In Moscow's Shadows 263: Voting for War Putinism

In Russia’s elections, the ballot box is no longer a measure of consent but rather a tool for manufacturing it. It's only two days into the three days of elections to the State Duma, but I catch up on the latest and consider what to look for, before addressing the growing concern/hysteria about the Russian threat to the West (no, Putin didn't try to kill Boris Johnson), mobilisation and the BRICS summit.

In the second half, I use Dmitry Medvedev’s striking line that Russia is “either a great power or nothing at all” to unpack how status, insecurity and strategic autonomy shape Russian foreign policy, alongside insights from Hanna Notte’s excellent book We Shall Outlast Them (Norton, 2026). Russia is changing, and "War Putinism" is building something that is often ugly and hardly always efficient, but in some ways is closer to the Putin/Medvedev vision of a "great power."

Some links:

• Russian Election Monitor is here.
• The Reading Russia Right event is here
• Medvedev's interview in Vedomosti is here.

The podcast's corporate partner and sponsor is Conducttr, which provides software for innovative and immersive crisis exercises in hybrid warfare, counter-terrorism, civil affairs and similar situations.

You can also follow my blog, In Moscow's Shadows, and become one of the podcast's supporting Patrons and gain question-asking rights and access to exclusive extra materials including the (almost-) weekly Govorit Moskva news briefing right here. 

Transcript

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What Russia Looks Like Now

MG 0:00

Well, as Russians go to the poles, in some cases early and often, while their state escalates its hybrid war on the West, what's emerging? A prominent state on its way out or a kind of great ham on its way up. Hello, I'm Mark Galliotti, and welcome to my view of Russia in Moscow Shadows. This podcast, of varying length, frequency and format, yet always reassuringly low production values, is supported by generous and perspicacious patrons like you, and also by the Crisis Exercise software company Conductor. So after a week's absence, it behoves me to catch up first of all on some of the current and newsy stories, and then in the second part I'm going to turn to this whole issue of great power, being guided, of course, by that peerless geopolitical thinker, Dmitry Medvedev.

