In Moscow's Shadows
Russia, behind the headlines as well as in the shadows. This podcast is the audio counterpart to Mark Galeotti's blog of the same name, a place where "one of the most informed and provocative voices on modern Russia", can talk about Russia historical and (more often) contemporary, discuss new books and research, and sometimes talk to other Russia-watchers.
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In Moscow's Shadows
In Moscow's Shadows 268: Peace and (Info) War
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A peace deal is easy to sketch and brutally hard to land. The latest reported shape of US-led talks offers some promise, especially with the talk of genuinely solid security guarantees for Ukraine and European involvement, although the last portion of the Donbas remains a seemingly-insuperable roadblock. Nonetheless, at least the announced ceasefire around Oleshky sounds like a little good news amidst the misery.
From there, I turn to the part of modern conflict that gets blamed for almost everything: information operations. Yes, Moscow runs disinformation and political influence campaigns, but should we respond in kind? Striking back sounds satisfying, but it comes with legal, moral, and practical costs and the biggest danger is the feedback loop: bluster creates bluster, trust at home erodes, and miscalculation becomes more likely even when nobody is looking for a shooting war.
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You can also follow my blog, In Moscow's Shadows, and become one of the podcast's supporting Patrons and gain question-asking rights and access to exclusive extra materials including the (almost-) weekly Govorit Moskva news briefing right here.
Welcome And Quick Housekeeping
MGPlease maybe some delay, but possibly closer. Some risk might from life. And the risk coming from information operations. Hello, I'm Mark Galliotti, and welcome to my view of Russia in Moscow Shadows. This podcast, of varying length, frequency, and format, yet always reassuringly low production values, is supported by generous and perspicacious patrons like you, and also by the Crisis Exercise Software Company Conductor. Well, hello and welcome back to the next episode of In Moscow Shadows. And before I start, let me just give my thanks particularly to the University of Tampere in Finland and those who attended our event last week, which I thought was a really interesting opportunity to get some insight into well, it's a new book, it's in Finnish, so I'm afraid I hadn't read it, but based on the presentations, lots of neat examinations of aspects of Russian history and above all ideology that haven't really been given that much attention of late. Everything from, never mind, my own ramblings about Russian history, Islamophobia to anarchy in today's Russia. So anyway, thanks for everyone who turned up.
Peace Deal Leaks And Security Guarantees
MGSo a couple of news stories I want to start before doing my deep dive. And that, well, the first one is clearly about this mooted peace deal that the Americans are once again working on. There was a recent, after all, gathering at in Oslo. And if we are to believe the leaks, and there's always a one always has to have caution with these, but they do seem to be strategic leaks of the sort that are there to prepare the ground rather than anything else. The way the peace process is evolving does show some promise. You know, we've moved away from the original plan, which was clearly way, way too Russia-friendly, into trying to make something that, on the one hand, gives Ukraine the sort of guarantees that it needs, but at the same time actually is going to be appealing enough to Russia to get it to stop the fighting. Lots of caveats, by the way, but nonetheless I'm just simply saying the the direction of travel seems encouraging. Particularly this point about security guarantees for Ukraine. I mean, what's being discussed is something very solid. I mean, they're talking about like Article Vithout NATO membership. Well, as I've said in the past, I think we need to be cautious about Article V because that's actually not quite as robust a guarantee as many people think. But I think this looks like actually, it looks like it would be solid guarantees that might even actually say that if Russia returns to war, then actually Western allies would be expected, even required, to come in and directly not just provide weapons, but actually fight on Ukraine's side. That would be a big, big deal, if true. Also, it's quite interesting to talk once again about a demilitarised zone along the front line. Now, loads of problems with that, not least with precisely who actually would uh be patrolling it and what would be the sanctions for breaches of it. But the point is it does address one of the key issues, which is this. There is no clear front line. It's all very well saying freeze the current fighting at the current front line, but the point is this mode of warfare we've got, with you know small handfuls of infiltrators and also ground drones and the like, mean that in fact what we have is a sort of band of hazy kill zone, grey zone, call it what you will, contested area between the two. Now, the thing is, if we try to actually delineate the front line, of course, Moscow is going to say, wherever we have a couple of guys who managed to sort of penetrate ten kilometers into Ukrainian territory and are currently sitting there sheltering, shivering in a little burnt-out hut, well that's our extent. Whereas, of course, Kyiv would be saying, well, no, of course that doesn't count. But on the other hand, we have a bunch of infiltrators in the Russian front lines, or else we push the Russian front lines to where they actually have substantial concentrations of troops, so you end up with a sort of a huge area for debate. So actually having a swath of DMZ might well be a way round that. Another element which is encouraging is that there is more evidence that the Europeans are being involved. I mean, we had the Oslo meeting, which also included Finnish President Alexander Stub, of whom more in a moment. But the point is that Europe always had to be involved in this process somehow. Now, obviously Trump being Trump, he regards essentially America as the one not just indispensable, but often I'm actually trying to think of the right word here, kind of standalone. But in other words, that it doesn't need anyone else involved. But of course, Europe will be necessary, because it's essentially first of all going to have to pay for any peace and any reconstruction in the main. But also, it is currently the primary military backer of Kyiv. The trouble is that A, Trump doesn't really want to listen to Europe unless it's to its convenience, and at the same time the Europeans, by their decision to, I don't know, this is always my my hobby horse issue, not talk to the Russians because the Russians are naughty, have essentially abdicated any