and Trump, and that this could theoretically take place as early.

A Possible Trump Xi Putin Meeting

MG 22:00

Early as November during the 2026 Apex Summit, which is being held in Shenzhen, China. So very definitely watch this space. I'm a little concerned about what would happen if you put Trump, Xi, and Putin in the same room. But the point is that, well, we'll just have to wait and find out what happens to that. And one just final little note before the break, continuing my archaeological theme from the previous episode, scientists from Novgorod State University and the Institute of Archaeology of the Academy of Sciences have examined over 13,000 coins from the reign of Prince Vasily I of Moscow, 1389 to 1425, son of Dmitry Donskoy. And from that cash they identified 151 counterfeit coins. And what's particularly interesting is that their suspicion that these medieval counterfeiters actually were working hand in glove with government officials who worked at the Moscow government mint. Why? Well, because it looks as if many of these counterfeits were made with the genuine coin dyes. In other words, the the things that are stamped in to make the coins that actually came from those government mints. So criminals, organized criminals, because you have to be organized for this kind of scale of counterfeiting, working hand in glove with corrupt officials. Some things really don't change. Anyway, let's take a break and let's actually move the focus to what's happening in terms of Ukraine and its intelligence community.

Sponsors And A Ukraine Intelligence Pivot

MG 23:42

Just the usual mid-episode reminder that you're listening to the In Moscow Shadows podcast. Its corporate partner and sponsor is Conductor, which provides software for crisis exercises in hybrid warfare, counter-terrorism, and civil affairs. But you can also support the podcast yourself by going to patreon.com slash in Moscow Shadows. And remember that patrons, as well as knowing that they're supporting this peerless source on all things Russian, get a variety of additional perks depending on their tier, including articles I've written, the most weekly Gavarik Moskvar press briefing, and other bonus content like the Chronicles of a Different Russia alternative histories. And you can also follow me on Twitter at Mark Galliotti or on Facebook, MarkGaleotti on Russia. Now, back to the episode. Now I often make the point that I am a Russia specialist, not a Ukraine specialist, and I think it really is really important, and I thank God we are getting away from this lazy and implicitly colonial assumption that if you're a Russianist, you can busk, you can sort of cope with talking about the other various post-Soviet states with some degree of authority. I mean, it still happens. The other day I was actually contacted and asked to comment on Armenian politics. And my first assumption had been that what they were asking me about is the Russian perspective on what was going on in Armenia. But no, no, they actually wanted me to talk about different Armenian parties, and I had to say, guys, what the hell do I know? Um, you know, I'm I am not an Armenianist. Okay, now that was a particularly extreme example, and thank God that is quite rare. However, there are particular areas in which I do feel that I have something to say about Ukraine, and one of them is crime, since I do tend to look at crime across the whole span of Eurasia, and the other one is intelligence services. And we've got some interesting stories that seem to represent the intersection of that. But