Duma Elections And Turnout Theatre

MG 1:20

But first, look, there's elections. Currently I'm recording this on the morning of Sunday the 20th of September, so in other words, the third of the three days of elections to the Duma. There's also some various local and gubernatorial elections. And well, what can we say so far? Again, obviously we we don't have the final results, or or do we? If we look at the turnout, last time, last elections, the turnout was 51.72%. And it was interesting that there was quite a bit of sort of wobbling and repositioning of goalposts. The target was originally for a 50% turnout, then it was reduced down to 45-47%. But by the close of Saturday, with a day still to go, the Central Election Committee Commission was reporting that it was already 44.6%. Of course that was boosted by high and conveniently unobservable early voting polls in the occupied territories of Ukraine, which included 80.9% in the Donetsk People's Republic region. I mean, that's even rivaling Chechnya, which again, as of Saturday night, had a surprisingly, suspiciously high, but also to be perfectly honest, characteristically high, 85.2% turnout. So it looks like they might be going for a record. I mean, remember, I'll talk about this more in a moment, but you know, given that these elections are meant to be exercises in trying to legitimate the regime, high turnouts matter, but of course, if you calibrate it too high, then it looks totally implausible. It was, and I think this is the highest that there's been in post-Soviet times, 60.2% in 2011. So if it's already 44.6, you know, maybe they're they're aiming for that kind of figure. And in this respect, not only are they boosted by the occupied territories votes, but also the e-voting is looking distinctly dodgy. Russian election monitoring, which is an excellent source on all these questionable shenanigans and things, it's a Russian election hyphenmonitor.org. I'll leave a note um reference to this in the programme notes, and by the way, if you follow them, there's a wonderful photo from Leningrad region of a packed ballot box in which quite magically the ballots are exquisitely neatly stacked in two vertical columns, almost as if they had just simply been placed in there. But anyway, according to Russian Election Monitoring, if you look specifically at Moscow's e-platform, two and a half million digital ballots had already been issued, meaning that actually in under the 24 hours, almost one third of the city's entire electorate had apparently voted online. It's not really very likely. So anyway, we were seeing the usual shenanigans there. But of course, big question is not just about turnout, but what the United Russia vote share is going to be. Now again, last time it was 49.82%, quite enough to get an absolute majority in the Duma. This time, again, look, the expectation is it's going to be around 50%. But of course, the question was how likely is that going to be? Yes, ultimately they they can they don't entirely just simply invent the results from whole cloth. They have to do things to manipulate. I mean, otherwise they they wouldn't be bothering packing ballot boxes or the like. Um but nonetheless, the more they manipulate, the more problematic it can be. And well, I think it's likely again that we're going to see it again go around the 50%. In part, though, they might feel it has to be even higher because of the Putin factor. This was a an odd election that started relatively early in terms of the campaigning. Then after a certain point they decided that in fact, because of the potential for sort of high anti-war votes, the same reason why they removed Yabloka from the ballot, that in fact they really wanted to maybe even depress turnout, so that only really the people who were mobilised by the state and by employers and the like would actually bother going and voting. So then it was a rather dull, low-key campaign, and then right at the end we had Putin playing a much more significant role than usual. But the trouble is that might mean that they need to have a higher vote to be able to prove that Putin is still the great locomotive of all, that who can drag the vote up. So I'll have to wait and see. I suspect though, in any case, what we're gonna see is a careful um management of the vote share for the other political parties, just to ensure that they all remain, you know, m much less able to challenge United Russia's dominance of the Duma. Is there going to be trouble? I think it's highly unlikely, even though again I I I don't think these are gonna be especially well received elections. But in any case, it's it's already harder, it seems, to either watch the polls, especially through through the cameras which are placed there, or access detailed data to crunch. So, you know, it'll be interesting to see what can be done to try and understand how far and where these votes are rigged, because they clearly will be. But on the other hand, that doesn't really affect how people feel about it, that gut sense of whether these are honest. Outright fake vow ballots, we'll have to wait and see. Last time, the the number of fraudulent ballots cast for Putin rose from an estimated ten million in 2018 to at least 22 million, that's um out of 75 million votes cast. So we'll have to see what what happens this time. And two other things to to watch. First of all, who exceeds their KPIs? Remember, local leaders, mayors, governors and the like all have been assigned targets for what level of turnout and what level of vote for United Russia. Again, in order to try and minimize the degree of necessary rigging, you want to pre-rig as far as possible. And clearly there are going to be some who are more and some who are going to be less successful. These KPIs are not flat across the board. They do reflect the circumstances of particular regions. Some regions it's always harder to get turnout and harder to get United Russia voting. But anyway, this will definitely, I would say, influence the next round of personnel reshuffles. And the biggest, broadest question of all, again, will it work as a legitimating ritual? Arguably the stakes are, after all, that much higher now because of the war and because of the various concerns besetting the Russian people. Now, some authoritarian states go for these ridiculously offensively inflated votes of confidence precisely as a kind of challenge, a display of power, to more or less say, look, we all know that this vote has been rigged. So what are you going to do about it? And given that then people generally do nothing, it's it's a sort of sign that we have cowed you, we have broken you, just accept it. You know, in 2014 we had in North Korea Kim Jong-un getting acclaimed 100% of the vote. Now, rather more modestly, in 2017 tokmenistan's Gurbanguli Berdimuhamedov, you know, he limited himself to a mere 97.69%. Indeed, one could also look at Ramzan Kadyrov, who was elected in 2021, or re-elected rather in 2021, with 99.7% of the vote. But that on the whole though, that is not the Russian way. You know, again, you can either accept that this is a fake, rip off the mask, and instead just leer down and try to dominate society, or you can try and coax society into accepting your rule through making it look as if even if each individual does not feel particularly positive and didn't vote for United Russia or for Putin, they can think, well, it looks like most of my neighbours did. So we'll just have to wait and see. Again, the more the rigging, the more the risk. So that's the domestic results, but again, we're gonna have to wait and see what the uh the real figures are.