role. Well, now fortunately that that seems to be beginning to change. And I think that's actually a very positive thing. And there's also talk of who's going to be Europe's point man, or point woman if necessary, in any dealings with Moscow. There were non-starter names like former German Chancellor Gerhard Schröder and Besi mate of Vladimir Putin, which is why he's non-starter, who had been sort of main mentioned largely by points east. Well now we've also got, as I said, the aforementioned Finnish President Alexander Stub being sort of discussed as a possible. Because it's interesting because it's not just that he is a clearly highly able chap who knows his Russia, but also he's a Trump whisperer. I mean whoever would have thought that European peace might hinge on someone having the right golf handicap. But nonetheless, he is a golfer, Trump is a golfer, they have bonded over the green. And worth noting that Dmitry Peskov, Putin's spokesman, said, We will see how constructive a contribution Mr Stubb can make. If he can make a constructive contribution, that can be viewed positively. If not, if he can only repeat the common European position, then it is unlikely to be a constructive contribution. Now that doesn't sound very positive, but the point is what he's framing is exactly the crucial point. There needs to be a person and a message. And at the moment, the European message too often is just simply, well, Russia just simply has to withdraw from Ukraine, which is entirely moral, and if this were to be a just peace, that would have to be part of it, this is not going to be a just peace. Almost no post-war peace ever, ever is. So let's just face realities and frankly find ways of getting the war to end in the best means possible for Ukraine. And as I say, I think the need for Europe to find its way into a renewed dialogue with Moscow, even if that involves holding its nose and talking to the bad man, I think is becoming more and more accepted within the mainstream. There was an interesting intervention by Czech President Peter Pavel, and again by no means one could regard as a friend of Moscow's, who said President Putin disregards the European Union as an authority. He doesn't want to talk to European Commission President Irsula von der Leyen. He doesn't want to talk to External Action Service head Kaya Kalas. And frankly, why should he, given what they say and given the limited amount of authority they actually have? He stopped talking to other European leaders, including Emmanuel Macron. So in his view, the the EU needs to identify a person or a group of people who would speak for Europe. Now these, he said, don't necessarily have to be representatives of EU or NATO leadership. In other words, it doesn't have to be presidents or prime ministers. But quote, simply leaders who would be given a mandate by the others to negotiate. Well, this is something I've been banging on about for ages. I'm not going to claim any credit for this, but nonetheless, at least it is faintly encouraging. But I would add, this should not just simply be an EU initiative, in my opinion. The UK, I would say, needs to be fitted in there somehow. So, you know, whatever the structure, it could be, you know, could I can be an EU plus UK or just be Europe wide or P5 or whatever the other structures. But nonetheless, Europe needs to get its hat together, identify a negotiator, and then crucially have something to say. Have a concrete vision for how it thinks that this war practically can and should end, and see how it can nudge things their way. Otherwise, the longer just Europe simply confines itself to these mantras about, well, it's for the Ukrainians to decide and everything for the Ukrainians and nothing without Ukraine, blah blah blah, frankly it continues to ensure that it is not part of the process.
The Donbas Sticking Point
MGSo look, things on the one hand would seem to be encouraging, but there remains that one crucial stumbling block, which is that last bit of Donbas region, whatever it is, 20% or so of Danetsk orblast Donetsk district within that region. Putin, for whatever reason, still seems to think that his peace will be a mutilated one, his victory incomplete without that territory. That's very much what he was signalling at Valdae. He was essentially hinting that he would abandon any other territorial ambitions, Edessa, Dnipro, Khakiv, whatever, but that nonetheless this was an absolute requirement. And there are some reports, I think they're overged reports, but he thinks that actually he wouldn't even politically survive if he forged peace without them. I don't really believe that. He might, who knows? This might also be a classic Russian negotiating tactic. Me, if it was me, I would give you what you want, but oh there are big beasts with sharp teeth right behind me, whom I, you know, cannot afford to alienate. So it could just be a bargaining position, but I don't think so unfortunately. And likewise, I still don't think that Zelensky can or would give it up. This is territory over which so many Ukrainians have died. The thought of actually sort of telling your troops, okay, lads, pack up your stuff and withdraw from this territory you've been fighting over, you know, firstly, would they even actually obey? But it certainly would would, I would imagine, be the d the end of his political career, and a real sort of dooming of his legend as well. So at the moment I think both sides seem locked in. So we we have what would seem to be the start, the basis for a proper peace, but there is that one crucial stumbling block, which means that although I am more confident than I have been of late, nonetheless I wouldn't say I'm confident that we're gonna have peace, and I certainly don't think we're gonna have peace before spring. I think if nothing else, Putin will think, well, look, let's have that other winter hammering the Ukrainians and doing damage that ultimately the Europeans will have to re reconstruct in order to increase the costs on them and basically make them feel a little bit more willing to compromise with my quote unquote legitimate territorial demands. So that's I think where
Aleshki Ceasefire And Humanitarian Corridor