Geran Drone Strike On The SBU

MG 25:39

first, and the real hook for this is that on Friday afternoon, what seems to have been a jet-propelled Geran IV drone hit the headquarters of the SBU, the Ukrainian Security Service, in central Kyiv. And we're actually told that they specifically hit a room which is used by the chief of the SBU, or acting chief at the moment, Oleksandr Paklad. Though it has to be said, in fairness, we had been told in the past that the SBU leadership was operating now out of a different building, precisely for security reasons. And it's certainly true that Moscow had absolutely no illusions about quite where the SBU was headquartered. I remember once I was almost detained, this is well before the war, in Kiev for taking a picture of the building, which is on a main street. And I I tried unsuccessfully to point out to the large camouflaged individuals around me that, look, you know, because they were saying this identifies the location of the SBU headquarters, and I said, look, it's on Wikipedia, it's on Google Street View. And given that it was the headquarters of the Ukrainian KGB, I'm pretty sure that Moscow knows where it is. To no avail, never mind. Nonetheless, it could well be that there is a certain parallel with actually what happens in Russia. Paklad may have kept his offices there for political and symbolic reasons as much as anything else, and likewise in Russia, although actually the bulk of the management of the Federal Security Service now takes place not in the infamous Lubyanka building, but instead in a much, much more anonymous, very ugly dark grey building right next to it on the other side of the road. But still the director of the FSB has his offices in the Lubyanka building for reasons of status as well as politics. Though interestingly enough, whereas originally, way back in the day of the Cekar, the first head of the Bolshevik secret police, Felix Sheginsky, had his offices on the outside of the Lu, looking out on the Lubyanka building. But then after an assassination attempt, which is almost successful, it was then moved to a one inside with just a view out onto an internal courtyard for precisely security reasons. Maybe Paklad might have considered that. But anyway, so we so we have this attempted attack, and Paklad was apparently uninjured, and Zelensky said, I instructed Paklad to deliver an appropriate, tangible response, and where possible, one that mirrors this strike to the Russians. So perhaps FSB director Alexander Bortnikov should take note. The thing is this was an unusual escalation. I suppose it's worth noting, by the way, that the Russians at first said it wasn't them. And various commentators tried to jump in with corroborating, but turned out to be inaccurate information, such as, oh, the claim that there wasn't even an air raid warning at the time active in Kyiv, suggesting somehow that it hadn't actually come across the border, but that had been an internal operation, of which more in a moment. But in fact, this all fell apart. A as I and thank you to those on Twitter who responded positively when I asked how was that actually true, since obviously not not being on the ground myself, and who were very, very quick to say no, there was an active air raid warning in place. And also it's worth noting that uh despite the claims that it wasn't them, this morning Moscowsky Kamsomolets rather incautiously included this attack in a list of Russian drone attacks on Kyiv, so narrative control fell apart. No, it seems fairly clear that uh two Geran IV drones were tracked heading towards Kyiv from the occupied territories, one of them actually made it to its target. But this is interesting because this is different. In the past, just as, you know, back in olden days there was a convention that even as their cannon were cutting furrows through the enemy with grapeshot, generals did not seek to have other generals killed in battle. That's just something that you do to commoners. Well so too, what was interesting is that in this war the Russians, although they they could have targeted the SBU headquarters or Bankova, the head of the presidential offices of the presidential administration, they haven't, presumably out of sense of if if they if they open that route, then they may face that themselves, and in fact they may well now.

Breaking The Taboo On Leadership Targets

MG 30:16

So why why break that taboo now? Well, presumably it's a part of a sort of general escalation as this war gets uglier, and I think as both sides think of themselves as getting more towards the end game, so you take more risks to improve your circumstances for any final peace negotiations. But more to the point, I think, in an attempt to try and exacerbate what seems to be an emerging an increasingly problematic feud between the SBU and Khur, Ukrainian military intelligence. And whether this actually will work, I have no idea, and probably not, is the honest answer. But again, they're very much trying to suggest that this attack on the SBU, because it didn't come from Russians, of course, was therefore perhaps something that the Khur had actually engineered as a blow against its rival. And this is a live story because earlier this week we had this extraordinary shootout between SBU and Hur officers that left three Hur officers wounded. And