Rigging Risks And Legitimacy Games

MG 9:59

Let me just touch on for a moment, because it does speak to a wider issue in terms of Russia abroad, that whole question of whether or not the Russians were trying to kill Boris Johnson, something that I confess there are certain some people in the UK that probably wouldn't be that bothered about. But anyway, along with uh the UK and other national security advisers and so forth, when they are on a train on their way out of Ukraine. Again, I know this is old news, but Kim and I didn't have a podcast last week, I hadn't really had a chance to address it. I don't think they did. In fact, it's worth noting, I mean their train was already on in in Polish territory by the time the strike actually hit. I think that the Kremlin knows perfectly well that killing a former British Prime Minister, killing other senior European officials cannot be done with impunity. That would be uh an MH-17 moment, you know, akin to when that uh Malaysian airliners, air, you know, civilian airliner was shot down over the Donbass in 2014 by Russian supported rebels with a Russian-provided uh book surface-to-air missile. You know, it it forced it it forced governments into much more stringent sanctions and the like, in part precisely because it totally changed the public discourse about what was going on. I said the Kremlin knows this. I think it's much more the case that this was intended as a sign that says, look, we know what you're doing, we're getting annoyed with what's happening, and we'll we can show that we can strike with impunity. This is part of our Russia's general campaign against locomotives, they're trying to degrade Ukraine's transport infrastructure just as they're also hitting its energy infrastructure. And in fact, I think in this I can quote a military expert who in due course was was quoted in the newspaper Moskovsky Kam Samoyets. What did he say? It's possible that the strike was intended as a warning to present to prevent representatives of the United West from feeling too comfortable in Ukraine. Therefore, the strike wasn't aimed specifically at the train car Johnson was in, but rather nearby, so that he and the delegation inside could hear the noise and see the glow. This is being done, as I've already said, as a warning, and I think it's right, because our Western partners must understand that if aid from Poland, Germany, France and England doesn't cease, such attacks will continue. And I think that is the point. We are absolutely seeing an escalation. We are seeing the Russians being much more willing to take risks, much more active in terms of their various hybrid war operations in Europe. Maybe even we might begin to be seeing them in the United States. There's the reports about an attempted assassination attempt, but certainly within Europe, and I think we should see that precisely as a combination of a warning and a preparation. There is, after all, suddenly a note of frankly be hard, I'd be hard not pressed not to call it hysteria in certain Western accounts. We had in France Macron having this long meeting with parliamentarians, political leaders, in which some came out saying just how shocked they were and how terrible the situation, and people saying that in fact the risks of an actual outright war are so much higher. The striking thing though is that the formal assessments that are coming from the UK, from NATO, quite possibly sort of other European governments, certainly the Baltic governments that you think would be very much in the front line of worry as well as war, are unchanged. And the Latvian Prime Minister Andris Kulbergs said, right now there's no reason for concern. At the moment there's no information indicating a particularly high threat level. And I think this is a key point to hold on to. We should not assume that hybrid war slides into real war. This is one of the reasons why I don't actually like the term hybrid war, but we're stuck with it as a term of art. We are seeing a whole variety of escalatory, but not infinitely escalatory, acts taking place. The arson attacks, potential assassinations, cyber attacks, etc. In part, this is out of genuine Russian anger, that they feel that in a way Europe's proxy war with Russia through the medium of Ukraine has indeed crossed a sort of a threshold. And they just want to basically say, we are angry with what you're doing and we're going to hurt you. You should not feel that you can arm Ukraine and provide targeting information so that Ukraine can strike deep into Russia and for it not to have consequences to you. So there is a, I think, an emotional element there. There is also a political element, an attempt to try and undermine Western support, which I mean is not working, and I don't think will work. It's amazing how often we find countries, through history and at the moment, believing that ultimately everyone else's population is that much more flighty, that much more able to be convinced to back away through these kind of direct acts. You've got Russia thinking that it could drone and missile Ukraine into submission. You've then got Ukraine thinking that its deep strikes can change the needle on Russian attitudes, which to a degree they are, but it's actually they seem to be annoying people more than anything else. And now you have Russia also thinking that somehow a variety of inconveniences and concerns are going to make Western electorates force their governments to back away from support of Ukraine. None of these work. If you cannot deliver an absolutely devastating hammer blow through your attacks, then actually the result is often really to increase the determination of the other side to defeat you. But nonetheless, everyone seems to think that they're in a different position. So I think there is that. And finally, again, because I think there is a growing sense that 2027 may well be the year in which there is some kind of not final resolution of the war, but a peace. Again, I I think this is Putin trying to prepare the ground, trying to more or less say this gives Europe a reason why it wants to see an early end to the conflict. So yes, this is a problem, and yes, the Russians could well miscalculate and do something which does force some kind of more substantive response from the West. But this is not the slide, in my opinion, to full war.