MGwe are there. But there was a bit of good news over Ayeshki. Now, this is a town that in February 2022, I think it was like two days into the invasion, I think it was, was occupied by the Russians. And I think it was, yeah, it was in right at the end of the year, in November, that was it, that they actually withdrew from the city of Herson and that bit of Herson region, which is down in the sort of the south of the contested zone. And as a result, Poralyeshki found itself essentially wedged between the floodplains of the Dnipro River, which are under Ukrainian fire control. In other words, it's not that Ukrainian troops are there, but Ukrainian artillery and drones can hit it, and at the same time, Russian forces positioned on the other side of the city. It's under Russian control, but as I said, rather tentatively. And the conditions there are absolutely terrible, which is one of the reasons why the population has decreased from around 25,000 before the invasion to only about a couple of thousand now. The Ukrainians blame the Russians for the situation. I mean they highlight that they sent several packages of humanitarian aid there by drones, and basically saying that the Russians are maintaining a blockade of Aleshki, a humanitarian blockade of Aleshki, and only allowing those residents who have or have acquired Russian citizenship passports to get aid. It's very hard to know precisely what the truth is, because at the same time the Russians are rejecting this, saying that this is all just Ukraine, you know, the the humanitarian aid mission was just theatre, and that the problem is that Ukraine continues to mine and shell the access roads, and why would we basically starve a a town that is under our control? Whatever the truth of the matter is, absolutely terrible conditions for those living there. And we now see that uh Melania Trump, apparently with the assistance of Pope Leo, I mean, how's that for a double act, has uh brokered a temporary ceasefire, which is going to begin on the twenty ninth, in other words, on Thursday, to allow humanitarian aid to get in, and perhaps even more importantly, to allow a safe evacuation of civilians who want to leave through a sort of designated humanitarian corridor. Now, we'll see, we've heard all kinds of claims before, particularly ones emanating from the White House, but in this case, both the Ukrainians and the Russians are talking about this seriously. There have been meetings, seemingly just based on video footage, quite cordial meetings between representatives of both governments. And the the Melania-Trump factor is interesting. I mean, already in the past, for example, uh Putin ascribed the release of children from the occupied territories to Ukraine to her work, so there's clearly an element to sort of keep her sweet. And I think it's clear that neither Moscow nor Kyiv want to alienate Klan Trump. So there is a bit of leverage there. Which creates this rather odd situation. Finns with golf scholarship, Stub after all won a golf scholarship to Furman University in Greenville, South Carolina, and Slovenian models may end up being Europe's salvation. Who'd a thought it?
Sponsorship And How To Support
MGAnyway, now let's have a break, and I want to move into my deep dive talking about information operations. And well the opportunities, but above all, the sometimes unexpected risks. Just the usual mid-episode reminder that you're listening to the In Moscow Shadows podcast. Its corporate partner and sponsor is Conductor, which provides software for crisis exercises in hybrid warfare, counter-terrorism, and civil affairs. But you can also support the podcast yourself by going to patreon.com slash in Moscow Shadows. And remember that patrons, as well as knowing that they're supporting this peerless source on all things Russian, get a variety of additional perks depending on their tier, including articles I've written, the most weekly Gavarit Moscovar press briefing, and other bonus content like the Chronicles of a Different Russia alternative histories. And you can also follow me on Twitter at Mark Galliotti or on Facebook, MarkGaleotti on Russia. Now, back to the episode.
What Information Operations Really Do
MGSo, information operations. Now, generally when we talk about this, it's about what those dastardly Russians are doing. And yes, absolutely, they are launching a whole variety of information operations. And look, although in the main, currently the sexy aspect of hybrid war that people are talking about is sabotage and drone intrusions and so forth, remember that the Russians maintain a very active program of disinformation and political operations too. But of course, the problem is that it's too easy to talk very vaguely and use the Russians as a scapegoat for anything that happens, which is often politically satisfying, but actually can obscure the realities of the situation. I mean, a couple of recent examples, we have British Prime Minister Andy Burnham, perhaps in a more kind of audience-pleasing moment when he was talking to a particular sort of anti-Brexity couple of podcasters, who suggested that, though we know that the Russians influence the vote, very much implying, though he was a canny enough political operator not to say outright, that actually Moscow was perhaps crucial in tipping that narrow vote in favour of Brexit. This does not seem to be the case. It doesn't seem to be borne out by the evidence, and in fact we had the director of MI5 making an unusual intervention to essentially suggest otherwise, that say, yes, we know that the Russians were involved in stirring the pot, but that they didn't actually swing the vote, and Burnham himself was formed in forced into something of a climb down and saying that, oh no, no, I never implied that. I'm sorry, Andy, but on this you I think you did misstep. Now we have the French protests. And again, there are some who very much want to suggest that sort of Russia clearly is it has stirred these things up. Well look, as near as I can tell so far, and you know, again, who can tell what will still emerge, there's no real evidence that Moscow in any way triggered these protests, but of course they exploit them. They want to encourage them, they want to stir them up, they want them to, well, firstly, generally incline people to feeling more positive about Marine Le Pen and her right wing party, because after all, if they win the elections, that'll be very good news for Moscow, or at least Moscow assume so, and at the same time they want to use this generally to encourage and instigate pressure and division and tension across not just France but Europe as a whole. But that really is the point. The goal from Moscow is less to have direct influence on votes and wider political processes in order to actually sort of push them in in into a specific decision. I think they found that that tends not to work. Indeed, it can actually be very counterproductive when it emerges. But rather to amplify existing divisions, to divide us, to distract us, to dismay us, and to reduce the unity within and between Western countries, which is such a crucial aspect of Western strength. I mean, think about Europe. You know, in any individual country would be frankly fairly minimal in its capacity to influence Russia significantly. But as an alliance, things are rather different in terms of the amount of resources it can mobilize supporting Ukraine, or even the much maligned and sometimes justly maligned, but sanctions a regime that absolutely does have an impact in terms of reducing the capacities of the Russian war machine. So, you know, it it's more about them trying to essentially take the existing discontents within our societies and just trying to nudge them that bit further.