The SBU HUR Shootout And Arrest

MG 31:26

it it's a murky story. Basically, late last month the SBU arrested Stepan Kaplunov, the deputy commander of the Russian Volunteer Corps, which is a unit of Russians who are actually fighting for Kyiv, and essentially operates under the umbrella of Hur. It's not a particularly effective combat unit, but it's quite a powerful propaganda unit, I think it's fair to say. And now Kaplunov will deny that he's a neo-Nazi, but many people who are by no means friends of Moscow would say otherwise. And of course that tattoo on his arm, reading Sieg Idot victory or death in German doesn't help. But anyway, the SBU accused him of actually being an FSB agent all along, plotting assassinations against Ukrainians. And after extensive interrogation, they got him to confess on video, a confession that he has later said actually was coerced out of him. On Wednesday, an SBU team was taking Kaplunov back to one of his apartments in order to carry out a search when they were intercepted by Ghur agents. Now Khur's position is that no arrest warrant actually had been issued for Kaplunov's arrest, so in practice he had just simply been kidnapped. Anyway, what happened was that there was a standoff, there was some jostling, the SBU called their Alpha Counter-terrorism commando team for backup, at which point shots were fired. And I'm using that very bland formulation, shots were fired because it's still not quite clear what the what the process that actually led to the firefight was. Now, look, I have no idea whether Kaplunov really is a Russian agent, but I would say that no evidence has been advanced so far to prove it beyond this confession that, as I said, he says was coerced. And he has apparently been released, which I don't think you would do if you seriously thought this guy was a Russian assassin. And at the same time, we've had Olyh Kramov, senior SBU official, who's been sacked in direct connection to the incident. He was the head of its direction, sorry, Department for the Protection of State Secrets and Licensing. Again, I'm not quite sure of the connection yet there, but no doubt it will emerge. But there are two wider contexts to this, I would suggest. One of them is what does seem to be clear and is very much being discussed within the Ukrainian press, which is this emerging feud between Paklad and Kirilo Budanov, who's now Zelensky's chief of staff, but was previously head of Hour, and very much is still seen as the curator, the overall manager of the agency. And Paklad seems quite keen to try and I think clip Budanov's wings, and in part by painting Hur as inefficient, incompetent, insecure, and indeed dirty, and then to be able to say, and all of these problems emerged during Budanov's tenure. So that may well be part of the reason for this particular sort of bare-knuckle struggle. And let's basically say it's not anything new. You know, we can go all the way back to, for example, March 2022, first month of the war, when the Russians and the Ukrainians were still engaged in direct peace negotiations. And one of the people within the Ukrainian delegation was Denis Kyreev, a Ukrainian banker who had very, very good contacts in Moscow, but who was actually all along a hur asset. And in fact, they credit him with having provided crucial intelligence about the way that the Russians planned to, at the very beginning of the war, seize Hostomel Airport as a way of basically being able to project power very quickly into Kyiv. And thanks to Kireyev, that was foiled. But anyway, what happened in March was that an SBU team snatched Kirayev off the streets, and his body was later dumped back on the streets with a bullet in its head. And this was later said, oh, it was all a misunderstanding. Look, a misunderstanding means someone gets arrested, maybe even roughed up and stuck into solitary confinement before they're released with an apology. A misunderstanding will very rarely lead to what basically looks like a hit. So again, it's a very murky story, but nonetheless, it's you know it emphasizes the degree to which there has been a long-standing uh rivalry. And frankly, this is a rivalry that can get very, very bare-knuckled. So that's one one part of the story.