The Johnson Strike And Hybrid Warnings

MG 16:36

And speaking of slides to full war, I suppose we should talk about the other issue that is so much in the news, but it's about the question of mobilization. The idea that after the elections are out of the way and Putin doesn't have to worry so much about the political fallout, he will mobilize 200, 300, how many hundred thousand extra troops to throw them at Ukraine. Well, look, the first point to make is this mobilization is already happening. It's happening on a small scale to make up for the shortfall between the number of Russians who are still willing to volunteer for service and the basically put it bluntly, the number of Russians who are chewed up in the in the meat grinder and therefore need to be replaced. So, you know, there there is a small scale mobilization going on. But are we going to see that kind of big mobilization wave that we saw back in autumn 2022? I don't think so. I mean, as I said in the past, if you'd asked me a month and a bit ago, I'd have said yes. The signs seemed to suggest so. And let's be honest, it you know there was no real evidence that necessarily just extra warm bodies, particularly recalcitrant, badly trained soldiers, would necessarily make a huge difference on the battlefield, or whether it just simply would mean a lot more body bags heading home. And perhaps as a result, I think since then the pendulum seems to have swung the other way. You know, Putin, for example, when asked, very, very specifically, very directly, unambiguously ruled it out. Now, does Putin lie? Yes, of course he does. But on the whole, these kind of, so say, strategic and intentional lies, he tends to outsource to his minions. He's perfectly happy for them to then look as if they were either mendacious or clueless. He himself, generally speaking, if he's going to actually come out flatly and say something, it's because that's his intent. And likewise, Midvedev, who remember, you know, for all his limitations, he is, after all, deputy chair of the Security Council. He, in an interview that I'm going to talk about in the second half, said one example of so called of Western disinformation, the rumours about a supposedly planned automobilisation. The Supreme Commander in Chief, Putin, recently spoke about this, and I repeat once again that this rumour is a false provocation by the bastard Kiev government. These days, this is how Medvedev speaks, which is experiencing a severe shortage of human resources. The needs of the Russian armed forces are entirely met by contract soldiers and volunteers. They are true patriots of Russia. Therefore there is no need for mobilization. So at present the signs seem to suggest not. Now again, this this can change, but but that's where we are right now. And to be honest, I'm actually quite relieved, in not least because if Putin does mobilize, it's really a a gamble, a definite throw of the dice, that he can ride out the immediate political turmoil that that would create, the dissatisfaction, and essentially quickly impose a military solution to the war, which would basically mean taking these last parts of Danetsk region, the fortress cities of Slavyansk and Kramatorsk, and then he can freeze the front line, say, there you go, mission accomplished, start negotiations, and that kind of thing, at which point there would be a huge amount of relief at home. But that's it. He needs then to have some kind of quick resolution if he mobilizes. What happens though if these troops are not able in the drone age to actually change the situation on the ground? I mean I have no idea if they would or wouldn't, but let's say if they wouldn't. At that point, I think that's when we see the greatest risk that Putin would feel he has to escalate in some particularly sort of potentially disastrous, game-changing way. And I don't know what that would be. Whether that would be, once again, think you know, the possibility of use of tactical nuclear weapons or something like that. But some kind of escalatory move I think would happen because he I don't think he would feel that he could honestly get away with a mobilization wave that does not lead to a quick resolution. So for all kinds of reasons, let's hope mobilization stays off the table. And

Mobilisation Rumours And Real Constraints

MG 21:03

a final news story that I did want to address, which again hasn't really had much attention, is the BRICS Summit in Delhi, this large kind of, in many ways, sort of cross-global south, uh largely trading, but increasingly also with a political dimension bloc. So it was held in Delhi, again a sign of India's increasingly sort of prominent role in in international relations. And Modi himself, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi, said the bloc is not against anyone, but he also announced that together they should increasingly become rule shapers, not rule takers, which is, after all, the implication, especially given that in the past Trump has called the group's proposals including de dollarizing, so trying to move away from the use of the dollar as the sort of global trading currency. Has called this group's proposals anti-American. And while naming no names, the joint communique that came out at the end of the BRICS summit condemns unilateral sanctions and what it calls indiscriminate rising tariffs. You know, it is very clear that BRICS is essentially saying that the age of American global hegemony, especially over economics, must come to an end and is coming to an end. And in terms of Russia, obviously all of this is good for Russia, especially the de-dollarizing side of things because it reduces the impact of sanctions. But although it's easy to scoff about these kind of gestures, it is worth noting the warmth of the reception that Putin was given by the audience when he attended a BRICS business forum. You know, again, we think of Putin and we think of it largely, and I'm actually no here I should admit my biases. I'm just assuming that most of my audience largely comes from the global north, and again, according to the data that I can access, it essentially does, and in particular, obviously the collective West, shall we say. But no, yes, here there are all these sort of caricatures of the aging out of touch dictator, the evil, bloodsucking imperialist, blah blah blah. That's not necessarily how much of the world sees Putin. And just simply just being perceived as anti Western, anti Western hegemony, that goes a long way. Anyway, beyond that, look, let's go beyond the day-to-day. And after