The Temptation To Strike Back
MGAnd in that context, perhaps it's inevitable that there is increasing talk of somehow striking back against Russia directly, doing unto others as we have had done unto ourselves. And look, I absolutely get the appeal because being on the defensive is very, very frustrating. But the idea of launching hybrid operations against Russia, whether it's the obvious ones, which is cyber attacks, which I think is already happening on some level at least, but going on through to political and information operations. Well, there are problems with that. First of all, remember we are meant to be the good guys. You know, we constantly frame our support of Ukraine, not in terms of raw geopolitics, though clearly that is actually a key factor, but in terms of international law and fundamental morality. It is the right thing to do. Well that's fair enough, but that does bring with it a certain obligation to us, given that we are not at war with Russia. I mean, you know, fine, if we want to declare war at Russia, then some of the gloves come off. But nonetheless, we are constrained by international law as well as national law. And however frustrating that is, the more we breach those, and let's be honest, the West has been known to breach it from time to time, well, the more we breach them, then the more threadbare our argument becomes. And it's one of the reasons why, frankly, the global south is not particularly interested in the main in joining and supporting our conflict against Russia over Ukraine, and regards us as essentially self serving hypocrites. Secondly, Russia is a much tougher target to operate in than the West, precisely because it is an authoritarian police state. So it's one thing to launch cyber operations, but if you want to actually start to sort of influence people, you are dealing with a much more controlled internet. And you're also dealing with media that are vastly under greater state sanction. So, you know, again, it's not quite the same kind of playing field that we're dealing with. And then there's the final question, which is actually how far does it really work? There is an open question, quite frankly, as to how far all the various Russian information operations really can be said to have had an impact. It's very, very hard to quantify, changing opinions, increasing tensions and suspicion within societies and so forth. But it does seem to be that a hell of a lot of what the Russians do fails or has so negligible an impact that in some ways it just simply encourages those who have certain views anyway, without pushing them into any any more radical position, let alone attracting more adherents to their position. So, you know, that is that is an open question. You know, is this something that is even worth doing?
Deterrence By Denial Versus Punishment
MGThe real defence against these kind of hybrid operations is deterrence by denial. It is essentially to ensure, and the parallel that needs to be drawn is with terrorism, and particularly one thinks of how Europe weathered the Red Brigades, the Brigade Rosse, the IRA, the Basque separatists and so forth, all the various other challenges in the 1970s and 1980s in particular. The key point is essentially to make it clear that this is not going to affect our policies in any way, for or against you. We are not going to go through what the Red Brigades called fascistification, you know, a massive and disproportionate, heavy-handed response that actually will alienate society, but nor are we going to give you what you want o overtly. So, you know, yes, of course, as with terrorism, you try to catch individual perpetrators of acts where there's human beings involved. You try to foil every plot you can, but you also accept that some attacks are going to get through, there's nothing you can do about that, but that you are able to weather them. We go back to that whole keep calm and carry on mantra. And after a certain point, given that all of these attacks and operations cost the Russians resources, they will realise that they're just wasting those resources. But that is a deeply unsatisfying and unsexy response. It's so much better to think of deterrence by punishment, by actually striking back. But the thing is, if that's actually your aim, you really have to decide. Are you just simply trying to hurt the enemy? In which case, covert operations that remain wholly covert, they they may well have a place. Or are you trying to deter them, in which case you must make known what you're doing? Because deterrence only works if it's evident and visible. You know, if you have some secret death ray, that is not going to stop the other side from fighting you unless they know you have that death ray. So essentially there is a there is quite a fundamental quandary. Do you keep this totally covert or do you make this more overt? Perhaps more of a deterrent effect, but also running the risk that it actually aggravates the situation more. The point is, information operations are, it seems, already happening. Look, I can't sort of point to things and say, oh, it's it's clearly that or whatever. But one can note some things that are taking place and note the responses they tend to have. Now, sometimes actually it's in the form really of the West acting as, in effect, a tool or an amplifier of Ukraine's highly active hybrid war operations against Russia, which range all the way from assassinating generals all the way through to planting disinformation within the Russian sort of information space.