Scam Call Centres And Weaponised Crime

MG 36:00

But another part, which is even murkier in some ways, is the potential that this is part of a competition for control over the exceedingly lucrative criminal industry of scam telephone call centres. Now Ukraine has really emerged as a very significant uh focus for this, carrying out scams, obviously within Ukraine, but also within, well, across the rest of the world, but particularly in Russia. Russia has experienced a huge upsurge in telephone scams. And Ukraine is an obvious place, A, because there's a lot of Ukrainians who are perfectly happy to basically, as they would see it, you know, fight back against Russians in this way, but also because, you know, a lot of Ukrainians can can speak Russian and speak Russian even without sort of obvious discernible accents. I'm often struck with this, by the way. Obviously, accent is is one of the most difficult things for outsiders to learn. I mean, I I can sometimes tell if someone has an an accent that is different from sort of mainstream Moscow Central Russian one, but beyond that, pretty much nothing. Whereas, you know, foreigners are often amazed that I can hear a Brit speak and quite quickly get a sense not just from which part of the country they come from, but even their socioeconomic standing. That is just the nature of the sort of various ways that accent is actually quite a powerful indicator. Anyway, I digress. So you have a lot of these telephone scam centres in operating in Ukraine, and clearly, like so many other criminal ventures, they tend to have their their Krisha, their roof, their protection. And a lot of that is just straightforward corruption, just paying off someone. But actually what's happened is the whole call sender industry has also become weaponized against Russia as part of this struggle. And in part it's just simply because anything that causes trouble for Russians and drains money out of Russia is a good thing. But also we've seen these activities being used to essentially coerce people into carrying out low-level sabotage. The classic example is pensioners who are conned into providing bank details or moving their monies or whatever else. Anyway, they have their money stolen, and then they're told if you want your money back, you are going to have to do something for us. And we've had quite a few cases of people like firebombing, voyenkomati, uh draft military commissariat boards, that kind of thing. So there is a sabotage and espionage dimension to this criminal activity. And historically it's been the SBU, which, again, whether it's for corrupt reasons or otherwise, has largely been the agency that has sheltered and protected these call centres. And there is some suggestion that Khur is looking to muscle in on this. Is it because of the potential operational value or just simply the opportunities for corruption? Look, I very much doubt it's all one or the other. I think again these things do tend to overlap, and they're by no means unique. I mean, we've also had the case this week of Naboo, the anti-corruption agency, moving against an organized crime gang involved in a whole network of scams, call centres, which they say was being protected by officials from the Prosecutor General's office. So this is a serious and widespread issue. And it is not just simply a struggle over a potentially useful asset, it's also precisely being weaponized by Paklad in his attempt to paint the guru as being dirty, even though actually it's his agency which is mainly involved. And it creates all sorts of complex interactions and relationships. I mean, let's consider the case of what happened in June in Monaco. You have a Ukrainian oligarch in exile, Vadim Yermolaev, who was targeted by a bomb which killed one person, injured several others. And this seems to very much have been connected to a family business. Late last year, Yermolaev's son Artur was detained in Cyprus at the request of Interpol and then extradited to Estonia, where he was charged with creating a criminal organization involved in telephone fraud. And over a three-year period had actually received over a hundred million euros, over five million of which was actually coming from Estonian residents, which is why he was being tried there, through offering sort of fictitious investment opportunities. Now, Yermalaev entered into a plea bargain, he got a suspended sentence, he paid eight and a half million euros, and he was kicked out of Estonia and is barred from ever entering again. But nonetheless, it's interesting that this is how essentially the strike on Yermolayev senior is being conceived, because the suspect behind the blast, the person who actually planted the bomb, was she then, she was a Ukrainian, she then returned to Ukraine, where she was fortuitously killed. And the two people who are currently charged with that murder are a serving officer from Kur and a former officer from SBU. Again, this is going to be a story that takes some time to unpick, but it's a reminder that geocrime, which is what the Global Initiative Against Transnational Organised Crime is the term that they're using for the systematic use of criminality as an instrument of statecraft. It is very corrosive. It can be a terribly effective weapon, but it also is a very dangerous one because it tends to corrode the honesty, frankly, of the agencies that are involved and the FSB, which is now the, I would suggest, about as dirty an institution as you can find, even within Putin's kleptocracy. But nonetheless, you know, in part this is because of the SBU's closeness to organized criminality. But also, it corrodes sort of old boundaries between acceptable behavior as well as national boundaries. And it's one of the problems that the Ukrainians are going to have to deal with. And, you