BRICS And The Global South Lens

MG 23:35

the break, as I say, I want to consider the thoughts of that geopolitical genius of our times, the world bestriding Colossus, that is Dmitry Medvegiev. I mean, seriously, it's easy to take the Mickey out of him, to assume that there's nothing really left of him but the trolling tweets and the rumours, fairly substantial rumours of alcoholism. But it's worth noting that shocking insight here, he is not a complete imbecile, and even if he does like a drink or three, he can be a pretty astute observer, and indeed is privy to a lot of insight Jen from his role. He didn't just accidentally become Putin's choice for president, potential successor, that was back then, that was back during the castling era, and then Prime Minister. And he is now Deputy Chair of the Security Council and the Chair of the United Russia Party. Putin is sentimental. Putin likes to hold on to people who have been sort of loyal soldiers, but not necessarily in the most powerful and prestigious roles. So we'll take a look at what he says. And this really is drawn from a couple of weeks back on the 10th of September, the business paper Viedomasti ran a very lengthy interview with him that actually bears some analysis and also gives me a hook to consider a new book on Russia's foreign policy, Hannah Notty's We Shall Outlast Them. So stay tuned. Just

Sponsor Notes And Where To Find Me

MG 24:59

the usual mid-episode reminder that you're listening to the In Moscow Shadows podcast. Its corporate partner and sponsor is Conductor, which provides software for crisis exercises in hybrid warfare, counter-terrorism, and civil affairs. But you can also support the podcast yourself by going to patreon.com slash in Moscow Shadows. And remember that patrons, as well as knowing that they're supporting this peerless source on all things Russian, get a variety of additional perks depending on their tier, including articles I've written, the most weekly Gavarik Moskvar press briefing, and other bonus content like the Chronicles of a Different Russia alternative histories. And you can also follow me on Twitter at MarkGaleotti or on Facebook, MarkGaleotti on Russia. Now back to the episode. Before I start, just a quick note that on Thursday I'll be speaking in Copenhagen at the Reading Russia Right event. I'll leave a link in the programme notes. And I will also leave a link to this interview, which Dimon gave to Viedomosti under the headline Either a Great Power or Nothing At All on the 10th of the month. And again, I'm only going to pick out a few bits and pieces. He talks about the need for refining and developing United Russia's vision and also the whole state strategy, saying this vision isn't static. Its formation is a constant living process. And that's United Russia's primary political task. We remember very well what happened to parties that absolutized the past and refused to change. Let's recall the unfortunate fate of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the tragic end of the Soviet Union. And hold on to that, about this issue of a changing vision, because I'm going to come on to that a little bit later. On the actual elections, our country is at war. What could be more difficult and dramatic for the state and its people? Comparing the current campaign to previous ones is pointless. For the first time in modern history, we are electing the State Duma at a time when Russia is waging an uncompromising struggle against a vile enemy. The rabid Kiev Nazis and their rabid masters. I did say this is how Medvedev talks these days. It's clear the enemy is trying to exploit the election period to weaken the country from within, to divide society, to destabilize the situation in every way possible, and ultimately to prevent us from achieving the goals of the special operation, to prevent us from winning. We see from the number of persistent falsehoods and stinking fakes how actively they're trying to exploit this opportunity. I mean I thought it was actually a fascinating, you know, pot calling the kettle black moment, in that, you know, what he is describing is pretty much exactly what Russia is trying to do in the West. And sometimes we we see this interesting kind of duality that precisely the the Russians entirely overlay their own plans and assumptions on the West and assume the West is entirely just like that. I think it's fair to say that it's probably not 100% false. Maybe 75-80% false, but let's not pretend that the West does not also hope to try and exploit weaknesses, divisions and so forth inside Russia. But no, in the main, what he's talking about is precisely Russia's plans. On the economy, he says, the current situation is unique. The country is fighting for its future at the front. Under these circumstances, the state's involvement in economic processes increases significantly. After the military operations end, economic life returns to normal. I think that will happen here. Though admittedly he later says, I will say frankly that due to the colossal international tensions and attempts to wipe Russia off the map, we will be forced to stockpile various weapons in our country's coffers for a long time to come. So on one level he's trying to signal a reassuring note, which is look, there are in some ways this is war communism. This is a temporary expedient that, yes, we're seeing more and more of the economy coming under state control or under sort of parastate control, with ownership being shifted to different people by the whim of the state and the courts. But don't worry, once the conflict is over, things will return to normal. But on the other hand, he's also singling, but quite how we define conflict. It's not just necessarily the fighting in Ukraine, but a wider confrontation with the West that follows, so maybe it won't be quite so quick. So he's trying to have his cake and eat it. There's lots of actually quite interesting stuff in this interview, uh, including frankly a question about why he's so much less diplomatic in his manner these days. But there's an especially telling paragraph that I want to focus in on right at the end.