The PACE Quota And Decolonisation Myths
MGAnd the particular example that I would use is the decision by the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, PACE, that when it set up its platform for dialogue with Russian Democratic Forces this January, not only did it demand that they agree to various positions that essentially made the participants criminals under Russian law, but it also acceded to Ukrainian pressure that one-third of the platform seats be allocated for what they call representatives of Russia's indigenous peoples. As if, quite frankly, Russians are not indigenous peoples, by the way. I mean, this is not some country that was kind of colonized by foreigners a couple of hundred years ago. This is a country where, you know, the the indigens, at best, they have been there for a thousand years, sorry, at least they've been there for a thousand years. And one could argue, given the intermarriage of Norse conquerors with local Slavic populations, one could say a hell of a lot longer. But anyway, so one-third to representatives of these indigenous peoples and, in fairness, national minorities. Now, the rationale is that this corresponds to the proportion of non-ethnic Russians within the total population, and that these people, these non-Slavic Russians, they should have a voice. And yes, okay, up to a point. But the thing is, if we really want to say that all Russians should have a voice, should have their say, one could just as easily argue, well, what about all those Russians who don't come from affluent metropolitan political and cultural elite circles, as essentially the other candidates, the other figures all do. You know, what are we talking about? We're talking we're talking about vastly rich people like uh Horakovsky. We're talking about the chess grandmaster Gary Kasparov, who, trust me, has absolutely no traction or constituency within Russia itself. Um, you know, again, we're talking even the other figures, who, and I'm not by no means saying that they're not well worth listening to, people like Vladimir Karamurazar, the the the the this dissident who the Russians have tried to poison not once, but well had poisoned, not once, but twice, you know, they they certainly have both moral and political standing. But the point is they there is there is a whole other Russia that one could argue is is equally not represented. Where's the quota for Russians from the Urals region, from the Far East, from the shitty second rank industrial cities? You know, if you are serious about ensuring that, you you basically bring your representation out of Moscow. Now, look, of course, the point is that Kyiv was playing a political game here. It's trying to amplify the essentially fictional notion of Russian decolonization. There is no real evidence that ironically enough, outside Chechnya and the North Caucasus, there's any appetite or has been any appetite for separatism. And I can't help but notice that no one's really enthusiastic about saying let's hear more from the Chechens. These representatives, look, I it's not that I'm saying anything against them. They may well be serious, sincere, hard working people, absolutely. But the point is they don't have a real constituency in Russia. But now they have a guaranteed voice, at least within PACE, which, look, in fairness, is pretty much irrelevant. And although, yes, there's going to be a regular cycling of the members of this board, the very notion of one third to members of these national minorities begins to be problematic. How many European nations have, for example, guaranteed ethnic quotas within their parliaments? And we should I think it's worth sometimes think about how this looks from the other side. Not because we need to conform to what Moscow thinks, but because we have to be aware about what the potential implications of what we are doing are. Again, this is the point. One one one always has to think about, well, not just how does this look to the other side, but what therefore might the other side do. What if, for example, the Kremlin proposed setting up in Moscow a Basque or Quebec representative office and to treat them as a kind of quasi government official representation? Or propose, not that I imagine for a minute that it will be considered, to the Scottish government that they set up an embassy in Moscow, or indeed the state of Texas. We would rightly consider this to be trolling, a bid to try to stir up divisions within the West and inflame such as they may be separatist uh feelings. Well, this cuts both ways. And look, with the pace case, I mean I think the Russians they yes, they they were angry and they were pissy, as is their their way, but nonetheless I think they also realise that pace doesn't really matter, and therefore didn't take this too far. But it's worth just thinking about that. How does it look? Because I am sure that there are covert operations in or aimed at at least Russia now. We need to consider how these are gonna work carefully, because the trouble is on the one hand, I am seriously worried that Russian hybrid operations could spin out of control. Now again, I I really don't want to say that I think we're gonna find ourselves at full scale shooting war with Moscow or anything like that. But at present the Russians do seem to be trying to calibrate, even while they escalate their attacks. There are more of them, they are more if you use words like audacious, it sounds like a compliment, I don't mean that. They are more willing to take risks. But on the other hand, they are clearly also trying to reduce the danger of innocent civilians being directly caught in the in the metaphorical crossfire. But what if they get things wrong? What if the train that they derail that's carrying military supplies to Ukraine gets der is actually a passenger train after all, or it gets derailed onto the neighbouring road where there's a bus full of children? What if the bomb that is set within a factory and due to explode and set it on fire at midnight when no one is around except maybe the odd night watchman actually is mistimed or somehow malfunctions and explodes in the middle of the working day. I think the risk that the Russians will accidentally cause mass casualties, and let's be honest, think of the MH-17 shootdown. It's not that the Russians gave these uh air defense missiles to the Donbass rebels saying, hey, go on, shoot down a civilian airliner. It was just rather that rebels who are given kit that can shoot down an airliner without the full corresponding radar and the operators who might have been able to tell from that little dot on the screen that that was not a military plane, who thought they were opening fire on a Ukrainian military aircraft, but ended up causing a mass casualty event that absolutely, you know, set Europe, and no, not just Europe, set the West increasingly on a confrontational path with Russia. So, you know, there is a track record that these things can go wrong and have a bad outcome. So that's that's my big concern, frankly, about Russian hybrid operations, that they might create a situation which would demand, for those obvious and right righteous reasons, a much more serious response from the West. But it goes the other way.