Mavericks, Daring Ops And Hidden Costs

MG 42:09

know, it's not that I'm giving a prescription one way or the other, but think about it. If you want to have the most imaginative and aggressive operations, then you will generally also have to hire and give considerable latitude to the sort of people who can come up with them. You know, you think of what Ukraine has carried out, some quite extraordinary operations, like say Operation Spiderweb, where a series of Russian airfields and strategic bombers were hit by drones, which were driven by unsuspecting Patsys in containers close to where the airfields were, at which point they were launched under control from inside Ukraine. You know, the operation it took to get the spare parts together, to have them assembled, to have them loaded into the dispenser systems within truck containers, and then to actually have people, people whom, frankly, you could dispose of, then drive them up to the airfields. An amazing operation. And we've had so many others, you know, the attempted assassination of the ultranationalist Vladlin Tatarsky by a bomb secreted within a bust he was presented at a literary event, lots of other things. Far, far more imaginative and effective than anything the Russians have carried out in Ukraine. But I said to do that, you do need to have the cowboys, the mavericks, the buccaneers, the opportunists, the guys who are going to think, plan, and sometimes pull off the unthinkable. But these are also people who are hard to control and corral. This is, after all, part of the concerns that London and Washington had with the SOE and OSS respectively in World War II, that these were essentially not espionage but sabotage agencies. And when they were effective, it was often precisely because of the kind of people that you you engage, but people who, to a degree, you know you only have limited control over. You sacrifice control and discipline for creativity and daring do. And at present I totally understand why the Ukrainians are willing to accept that, because they're in an existential struggle and they need to be able to strike in into Russia. It'll probably be a problem in peacetime, though. But again, I think it's going to be the least of their concerns. And it's quite worth noting, well, why isn't the FSB doing quite the same? Or indeed, you know, GU, Russian military intelligence. And I think in part, there's a whole variety of reasons, including just the much more sort of bureaucratic and hierarchical nature of these structures. But also it's because certainly the FSB has been burnt by this already. Think back to the early days of cyber espionage and cyber sabotage. The FSB thought they came up with a cunning wheeze to short circuit the whole process, rather than doing it the tedious little way that GU was doing it by training up soldiers to be hackers and such like. They thought, well, look, let's just in effect buy our expertise off the shelf and co-opt a whole bunch of criminal hackers to work for us. And on the surface, yes, that that's a very quick way of building up your capacity. However, surprise, surprise, you take these criminal hackers, in other words, people who delight in breaking the rules and looking for loopholes. And are you surprised that they then get to use the access and the impunity that being FSB staffers means, for them to carry out their own operations as well, whether for their profit or just simply for their joy? Well, that's exactly what happened. And it led to a lot of trouble for the FSB. So I think to the F to a degree the FSB is now leery and frankly is much, much more risk averse. And that's one of the reasons why they are so much less effective in their various operations than the Ukrainians have been. But of course, I think even the Ukrainians must actually recognise some limits.

Why Targeting Bortnikov Could Backfire

MG 46:12

Go back to Zelensky's comment about some kind of symmetrical response. The obvious answer therefore would be a strike against the 74 year old Alexander Bortnikov. But to be perfectly honest, when I look at his track record, when I look at the amount of energy he still got for the job, and when I look at his likely successor, General Karalyov, a man whom we basically do know is already closely enmeshed with organized crime, and is probably, not least because he'll want to make his mark very quickly, much more likely to be rather more of a risk taker than Bortnikov in his in international operations. There's a part of me that thinks that actually the best thing for Kyiv is to gently cradle Bortnikov in their bosom and hope that he has a continued long and undistinguished life as director of the FSB. But there again, I doubt Kyiv is looking for my advice on what to do. So it's a suitable point for me to end. As ever, thanks for listening. Well, that's the end of another episode of the In Moscow Shadows podcast. Just as a reminder, beyond this, you can follow my blog, also called In Moscow Shadows. You can follow me on Twitter at Mark Galliotti or Facebook, MarkGaleotti on Russia. This podcast is made possible by generous and enlightened patrons, and you too can be one. Just go along to my Patreon page, that's patreon.com slash in Moscow Shadows, and decide which tier you want to join, getting access to exclusive materials and other perks. However, whether or not you contribute, thank you very much indeed for listening. Until next time, keep well.