Medvedev And Great Power Or Nothing

MG 29:52

I think it would be very important for the citizens of our country to view this period in the future as a time when we preserved the country. And not just preserved it, but once again elevated it to the ranks of great powers. Why is this important? Our country, and this is my deepest conviction, my belief as someone who has, after all, been leading major processes for many years, can only survive as a great power. As soon as it begins to fade, it begins to crumble. We saw this in the example of the Soviet Union. Therefore, either a great power or nothing at all. That really I think is significant. This idea that the struggle for great power status, the struggle to be more than just another country, is not just about prestige, it is not just a bauble for a particular regime to have. It is absolutely existential. That Russia, its particular position in the world, its particular historic trajectory, means that that is absolutely necessary. And I think that edge is is really important to understand. And in some ways the fact that it is driven by not ambition, not ooh, let's be bigger, let's be more powerful, but insecurity. If we are not at least at this level of power, then essentially we are on the road to damnation. That really matters. But of course, quite what does a great power mean to Medvedev and indeed to Putin? Now, in the past I very much presented Putin as being a kind of a nineteenth century geopolitician, whose view of great power is that you have a sphere of influence or what Medvedev calls zones of privileged interest. In other words, other countries that you don't directly control, but nonetheless whose sovereignty is subordinate to your own, for whom in some ways you have a veto over their policies. And that's really what Putin wants to impose, amongst other things, on Ukraine. But also more broadly you have a say in all the key issues of the moment around the world, and obviously a say also again means a veto if necessary. And thirdly, you don't actually want to break the global order, but you want to have a right to be able to flout it, to break the rules from time to time when it's in your interest. So these are all things, after all, that as far as Putin and Medvedev are concerned, the United States has. And certainly under Trump, it's very hard to argue that that isn't the vision, certainly, that the White House has of the US role in the world. But underpinning all of this is a sense of strategic autonomy. On the basis, yes, of military self-reliance, you know, no one can force or coerce us to do anything. Because that allows you to preserve your country's domestic integrity. And of course, you know, all this has an economic dimension. I mean, during Medvedev's brief presidency, he routinely stated that relying strictly on oil and gas exports was a humiliation for Russia, that it needed to be something more than that, that it wasn't just another extraction economy. And for his view, in order to maintain this competitive great power status, what Russia needed was huge amounts of modernization. Technological modernization across its infrastructure, information technology, medicine, space, energy technologies, all of these. So it was very much, it was a dynamic view. It wasn't just simply, oh, we got lots of men and guns and tanks and that'll do it. No, it was actually that we are at the forefront of a whole variety of different technologies, but particularly technologies that would allow Russia to have that crucial autonomy. So there is more to, I think, to this than the usual tropes of Russian imperialism. I actually want to address the question of Russian imperialism in the future podcast.