When Western Ops Create Blowback
MGWhat about Western ones? There's a specific example I mentioned in my recent patrons only questions and answers, so I apologise to my patrons. There will be some overlap in what follows.
The Kaliningrad AI Institute Case Study
MGBut nonetheless, an interesting case study seems to have recently played out over the Russian exclave of Kaliningrad. Something that calls itself the Institute for Deterrent Studies popped up very recently online. A frankly quite dubious outfit. It says that it's a collective of European and Asian military, security policy and defence industry thinkers, but gives no names at all, not even of whoever actually might be running this institute. And they they later said, We've decided to stay anonymous. No nefarious reasons, but our identities are a distraction. What matters is the content of what we're saying, not our names. Well, for a start that is disingenuous, because actually it makes a big difference, frankly, to me, if something is being said by someone whose views I know and re and think is a sort of serious heavy hitter, who clearly has experience, or whether it's a couple of undergraduates. No disrespect intended to undergraduates, but nonetheless, the the the person behind an institution does matter. There's no physical address or email contact. And it you know, they say what matters is the content. Well, the text, frankly, to me, from the beginning, all looked like it had been compiled by AI. And indeed the scholar Pavel Podvig ran it through an AI detection software system and it came up with a 100% match. So it says this is all generated by AI. Now the site seems to be based in Estonia and frankly would have largely probably stayed under the radar had not certain high followership accounts, people who and look, you know, I I think it's clear that they are definitely on the more hawkish end of the spectrum. Edward Lucas's former Estonian Prime Minister Tomas Ilves very approvingly referenced them on social media. Now, so what? What's the big deal? Well look, anyone can call themselves an institute, an academy, or whatever else. And as I told my patrons, I mean I'd love to be able to use this opportunity to sort of get away with calling myself Duke Galliotti or Alt Pope Mark I. But the point is that fine, anyone can generate anything they want. But this is clearly intended to get a rise out of the Russians. The Institute published three pretty dubious scenarios, all of which involve NATO attacks into and or against Russia, launching long-range attacks into Russia, including with Ukrainian capabilities, as the first one. The second was an attack to, quote, establish control over a limited, isolated Russian territorial position in the Gulf of Finland during an acute confrontation. And the third one was seizing Kaliningrad, which, let's be clear, is advocating an operation to invade Russian territory. Now, they claim that they are just exploring possible options to pose strategic dilemmas for Moscow. And look, yes, I can understand there's this the appeal of a sort of how do you like being on the receiving end of this kind of implied threat situation. And frankly, exploring these options does have validity. Again, I'm not saying that there isn't value in thinking about all kinds of options, including ones that at the moment seem over at the loony end, because that's how you consider contingencies, that's how you break out of the shackles of groupthink and so forth. However, these are painfully thin scenarios, as I said, obviously written by AI, presumably just simply generated for a kind of quick and dirty splash. They are not in any way serious explorations of potential strategic options. If this is the best that a collective of European and Asian military security policy and defence industry thinkers can come up with, then we really are in a pretty bad place. Still, it certainly seems that Moscow paid attention and Moscow didn't like it. Now, it may well in fact have been part of the reasoning why Russia released a memo. Technically it's what's called a non-paper, which is a diplomatic term for an informal communication that doesn't constitute a formal policy statement, but nonetheless has come from a government, so you know, frankly, it is an official statement. And in part, as I said, it's also reflected the fact that it came coincidentally or not, with firstly, moves against Kaliningrad also being discussed in a recent British television war game program simulating an attack by by big bad Russia on on Britain. So, you know, striking against Kaliningrad was one of the policy options discussed there. There was more talk in the West that Kaliningrad could in effect become a hostage to Russia, because it is vulnerable, even though, in some ways, this is a microcosm of much Russian, sorry, much Western discussion of Russia, that Russia is regularly posited as being both a terrible, terrible threat to the poor, shivering, quaking West, and at the same time a colossus with feet of clay that any minute now is going to collapse into political or economic chaos. Well, likewise, Kaliningrad is at the one hand being described as this sort of highly militarized threat against Europe, and also that it's virtually undefended. So the idea is that if there was actually a sort of a Russian attack on NATO, God forbid, it could become a vulnerable point whereby it could be seized. And fair enough, in a time of small-scale war, all bets are off. And in fact, the aforementioned Edward Lucas's new Baltic International Security Centre has what's called Kaliningrad 2050, which is a sort of a project in which they say that they are countering Russian propaganda and Western defeatism about the Sualki Gap. And in particular, Suwalki Gap being this the idea of another of these areas where Russia could could sort of strike and basically cut off the Baltic states with a single dramatic move, as if it could launch a single dramatic move like that without its preparations being very, very clearly identified by Western intelligence. Anyway, but particularly they want to note that the Russia's problem in Kaliningrad is far greater. Now they're not actually wrong, by the way, but the point is there just does seem to be a whole collection of moves and discussions about the vulnerability of Kaliningrad coming together. And it is amazing how actually the same names keep cropping up here. In the Times, Lucas wrote that, quote, well, this is a subhead, so I don't know for certain that he wrote it. But anyway, the subhead is Putin's fragile grip on Kaliningrad raises questions for the West about what to do if it collapses. But nonetheless, you know, in his actual text he does say the Kremlin's rule is rigid and brittle. Any crisis in Moscow risks upheaval in Kaliningrad. If the Russian Federation is going to disintegrate, I predict this is where it will start. And look, all of these, one could just simply say, fine, it's individuals expressing their views, which is perfectly true. But remember that the Russians look through information spheres with their own particular prejudices and prisms. Given that the Russian information space is much, much more heavily controlled by the Kremlin and the Presidential Administration, and it's not just direct censorship or directly sort of instructing certain lines. There is this shady tradition of even within business and as well as politics of people ordering the right news stories so that you can amplify your own reputation, blacken arrivals, prepare a target for being raided, you know, basically by being you know being s seized by pseudo-legal means. You know, all of this takes place all the time within the Russian information space. So no wonder the Russians have a tendency to assume that stories are being pushed by states or are in some ways representations of some kind of conspiratorial intent. So it seems I would imagine that at least there are some people in Moscow who are looking at suddenly all this discussion about Kaliningrad, all this suggestion that it's vulnerable, that it could be seized as a means of bringing pressure to bear on Russia, or that somehow it's going to be sort of broken away or break itself away, and assume that there's something going on.
Russia’s Nuclear Warning And Media Panic
MGNow this non-paper that came out, which is then subsequently amplified by in social media posts by the Russian Embassy in London, certainly and may well be others, warns that, quote, Russia will be ready to use the entire arsenal forces and capabilities at its disposal, including nuclear weapons, if NATO try and cut Kaliningrad off from the motherland. If this was actually triggered, even in part by the mythical institute and the rest of the frothing in the press, then the Russians once again demonstrated themselves to be rather thin skinned and all too easy to troll. And I'm sure that if this was the case, and if this is some kind of information operation, whoever was behind it no doubt chortled at their success. But first of all, look, this non-paper is likely to be something of an overreaction. But the wording is not unreasonable. I mean, of course a country is going to resist any efforts to cut off parts of its own territory. And it's in line with the Russian military doctrine that this can entail whatever it means, whatever it means are necessary, up to, but not automatically including nuclear weapons. I mean that's what they're there for, if there is a threat to actual Russian territory. But of course the trouble is by stating this, the Russians generated a new moral panic in the West. Here are a few headlines. Financial Times, Russia makes extreme threats. Against NATO countries over Kaliningrad. They weren't extreme. Reuters. Russia sends nuclear warning to NATO as tensions rise in the Baltic. I mean, are they really rising? The I Paper. Russia sends nuclear warning to NATO as tensions rise in the Baltic. Sounds very similar. So this is the point. There's always going to be an equal and opposite reaction. There's some Newtonian politics in this respect. As Moscow, in Moscow, hawks will use this as an opportunity to posture and preen. When they see what they see as threats coming from the West, they will issue their own counter threats. When the West then sort of gets all up in arms about that, it makes them feel smug and satisfied that they've got us on the run. And of course, to push their own hawkish agendas. You know, one can think about the grandfather of the hawks, the great rock, that's ROC, the huge mythical bird, I should add, not the lump of stone. But anyway, and also, frankly, disgruntled pensioner, Nikolai Patroshev. He held a working meeting with the governor of Kaliningrad, and at the point he said If they even try to take action, there'll be a swift and appropriate response. We've stated this repeatedly, and everything will be put on a completely different plane. If they launch any aggressive military action, they'll regret it. So some people in Moscow are actually really enthused about this. You know, we we have figures like um Karaganov, the academic and general sort of hawk gargoyle, who again uses every opportunity to basically sort of stress that really Russia ought to be just simply launching a nuclear attack on the West because it's somehow this is going to restore deterrence. So hawks love it when we get hawkish and when we seem to be trying to undermine them. Putin, ironically enough, in this respect, actually acted as something of a stabilizing force. Speaking of Valdeim, he said, I think they're expecting this answer from us, i.e., the West of this non-paper, because they'll now pluck it out of the air and abuse it, exploiting this thesis, the thesis that Russia is threatening us with nuclear weapons, to distract their citizens from the fact that they themselves are pursuing an aggressive policy towards Russia, from the fact that they are dragging their citizens to the brink of confrontation. So, in some ways, as I said, this is, by Putin's standards, so accept that caveat, a pretty balanced take. Certainly doesn't suggest that he thinks this is a real flashpoint. He's presenting this essentially just as Western political manipulation of the Western audience to try and keep the Western audience riled up and revved up so that it accepts high levels of military spending and accepts the continued support for Ukraine.