What Great Power Means In Moscow

MG 33:47

But it has to be said, look, being involved in an imperial war, that's very much how I would see what's happening in Ukraine, and even having certain imperial perspectives does not mean that one can just simply characterize a country as imperialist. Or indeed chauvinist. I mean, Sabine Fisher, in her book The Chauvinist Threat, Russia's War and the West Response, you know, presents a picture of Russian policy as being shaped by three things. Aggressive nationalism and imperialism, sexism and extreme patriarchy, and thirdly autocracy. I mean, I yes, all of those may well be present, but I'm not convinced really that that gets to the root of what's going on. As I said, although there are elements of all of these in Russian policy and political culture, Russian thinking is something I think more serious and less primordial. And I think there is a problem here, for us, for the West, because so much debate seems driven by simplistic notions. Putin is Hitler 2.0, Putin wants to rebuild the USSR or the czarist empire, Putin is simply drunk on blood and conquest, whatever. And that informs public discussion, it informs media representations, and by necessity in a democracy, it shapes policy debates. And I have to say, I honestly don't think that future generations of historians will look at Western policy since 2022 and regard its practitioners as modern day Machiavellis, but nor frankly as moral titans. So I think it's especially encouraging to read a recent book that really does seek to develop what we could think of as a three-dimensional picture of Russian policy and its, let's call it, combatively interactive relationship with the West.

Russia’s Adaptation And Notte’s Argument

MG 35:38

And this book, as mentioned, Hannah Notty's We Shall Outlast Them, Putin's Global Campaign to Defeat the West, which came out with Norton in 2026. Even though one could argue that the subtitle could just as easily be The West's Campaign to Challenge Putin. Anyway, this is one of those very welcome books that manages to balance scholarship with readability. And ironically enough, it doesn't set out to provide the answer to what drives Putin and Russian foreign policy in a kind of deep, ideological or similar way, even while it does acknowledge the explanations from insecurity to ideology. Instead, it very much focuses on what Russia has done. And I would suggest that what emerges, and again, because it is important generally, since we can't crawl into the deep dark recesses of Putin's brain and soul, you know, we have to look really at precisely what they do. What emerges from this is a picture not of the final culmination of a 26-year programme. You know, some people more or suggest that Putin knew what he wanted back in 2000 and has just been building towards it. Nor, though, is it a picture of failure, of decay, but instead one of evolution through adaptation. I think as ever with Putin, this is about improvisation, not inspiration, but improvisation to a particular goal. And I think this is where, if one can go back to Medvedev's point about a changing vision. Different circumstances, different opportunities will obviously create different senses of where Russia is. But the point is, Russia is building something. We may not like it, most Russians may well not like it. It may well not be efficient, it may well certainly isn't humane, but nonetheless, it is a thing. And Hannah Notty recognises that certainly since 2022, in her words, confrontation with the West became the central organizing principle of the country's foreign policy. Yeah, and of course, I mean that means rather more than just foreign policy, but covering everything from the way that history to economics are bent to this purpose. And that's just not just simply a negative thing. It's not just simply about, well we we must fight the West, and therefore we'll become a mirror image of the West or anything like that. The West confidently, after all, anticipated the end of Putinism. And in a way, this was the end of Putinism or a certain stage of Putinism and the beginning of something new. As again to quote Notte. Many expected the country to turn into an international pariah following its invasion of Ukraine. But in fact, the war marked the arrival of a newly outward facing Russia. So what she does in a series of very interesting and very effectively framed chapters, she cycles through what this has meant, from building new relations in Africa to sanctions proofing its economy. And as a result, to quote her from page where is it two seven one, what she says is this How can one make sense of Russia's global adaptation after the full scale invasion of Ukraine? It was a dizzying amalgamation of disparate efforts to stay afloat, even to get ahead. It was both strategic in its intent to outlast the West and highly opportunistic in its execution. There was the comedy of Russia's BRICS chairmanship extravaganza and of its antics at the UN. There was the melodrama of Russia's outrageous nuclear threats. There was the theatre of the absurd when Russia claimed its soldiers were dying in Ukraine so that Africa could be free. And there was the drama of Progoshin's failed mutiny which ushered in the creation of Africa Corps. Now she says the question for Russia is whether Putin has also condemned the country to the fate of tragedy. But the point is this Putin's Russia precisely has reinvented itself, and not simply as a war fighting state, but also one that is both disconnected from a West it had become increasingly connected to, and also more connected to the global south, and arguably therefore a wider world. Notty quotes Fiona Hill, who in 2023 characterized the Global South position on Ukraine as a mutiny against what they see as the collective West dominating the international discourse and foisting its problems on everyone else. It's perfectly true, and to be perfectly honest, the Global South is right about that in my opinion, but there you go. But it's interesting that turn phrase, mutiny. A mutiny is a rebellion against an existing notionally legitimate power. So it it's fascinating. I mean I don't want to read too much into one of Fiona's words, but nonetheless, it's interesting that what that implies about the assumption that surely the global south ought to be accepting of a certain degree of Western hegemony. But anyway, the point that I would say is that in many ways the Russia of war Putinism is actually closer to a great power in Putin's and certainly Mitvedev's terms than before. Yes, it's now bordered by hostile states to the West. Yes, its economy is deformed and will take a long time to recover, and there's some very, very rough times ahead. Yes, it's lost already perhaps half a million dead and another million wounded. Yes, it has also shed many of the democratic elements that did for so long maintain it as a hybrid state, neither a full blown authoritarianism, nor clearly a democracy. And so now it leaves it as much more of a sort of thuggish personalistic authoritarianism dependent on the whims and indeed survival of one rather limited man. It doesn't really have a zone of privileged interest, with the possible exception of Belarus, but look, one could argue, did Russia ever really? I mean in many ways Russian hegemony over parts of the post-Soviet region were really just out of a sort of default. Though they just didn't happen to be anyone else and it wasn't really often challenged. However, the point is Russia is able to break the rules of the international system with consequences, yes, but bearable ones. More to the point, in technological, economic, military, and even ideational terms, there is a growing sense of Russian autonomy. Yes, obviously greater dependence upon China, but not yet reaching a point of no return. Now, I'm not for a moment trying to say this is a good thing. I know this sounds as if I'm actually exalting war Putinism and saying, look, look at how wonderful Russia has become. It hasn't. It's an ugly, ugly thing. But nonetheless, I would say that there was an instability to earlier iterations of Putinism. It was neither one thing nor another. And look, when it reached a crossroads, I would have hoped that it would have broken towards deepening its commitment to being a law-based state, and one that accepted a less dramatic and demanding position in the global order, instead of obviously the road it ultimately took. But arguably, it was going to have to take a choice. It couldn't continue to hover at that fork in the road. And I think what really comes out, you know, certainly what what I felt, as I said, lots and lots of good stuff in Notda's book. Again, reminder, we shall outlast them. You know, she she's spoken to all sorts of interesting people, done all sorts of interesting things. Interestingly, almost I would say sympathetic portrayal of how people like Dmitry Trenin, who have very much turned from once being, you know, bridges between Russian and Western academe and think tank worlds, very much turned towards being a bit of a hurrah patriot, you know, but why that happened. But for me, very much what what came out of this was that sense of something else being born, which again, as I say, doesn't have to be something good, but definitely that there is that change, that there is a kind of viability in its own twisted way to the new Russia. If one accepts, if, and let me really emphasize that, if one accepts this notion that Russia has to be a great power or it is nothing, because if you believe that, then actually that really was the choice. This is how Russia gets to be a great power and thus avoids being nothing. Which again I'm always uncomfortable and it looks like I'm I'm underwriting something that Madevedev and Putin think. But without accepting their premises, we have to understand what their premises are, because that will drive what the Russians do. It's the real Russia, not the Russia of Western fantasies and headline writers. One final note, by the way, while I'm talking about the book. Sadly I shall be in Finland. Well I say sadly, but for this reason, I'm certainly casting no shade on Helsinki and Tampere. But for those of you who are in London, on Tuesday the twentieth of October, she will be in conversation with Arkady Ostrovsky at the Waterstones bookshop in Gower Street, if you want to go along and hear how she presents the book rather than how I do. Anyway, as ever, thank you indeed for listening, and there will be another podcast next week, in which I think it is entirely possible that I will be talking about the Doomer elections. Bye. Well,

Closing Thanks And Next Week

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that's the end of another episode of the In Moscow Shadows podcast. Just as a reminder, beyond this, you can follow my blog, also called In Moscow Shadows. You can follow me on Twitter at Mark Galliotti or Facebook MarkGaleottion Russia. This podcast is made possible by generous and enlightened patrons, and you too can be one. Just go along to my Patreon page, that's patreon.com slash in Moscow Shadows, and decide which tier you want to join, getting access to exclusive materials and other perks. However, whether or not you contribute, thank you very much indeed for listening. Until next time, keep well.