Calming The NATO Attack Narrative
MGMeanwhile, it is actually up to certain figures in the West to try and defuse the situation. And particularly this fear of a wider Russian direct attack. Because the trouble is there have been these recent intelligence assessments saying that the risk has got greater, which I think is unfortunately probably true. But what is not then generally reported is the fact that they also say from a very, very low base. So this is still massively unlikely, but of course, the more the tensions rise, the more we have to be aware of the potential danger. But I have to say, parsing this is so crucial. And certainly kudos to Ambassador Jonathan Sivyov, Secretary General of the Estonian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, who said, I'm pleased to confirm there is absolutely no reason to believe that Russia is imminently going to launch a military attack on NATO, Estonia or the Baltic states. We can see beyond our borders. It is somewhat surprising to find ourselves as representatives of Estonia in a situation where after years of explaining to our Western colleagues that Russia poses a strategic threat, and I assure you it remains a strategic threat because it wants to fundamentally change the way Europe is organized, we now have to tell them, listen, friends, calm down, keep a cool head, and breathe normally. Which is, as I say, admirably balanced. Yes, there is a continuing threat. Yes, it is a long-term threat, not because Russia, as I said, is likely to invade NATO, but because there is that possibility, which is why the West does need, or Europe rather, does indeed need to rearm and just think seriously about its security options. But the kind of overheated conversations that we have, the kind of beliefs that not only is Russia about to attack next Wednesday, but also that it is worth talking up potential threats to Russia, knowing full well that there are Russians who genuinely believe that NATO does have hostile intent, actually is risky because it gives the Hawks further ammunition, it stokes their own fears, and it makes their positions seem more plausible.
Trust, Populists, And The Feedback Loop
MGSo while I can see why people want to strike back, to make Russia feel some of the concern, fear even, expressed within the West, I am worried about this. First of all, it tends to involve lying to the Western public. And that is already problematic, because it's exactly what opens the doors to populists who essentially say the metropolitan elites are just simply trying to lead everyone by the nose and they want to distract us with talk of war while they whatever it is that they fear, whether it's they let all these immigrants in, or they tax our businesses, or they kowtow to big business, or whatever. I mean the populists are on both left and right. But it also provides opportunities for Russian propaganda. The more people feel that their own leaders, their own states are not being candid with them, the more they are willing to believe alternative narratives which can come from Russia, from other countries, from bizarre and hostile political movements, from jihadists, from you name it. We need to actually rebuild trust within our societies, and therefore essentially manipulating our own populations through information operations, even if with a positive intent of trying to make Russia back away or feel concerned or whatever, is dangerous. And secondly, there is this feedback loop of bluster and threat. As I say, I'm I'm sure that the people behind this Institute for Deterrent Studies enjoyed feeling that they had given the Russians a taste of their own medicine, rattled Putin and the like, though, you know, again, as I said, hard to know how far they genuinely, if at all, contributed to the current kerfuffle. And likewise Russian hawks, like the aforementioned malevolent Gargoyle Karaganov, who, let's not forget, recently told the BBC Steve Rosenberg, I criticize my government for not being rough enough. But now we are getting rough enough in Ukraine. You know, these are people who take obvious delight in winding up the West. But in the process, they all contribute to this slow rhetorical escalation, this vicious circle of mutual fear and mistrust, and deliberate cultivation of that fear and distrust, that risks, and I would stress risks, it is, and it is by no means a likelihood at this stage, but still it's a risk, that could one day push this beyond the levels of the rhetorical and into some kind of actual outright action.
How Miscalculation Could Spark War
MGNow, if I had to create a scenario whereby Russia would find itself attacking NATO, it would not be because of Putin's imperial intent. It would not be because he feels that because things have gone so well in Ukraine, why not try the same thing in Poland or wherever else? No. It would be driven by insecurity and miscalculation. It would be driven by that sense of, oh my gosh, we can tell from this that the West genuinely does indeed have hostile intent towards us. If we give them the time to fully arm and prepare themselves and to be able to start the war on their own timetable and terms, then we're going to be in a terrible position. So however risky this might be, we have to strike preemptively in order to derail their own plans. That, if any, and again, please, because I always get after a podcast in which I talk about potential for war between Russia and NATO, I always get some people saying, Oh my god, do you think it's really gonna happen? So let me stress, I still think it is not likely, I'm just simply saying, if it were to happen, I think that's how it happens. And isn't that a heartwarming and uplifting topic? But nonetheless, it is one to which I plan to return at some
Final Thoughts And Sign-Off
MGpoint. But for now, I think I have been miserable, pessimistic, and crabby enough, and therefore will bring this podcast to an end. Thanks as ever for listening. Well, that's the end of another episode of the In Moscow Shadows Podcast. Just as a reminder, beyond this, you can follow my blog, also called In Moscow Shadows. You can follow me on Twitter at MarkGaleotti, all as one, or Facebook, MarkGaleotti on Russia. This podcast is made possible by generous and enlightened patrons, and you too can be one. Just go along to my Patreon page, that's patreon.com slash in Moscow Shadows, and decide which tier you want to join, getting access to exclusive materials and other perks. However, whether or not you contribute, thank you very much indeed for listening. Until next time, keep well.